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Abstract
! In this dissertation I attempt a critical evaluation of identity.  While I see identity, in 
the sense of the social categorization of individuals, as a discourse that perpetuates the 
kind of reduction that impoverishes conceptions of those labeled as “others,” ultimately, 
identity canʼt simply be dismissed.  My analysis begins with Asian American poets who I 
see as challenging the different forms that racism takes across more than a century of 
Asian American writing.  But I go on to suggest that the form these critiques take 
connect them to the work of American poets who outside of race, seek to contest the 
reduction of a sense of the full multiplicity of personhood, that is, they defend a certain 
democratic understand of self.
! The first half of my dissertation consists of two chapters that critique identity by 
appealing to selfhood.  My first chapter reads the work of Walt Whitman and Sadakichi 
Hartmann in the context of Chinese Exclusion.  I argue that Chinese Exclusion results in 
a social death, in that “Oriental” immigrants were defined as not possessing the full 
social existence conferred by legal rights.  Thus I read Hartmannʼs early work as a kind 
of late work; he draws on late Whitman, who he knew.  Both poets focus on the 
fragmentary and personal to object to a presumption that individuals can be known or 
totalized, which therefore also rejects race and identity.  Similarly, my second chapter 
shows that Marianne Moore and José Garcia Villaʼs poetry, directed toward creating 
what I call the “didactic subject,” is meant to challenge the kind of assumptions that 
subsume individuals under categories of identity.  The didactic subject is a form of self 
understood to be self-critical and in process, and thus ethical.  But in the context of US 
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colonization of the Philippines, which took a tutelary form, conceiving the self as 
unfinished risks repeating notions of racial atavism and makes the didactic subject an 
ambivalent, possibly compromised form of critique.
! The two chapters comprising the second half of my dissertation reflect a shift 
away from challenging identity to appropriating it.  My third chapter argues that the 
poetry of David Rafael Wang and Amiri Baraka attempts to naturalize identity to 
personality by invoking intensely subjective experiences, pain and sex, as proof for the 
reality of racial identity.  But since race must be constructed to define selfhood, 
alternative notions of the self have to be disavowed.  My final chapter proposes an 
understanding of identity as multiple, through a critique not just of identity but also the 
self.  In it, I suggest that what Whitman undertakes in 1955, a grounding of identity in 
the multiplicity of simultaneous experience is affirmed in the postmodern poetry of Linh 
Dinh.  Dinhʼs work suggests that the multiplicity of identity canʼt be affirmed, except 
asymptotically, as a horizon.  That model of identity, multiple and never attainable 
describes identityʼs continued significance in understanding not only the social, but the 
personal. 
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Introduction
Identity, Literature, Myth
! This dissertation proposes a relation between Asian American poetry and 
American poetry that is not one of opposition and correction--Asian American poetry is 
not just a condemnation of the American project, at least as I read it through the more 
than one hundred years this project covers.  I do not mean to say that Asian American 
poetry, or more broadly Asian American cultural discourse, doesnʼt address race or 
inequality, it certainly does.  What I do want to argue is that Asian American poetry is 
sympathetic to a strain in American poetry, and American cultural discourse, directed 
toward self-critique.  In fact, it is through what I am here calling “self-critique,” but what I 
mean to develop into a critique of identity itself, that the anti-racist potential of Asian 
American culture emerges.
! My claim that itʼs by refusing identity that Asian American poetry combats racism, 
and that American poetry stemming from Walt Whitman is similarly a refusal of identity, 
might sound wrong in at least two initial ways.  First, even the adjective “Asian 
American” suggests the preeminence of racial identity so that some degree of insisting 
on identity is necessary to justify the category of Asian American poetry.  And then from 
the perspective of American poetry, what Whitman most obviously does is assume a 
bardic role, that is, he asserts his identity as an American in order to sing about 
America.  I mention these objections because I agree with them.  Whitman does indeed 
invoke his status as a “rough.”  But then his point is not that this identity is the ultimate 
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horizon for his entire personhood.  If anything, his objective is expansive; he is not only 
a rough, but also a “kosmos.”  Similarly, the term Asian America was indeed constructed 
to be a political identity in response to the racist pejorative “Oriental.”  But part of the 
corrective reappropriation of race in Asian America is the openness of Asian America as 
a category.  Furthermore, to claim that personhood is totally constrained by racial 
category is obviously the kind of racist reduction Asian American discourse is meant to 
combat.  
! Thus what I attempt in this dissertation cannot be to argue identity out of 
existence, though I am attempting to seriously undermine its preeminence.1  I test the 
concept of identity against a literature of interiority, or more polemically, a literature 
meant to express personhood, and find the strong version of identity we might 
recognize in identity politics, a sense that social identity determines all other aspects of 
a person, to be a historical construct that doesnʼt explain the bulk of a history of Asian 
American race and culture.  Instead, what I show is that a boundary between identity 
and those aspects of personhood that are beyond it is where social discourses like race 
and racialization are constructed and thus can be contested, in a limited way.  Limited 
because the tension between identity and its opposite is not a simple opposition, but 
rather a condition of mutuality, in the manner of poststructuralism, in which any concept 
refers to, and is then dependent upon, its opposite in order to create meaning.  What 
this means is that a sense of identity as a socially coherent form of personhood is both 
necessary to my project and what I denounce as fictional.  
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1 I adapt the phrasing of arguing identity out of existence from Amanda Andersonʼs comments on identity 
politics in The Way We Argue Now (Duke UP: 2006) p. 4.
! This odd dependence on the very thing I am trying to critique creates a situation 
that Roland Barthes describes as a choice which “can bear only on two equally extreme 
methods: either to posit a reality which is entirely permeable to history, and ideologize,” 
to make transhistorical claims, “or conversely, to posit a reality which is ultimately 
impenetrable, irreducible, and, in this case poetize,” (Barthes 158).  Here Barthes has 
phrased the two options as a binary only to comment that what he actually proposes is 
a mixed procedure: “we constantly drift between the object and its demystification, 
powerless to render its wholeness” (159).  And while Barthesʼs tone is almost elegiac, 
what he describes is actually a poststructuralist approach to meaning.  
! My poststructuralist method differs from what Amanda Anderson summarizes as 
a kind of traditional, poststructurally-inflected critique of identity “that advocates the 
subversion of identity by any means possible--the denaturalization of what are 
nonetheless inescapably imposed identities by means of parody, irony, or 
resignification” (Anderson 5).  Instead, what I attempt to demonstrate is more the 
ambivalence of not only enforced, social identities, but also of subversive, resignifying 
identities.2  Furthermore, I contend that my approach is better at enabling anti-racist 
critique.  Why?  Because I seek to complicate what otherwise is an assumed binary 
between the kind of poststructural critique that tries to subvert identity and an opposite 
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2 In making this critique of what I, following Anderson, call resignifying identities, I also follow from Viet 
Thanh Nguyenʼs Race and Resistance: Literature and Politics in Asian America [2002].  Nguyen argues 
that Asian American critics tend to read “not for ideological heterogeneity” but solely for “either resistance 
or accommodation to American racism” (7).  Nguyen is thus implicitly skeptical of claims for resistance, as 
my work is.  But then perhaps an irony in Nguyenʼs book is that though he avows a concern for 
heterogeneous ideologies, his literary criticism ends up defending a recognizably and uniform anti-racist 
perspective, concerned with reading how works respond to racism.  Nguyen is thus dependent on the 
ideological homogeneity he opposes.  My work similarly cannot dismiss anti-racism and must take it as a 
given.  But then I am also trying to demonstrate that racism itself is shifting and uncertain, so that anti-
racism demands a similarly “heterogeneous” response.  
critique to identity, a sense of the universalism of literature, beyond social identity.  
These two approaches are possible in response to what might seem at first like an 
example of an uncomplicatedly multiculturalist work, Li-Young Leeʼs 1986 poetry.  
Poems from this volume have come to be canonized as Asian American poetry in the 
push toward multiculturalism of the 1980s and 1990s; and furthermore, Leeʼs verse 
seems to prove its multiculturalism having been selected for publication by Gerald 
Stern, a Jewish-American poet.  What I want to show by an excursion into Leeʼs poetry 
is how combining these two critical discourses, what we might think of as minority and 
canonical approaches, ultimately challenges what seems to be at stake in both:  identity. 
" In his foreword to Rose (1986), Stern struggles to describe Leeʼs poetry.  He 
writes that itʼs characterized by “a certain humility, a kind of cunning” while itʼs also in 
“pursuit of certain Chinese ideas, or Chinese memories, without any self-conscious 
ethnocentricity” (9).  Who exactly that last clause is meant to differentiate Lee from isnʼt 
specified but what Stern seems to mean is that Lee, despite being multicultural, doesnʼt 
take ethnicity to be the subject of his poetry in a political register, instead, his is an 
ethnicity that is personal, part of memory.  
" Twenty years later, when Xiaojing Zhou, in the first monograph devoted solely to 
Asian American poetry, makes Lee not an apolitical poet, but a poet of alterity, her 
critique reads with the force of an accepted critical model, one that has as its agenda 
not just avowing multiple cultures but arguing for why the multiculturalist perspective 
needs to be promoted.3  Against discourses that claim to know, and thus to control and 
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3 Xiaojing Zhouʼs 2006 The Ethics and Poetics of Alterity in Asian American Poetry is attributed as the first 
scholarly monograph to focus only on Asian American poetry on the bookʼs jacket.  
subjugate minorities, Leeʼs work reveals a resistance to that knowledge, which 
ultimately shows that alterity is outside the signifying practices of dominant culture.  
While not exactly historically contemporaneous, Zhou and Stern see Leeʼs Chineseness 
in surprisingly opposite terms, either as something subordinate to an essentially lyric 
subjectivity of pursuit and loss, or as something that resolutely refuses that tradition.
" What emerges in Leeʼs work, or so I would argue, is actually something between 
Zhou and Stern.  Leeʼs most anthologized poem, “Persimmons,” is from Rose and it 
owes its fame, probably, to the fact that it addresses Chinese American ethnicity, but in 
the form of a gently postmodern lyric.4  Zhou emphasizes the figure of Mrs. Walker, a 
teacher who humiliates the poet for confusing similar-sounding English words, only to 
misrepresent her own faulty knowledge of things Chinese by having the class eat a 
disgusting, unripe persimmon.  Stern doesnʼt single out this poem for comment, but 
since he sees Leeʼs father as the central figure behind the poems in Rose, heʼd 
probably focus not so much on Mrs. Walker, but on the elegiac father, whose old age 
and blindness isnʼt a matter of political alterity.5  
" The poem as a whole alternates between Mrs. Walker and the poetʼs Chinese 
family, except for one awkward stanza, that Zhou, in block quoting the poem, omits.  Itʼs 
the third stanza which doesnʼt at first read as a departure.   In fact, this third stanza, 
which is about sex, follows from the sensual eating of a persimmon in the second:  
“Peel the skin tenderly, not to tear the meat. / Chew the skin, suck it, / and 
5
4 I speculate that “Persimmons” is Leeʼs most anthologized work without concrete statistical numbers, 
though Elizabeth Thomason in her entry on Leeʼs “The Weight of Sweetness” in Poetry for Students also 
makes the unsupported claim that “Persimmons” is his most anthologized poem (Thomason 229).  
5 Stern sees Leeʼs work as ultimately being about  “coming to peace with a powerful, stubborn, remote, 
passionate and loving father” (Rose 9).
swallow” (12-14).  But then while the first stanza is enjambed into the second, so that it 
reads continuously, despite a thematic shift, the second is end-stopped so that the 
thirdʼs opening, “Donna undresses” comes as a break.  
Donna undresses, her stomach is white.
In the yard, dewy and shivering
with crickets, we lie naked,
face-up, face-down.
I teach her Chinese.
Crickets:    chiu chiu.  Dew:    Iʼve forgotten.
Naked:    Iʼve forgotten.
Ni, wo:    you and me.
I part her legs,
remember to tell her
she is beautiful as the moon.  (18-28)
Elements of this stanza repeat the implied trauma of the sixth grade.  Mrs. Walker, 
presumably, is white, just as Donna is, on the thin evidence of name and absence of 
race being explicitly pointed out.  And where initially the speaker is made to “stand in the 
corner / for not knowing the difference / between persimmon and precision” (3-5), the 
content of this third stanza also focuses on language as particular words with their 
foregrounded, specific meanings.  But then for “dew” and “naked” itʼs notable that the 
poet knows only the English words, and not the Chinese.  The repeated “Iʼve forgotten” 
foregrounds that the speaker is an imperfect teacher of Chinese, and ironically, 
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foreshadows Mrs. Walkerʼs botched attempt at a multicultural curriculum, bringing a 
persimmon to class “so everyone could taste / a Chinese apple” (42-43).  
" The subtle parallel between Mrs. Walker and the speaker suggests what should 
be an obvious point, that Chineseness is cultural, and for that reason itʼs experienced 
only indirectly, as something that is mediated through particular experiences, not only 
for Mrs. Walker but also for Li-Young Lee, or anybody.  But then if this parallel does 
seem subtle, the assumption that the speaker and Mrs. Walker must have an inherently 
different experience of Chineseness suggests how race implies identity at some 
presupposed, unarticulated level.  In Racial Formation in the United States, Michael 
Omi and Howard Winant write that racial theory “provides society with ʻcommon senseʼ 
about race, and with categories for the identification of individuals and groups in racial 
terms” (Omi and Winant 11).  It is through race in Omi and Winantʼs sense, as a 
contingent process of assigning individuals to a common sense category, that one 
expects Mrs. Walker to not know about persimmons and Li-Young Lee to know about 
them, even as the poem challenges that division.  
" Denouncing raceʼs apparently natural categorization as constructed, as I argue 
Leeʼs poem does, is something of an expected interpretation.  In Asian American 
studies, David Palumbo-Liu undertakes, in his massive cultural history Asian/American: 
Historical Crossings of a Racial Frontier (1999), a critique of what he calls “the tendency 
to situate too strictly the minor only at the margins of the dominant,” which in 
“Persimmons” would be the assumed separateness, the total opposition between the 
immigrant Chinese-American child and white teacher, an opposition that the poem 
belies (3).  While arguing for a more complex understanding of how the categories of 
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majority and minority actually interrelate, Palumbo-Liu takes care to acknowledge that 
racism has the “effect of marginalizing many Asian populations” (3).  Similarly, in 
Immigrant Acts (1996) Lisa Lowe argues for “replacing notions of ʻidentityʼ with 
multiplicity and shifting the emphasis from cultural ʻessenceʼ to material hybridity” (Lowe 
75).  Thus, for Lowe, something like the forgetful speaker of “Persimmons” shows the 
historical mark of racialization: as opposed to an inexorable Chineseness, the speaker 
shows a history of displacement and its resulting cultural hybridity.  
# One implication of this kind of critique, perhaps more in evidence with Lowe, is 
that what racialization obscures is a historical specificity.  When Lowe argues “that the 
modern nation-state forms abstract citizens for the political sphere, disavowing the 
racialization and gendering of noncitizen labor in the economic space through the 
reproduction of an exclusive notion of national culture,” she implies that the erasure of a 
history of cultural hybridity is part of a deeper mechanism that enables exclusion.  And 
then recovering that erased history would point out the contradiction of an abstract 
citizen--its impossibility.  Thus criticism of race would reveal the inherent injustice of a 
nation-state that does not address itself to the specific conditions that enables its 
privilege.  
# But then if a criticism of race serves this more broad critical project, race 
becomes curiously ambiguous.  On one hand it is false in that it exists to hide the reality 
of exploitation under a simple otherness.  But to make this point is not to say that race is 
not a real difference and we are all just humans.  If anything, it is raceʼs difference, its 
position outside the stateʼs sense of abstract citizenship, that enables that abstraction to 
be denounced, and goes on to make any claim of a universal humanity suspect.  If what 
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we understand to be racial phenotypes donʼt mean what racists say they do, any 
phenotype is potentially symbolic of any trait, which makes abstract citizenship 
impossible since such a concept will require all possible traits to be included, or else 
repeat racismʼs logic.  
" The key to understanding this impasse, or so I would argue, is representation in 
the literary, mimetic sense and particularly the relationship between representation and 
history.  Race itself, as Etienne Balibar argues, is an issue of fabricated 
representations.6  Not only are “somatic or psychological features, both visible and 
invisible” contingent in “creating the fiction of a racial identity,” the very functioning of 
race is also symbolic (Balibar 99).  Balibar characterizes the “symbolic kernel” of race 
as ultimately one of genealogy--which is a word that Balibar uses but then qualifies as 
“the idea that the filiation of individuals transmits from generation to generation a 
substance both biological and spiritual” (100).  Perhaps such a qualification is 
necessary to avoid confusing this neutral, descriptive use of “genealogy” with Michel 
Foucaultʼs use of the term, as more or less the intellectual project of what has become 
New Historicism.7  For Foucault genealogy as a critical practice should be directed 
against a sense of “genealogy.”  Against the idea that in race there are “subtle, singular, 
and subindividual marks” that create race as a category, Foucault contends that the 
9
6 According to Balibar, ethnicity is the fictional construct of a nation.  It is by representing various social 
formations within the nation as ethnicities that the nation then naturalizes a community as the nation.  See 
Balibar 96.  Race is distinct from ethnicity in being an articulation of ethnicity tied to naturalizing social 
differences to physiological differences.  Balibar argues that ethnicity is a fabricated representation, using 
his term “fictive ethnicity,” but given that race is an articulation of ethnicity, race would also be a fabricated 
representation.
7 Foucault writes that contrary to an idea that historical inquiry uncovers truth, truth itself “has had a 
history within history” (Foucault 80).  This understanding that those givens which seem to offer ways to 
evaluate or conceptualize history are themselves historical is the project of genealogy according to 
Foucault.  
assumption of the category confers the meaning onto the traits (81), not in the mode of 
knowledge “slowly detach[ing[ itself from its empirical roots […] to become pure 
speculation” (96), but in “an empty synthesis” that exposes any origin, even the concept 
of origins, as a series of “numberless beginnings” (81).  Thus what race finally 
symbolizes is a kind of ahistorical version of history, an essence as origin that doesnʼt 
change with history, but that a naive non-Foucauldian history seeks to affirm. 
" According to Barthes, “the very principle of myth” is to transform “history into 
nature,” and thus Barthesʼs understanding of myth is also a critique of the symbolizing 
procedure behind race (Barthes 129).  Beginning from the Sausserian sign-signifier-
signified triad, Barthes proposes that myth should be understood as a further 
signification, one that uses the sign itself as a signified, and myth as the second-order 
signifier.  Barthes suggests that just as signified and signifier donʼt have a necessary 
relation in structuralism, the discrepancy between myth and the signs which comprise it 
makes the myth seem to be both a crystallization of history and something apart from, 
and deeper than representation.  One of Barthesʼs sustained examples is a cover 
photograph of an issue of Paris-Match in which “a young Negro in a French uniform is 
saluting, with his eyes uplifted, probably fixed on a fold of the tricolour” (Barthes 116).  
The image is mythic in that it is meaningful at a level beyond the image itself:
I see very well what it signifies to me: that France is a great Empire, that 
all her sons, without any colour discrimination, faithfully serve under her 
flag, and that there is no better answer to the detractors of an alleged 
colonialism than the zeal shown by this Negro in serving his so-called 
oppressors. (116)
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Barthes points out that to read the photograph in this way “one must put the biography 
of the Negro in parentheses” which suggests that in appropriating a sign, myth makes 
use of that signʼs emptiness to construct its second-order significance.  And yet, 
historical contingency, like biography, isnʼt disavowed or negated by myth.  According to 
Barthes what the myth appears to refer to, meaning, works “like an instantaneous 
reserve of history, a tamed richness, which it is possible to call and dismiss in a sort of 
rapid alternation” (118).  Recalling that the naturalness race offers also works in this 
mode of calling and dismissing, we could generalize and say that race is myth.  
" Barthes remarks that contemporary poetry, by which he means nonmetrical 
poetry, “resists myth as much as it can” (133).  This remark is suggestive in considering 
how culture, for this dissertation poetry, might address politics.  In a footnote, Barthes 
defines classical poetry as “a strongly mythical system” in that beyond the poemʼs 
meaning “it imposes […] one extra signified, which is regularity” (133n.10).  The 
classical poem works when there is an “apparent fusion of the two systems,” metrical 
regularity harmonizing with content, in the same way that myth works by appearing to 
naturalize an image with a possibly heterogenous meaning.  But after noting this 
parallelism, Barthes veers off into a side argument:  “It is because of an age-old abuse 
that critics confuse meaning and content.  The language is never anything but a system 
of forms, and the meaning is a form.”  To Barthes, meaning is not content, but form; and 
the comment that language itself is just a system of forms suggests that what Barthes 
calls meaning, which after all is only a form, is really the signified fullness referred to by 
signifiers.  If so, classical poetry is mythic in creating the illusion of an inexorable fit 
between content and meaning, signifier and signified.
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! That Barthes opposes contemporary and classical poetry on the basis of meter 
means that for Barthes, poetry is determined by form.  Implicitly, what we might call 
content, the explicit subject matter of a poem, isnʼt important to Barthes since he goes 
on to characterize the whole of contemporary verse without distinguishing its genres.  
To return for an example to Leeʼs “Persimmons,” one might, following Barthes, expect 
that the difference between “persimmon” and “precision,” the confused words that open 
the poem, is not a real difference, especially since, as V. Nicholas LoLordo points out, 
these words are metrically identical.   And while the poemʼs ostensible content invites us 
to see persimmons and precision as requiring if not differentiation than at least 
discernment, after all Mrs. Walker chooses a persimmon without precision and thereby 
exposes her cultural arrogance, the poemʼs form proceeds by a series of substitutions 
that repeat the accidental connection of persimmon and precision, which then turns into 
an associational connection: “How to choose / persimmons.  This is precision” (6-7).  
Thus, the sensual eating of a persimmon turns into a sensual encounter of language 
learning, that in turn, goes back to other confused words of childhood, and so on.  The 
point of these transitions, which when read analytically are arbitrary, is very much in 
keeping with how Barthes characterizes free verse poetry:  “it tries to transform the sign 
back into meaning: its ideal, ultimately, would be to reach not the meaning of words, but 
the meaning of things themselves” (Barthes 133).  Lee emphasizes the emptiness of 
signs, their ability to be appropriated, but his point, at the level of form, is the deeper 
logic of association beneath what is externalized in signs.  Thus when Stern 
characterizes the mythical quality in Leeʼs verse as one that has as its archetype a 
search, we can see that the mythical transformation, its significance, is not externalized 
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as in Barthesʼ account of classical poetry, but takes place at what appears to be the 
psychological depth of the poetic consciousness, the subconsciousness below 
language. 
" Leeʼs work then is not about alterity nor about universalism, the two alternatives 
with which I opened this discussion, but more about the signifiedʼs priority over the 
signifier, and a sense of a signʼs lack, to lapse into structuralist jargon.  What 
“Persimmons” foregrounds is an unknowableness that runs through the logic of the 
poem and belies both the confessional and the political.  The poem preserves this 
irresolution because of its form, its associational slippages, which after all is an open 
form, nonmetrical, and thus indeterminate.  It is actually the openness of form which 
defines contemporary verse according to Barthes: the “open-work structure of the 
concept is […] maximally exploited” in poetry, meaning that the sense of a signʼs 
signified overtakes the signifier (133).  And though describing poetry in this way, Barthes 
seems like he doesnʼt care about the inevitable materiality of actual poems, his final 
point is not that contemporary poetry is actually an “anti-language” directed toward 
meanings instead of signs, but that the whole of poetry and its ostensibly authentic 
essence are themselves a form of myth, a way to “signify poetry” (134).  
" Myth, if it falsely naturalizes meanings which arenʼt natural, seems as though it 
should be the object of critique, and exposed as false.  But then such exposure, insofar 
as it presupposes another truth, would itself be mythologizing.  This kind of impasse 
suggests why poetry as myth, even as “counter-myth,” is at best a mixed response that 
to some extent perpetuates the symbolic logic behind racism.  Such mixture isnʼt 
because poetry inherently acquiesces to racism--a reading that is tempting if we accept 
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Barthesʼs observation that poetry is all the more mythic for trying to resist it--but 
because conceiving of a social relation totally pure of racism is ironically the kind of 
symbolization of unpolluted essences that racism is a product of.  
" The critical work that I propose for opposing racism, and attempt in this 
dissertation, is one that ambivalently embraces both the limited, historical attempts to 
rewrite race that poets historically engage in, and the broad vision of a transcendence of 
race that is the underlying rationale for their projects, and I see in this logical 
inconsistency a necessarily open approach to identity, which in the end connects 
canonical and Asian American poets.  In fact, pursuing this inconsistency justifies what 
might otherwise seem like an accident of scholarship, my focus on the post-Whitman 
American lyric.  
" As Simon During describes it, Foucault uses the concept of genealogy to 
“reintroduce memory and purpose into his own work,” which is to say that Foucaultʼs 
analysis of discourses leads to the same kind of impasse as myth criticism (During 125). 
Foucaultʼs work, too, is split between “organizing its analysis in terms of discourseʼs 
ʻrules of formationʼ and providing a neutral and true description of statements” (During 
125).  His turn toward genealogy is an attempt to put whatʼs ostensibly above history, 
such as the rules history traces, into history.  Thus Foucault writes: “The traditional 
devices for constructing a comprehensive view of history and for retracing the past as a 
patient and continuous development must be systematically dismantled” (Foucault 88).  
" In Our Last First Poets: Vision and History in Contemporary American Poetry, 
Cary Nelson attempts a genealogical account of Vietnam War poetry in arguing that the 
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two modes most obvious modes of working with the historical trauma of Vietnam in 
verse, direct address and lyric transcendence both fail to be adequately historical, and 
that these attempts generally are also versions of rewriting Walt Whitmanʼs poetic 
project: the creation of a poetry that is simultaneously intimate and a form of public 
address.  But then in Whitmanʼs own work, a public and private poetics is only achieved 
in his Civil War writings; which means that itʼs not so much through the assertive force 
of the great poet that the nation affirms its poetical nature, but through historical 
violence.  
  " American poetryʼs myth is not that it isnʼt political, but that it is.  Derived from 
Whitman, a particularly American free verse is about an open, innocent nation that 
redeems itself through individual utterance and thus what seems personal is really an 
affirmation of the person in democracy.  Nelson writes that “part of the American poetic 
myth” is that the “poetʼs individual, sacrificial speaking revitalizes all our 
language” (Nelson 4).  But then such revitalization invokes the kind of origin that 
genealogy has to disavow, what Nelson in the context of Vietnam calls “an impossible 
origin before the newspaper body counts were read.”  Thus, a sense that literature can 
be what Barthes calls an “anti-language,” the essences that arenʼt representative but 
intuitive, becomes a way to prevent language from degenerating into cynicism.  But only 
because literature read in this way disavows history.  
" If we accept that American poetry constructs a sense of individuality that freights 
the individual with democratic significance, a dream of openness writ large that still is 
personal, we can see the politics that underlie this type of poetry in two ways.  One, that 
whatever political context informs the poem, that context can be transcended and 
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redeemed through the sacrificial utterance Nelson describes above; an imperfect 
example would be how the racism implicit in Mrs. Walkerʼs treatment of the poet as a 
child is wryly deflated by the poemʼs ability to accept Mrs. Walker in her flaws, through 
memory.  The second version of the deep politics in American free verse would be 
something more exhortatory; and for an example weʼd probably have to look not in 
Leeʼs work, but at someone like Marilyn Chin.  In her poem “How I Got that Name (an 
essay on assimilation)” (1994), Chin makes sardonic comments that use Asian 
American stereotypes to stoke outrage. 
Oh, how trustworthy our daughters,
how thrifty our sons!
How we've managed to fool the experts
in education, statistic and demography—
We're not very creative but not adverse to rote-learning.
Indeed, they can use us. (36-41)
What makes Chinʼs poem both attractive and surprisingly similar to Leeʼs is that her 
poemʼs rhetoric masters the same intractable history of racism that Leeʼs does, but 
through an exhortatory mode.8  Chinʼs use of the plural first person, which she only uses 
in the second stanza of “How I Got that Name,” clearly refers to Asian Americans, 
especially in contrast to the “they” who “can use us” (41).  In this distinction, Chin is 
recognizably political in that her use of pronouns proposes modes of identification that 
respond to a particular social formation for the purposes of correcting the relation, 
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8 In characterizing these two responses to the problem of the political imbrication of the literary, I follow 
Nelsonʼs reading of two apparently opposite Vietnam war poems, James Wrightʼs “A Mad Fight Song for 
William S. Carpenter, 1966” and George Hitchcockʼs “Scattering Flowers.”  See Our Last First Poets pp. 
4-9.
implicitly unjust, between they who use, and we who are used.  But then the poem is 
actually just too weird to be simply political in this way.  While maintaining use of “we,” 
the stanza ends in what seems to be a cultural--not specifically racial--critique.
History has turned its stomach
on a black polluted beach—
where life doesn't hinge
on that red, red wheelbarrow,
but whether or not our new lover
in the final episode of “Santa Barbara”
will lean over a scented candle
and call us a “bitch.”
Oh God, where have we gone wrong?
We have no inner resources! (48-57)
Itʼs clear that by the end of this stanza, “we” somehow encompasses something other 
than the model minority.9  The very clunkiness of the plural first person, when it really 
should be the singular, in phrases like “our new lover,” “call us a ʻbitch,ʼ” raise what 
might well be the hidden, but central concern in this stanza, a relationship of 
vicariousness and desire that underlies the interpersonal, and complicates it.  
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9 This later part of the stanza makes a number of interesting comments.  For one, Chin explicitly refers to 
history turning with the effect that life doesnʼt depend on William Carlos Williamʼs red wheelbarrow, but on 
the outcome of a TV show, and that this substitution is wrong, and a reflection of our interiority.  But then 
ironically, Chin herself follows Williams in her progressively more minute descriptions; it is not just the 
show Santa Barbara, but its last episode, and not any candle, but a scented one (though scent is not 
perceptible through TV), and what our lover does is also detailed down to a quotation.  So then the formal 
method opposes the explicit content, at the level of its construction, the poem suggests that the modernist 
lyric is also beyond the turnings of history. 
! The very triviality which ends this stanza, as opposed to the politically serious 
“message” of the first part, is pointedly empty.  But then that emptiness is bemoaned 
and grieved in the last lines, thereby invoking something beyond the vacant culture that 
supposedly is what historically determines life.  In fact, the disavowal of meaning in 
being called a bitch in Santa Barbara, is actually an appeal to truth, to faith that 
language articulates meaning, for the sole reason that it isnʼt actual silence.  But while 
language presupposes at least the possibility of audience and thus meaning, it also 
exists as something exterior to our deep intentions; it is, after all, something we learn to 
use and donʼt invent.  
! Language itself has the kind of ambivalence that Chinʼs poem suggests, between 
affirmation and negation, and in this, Chin strikes an inescapably Whitmanian chord.  
Whitman, after all, is the poet of encompassing catalogues that are both personal and 
not personal enough; for that reason, Whitmanʼs work straddles a demarcation between 
personal and political writing, in the way that with Chin we see the plural pronoun shift 
from one of political address to awkward interiority.  In fact, according to Nelson, 
American poetryʼs genealogy itself bears this kind of dilemma, between speaking for a 
nation, and undermining itself in an affirmation of openness.
! In what follows I critique identity as unreal and incomplete, with the intent not to 
debunk it, but to show that the power of identity comes from what seems like it should 
be identityʼs weakness: that as a concept, identity is always outstripped compared to 
something like personhood.  In fact, to assume that an entire self is determined by 
identity is perhaps the simplest kind of racism, the kind empirically refuted but 
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ideologically insisted on.10  But more to my point, what the relationship between 
selfhood or personhood and identity shows is that a kind of symbolism is at the heart of 
any invocation of identity.  The relatively impoverished concept of identity refers to some 
element of personhood; and this reduction, or signification if identity is the signifier and 
personhood the signified, is why the logic of identity canʼt help but perpetuate race, and 
then serves to enable racism.   
" I begin in a moment in which the unreal or symbolic aspect of racism was 
retrospectively obvious, the period around the Chinese Exclusion Act.  Whatʼs striking 
about this law is not only that it connects race to immigration for the first time but that it 
does so in the absence of a significant national Chinese immigrant population.  Oddly, 
this groundbreaking piece of legislation, with its discursive break from previous 
immigration laws that didnʼt specify race, is based not on the presence of actual bodies 
but what the possibility of migration means--that is to say, the law is directed toward a 
symbol. 
" What does Chinese Exclusion actually symbolize?  I suggest that its context in 
the wake of the Civil War is decisive.  In its barest terms, the Civil War showed that the 
nation could be fractured in response to a problem of racial otherness manifest in 
slavery.  Tellingly, much of the anti-Chinese rhetoric focused on inflated accounts of the 
coolie trade.  Thus an eminent figure like Ulysses S. Grant who initially opposed race-
19
10 The kind of racism I have in mind would be captured in a statement like “all Samoans are smelly.”  I 
take this example from an episode of Saturday Night Live that I watched some time in the 1990s.  The 
skit, as I remember it, consisted of some famous African American who had lately made a racially-
charged remark, obviously I forgotten exactly who, and while apologizing for that remark and other 
remarks, this celebrity consistently brings up his hatred for smelly Samoans. But while I am claiming that 
this is the simplest kind of racism, this type of racism also has its own complexities.  For example, if 
someone did hold the belief that all Samoans were smelly, simply having him or her meet a Samoan 
without body odor would not be enough to change his or her initial racism.  Racists see a deeper cause 
that affirms their racist idea.  Slavoj Žižekʼs remarks on antisemitism make a similar point.  
based immigration policy came to embrace it under an opposition to slavery, which 
came to be conflated with Chinese migration.11  As an echo of slavery, what Chinese 
Exclusion comes to represent is the destruction of national identity into a competing 
regional sense of identity.  Thus that conceptions of the nation, articulated in 
immigration policy, take the form of specifying which races are barred answers a 
specifically historical trauma, that of disunion and slavery.
! My first chapter, “Late Style and the Critique of Identity: Late Whitman and Early 
Sadakichi Hartmann,” takes the connection of Chinese Exclusion to slavery to argue 
that one major cultural effect of Chinese Exclusion was the consigning of “Orientals,” 
after all the immediate aftermath of the successful Chinese Exclusion Act was the 
immediate targeting of Japanese immigrants, to a kind of social death.  I appropriate the 
term social death from the work of Orlando Patterson whose comparative history of 
slavery suggests that the slaveʼs deprivation of belonging “in his own right to any 
legitimate social order” means that the slave doesnʼt have a social existence, except 
through his or her master (Patterson 5).  While the restriction of immigration is not 
slavery, it did establish Chinese immigrants as categorically illegal.  This categorization 
creates what Mae M. Ngai calls an “impossible subject,” a subject “whose inclusion 
within the nation was simultaneously a social reality and a legal impossibility” (Ngai 5, 
4).  
! The prevailing theme of Hartmannʼs early poetry as I read it is not directly politics 
nor race, but negativity, invoked through a form of aestheticism drawn from both 
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11 In an 1879 visit to China, Ulysses Grant himself goes on record opposing Chinese immigration because 
“they….do not come of their own free will….Their labor is not their own, but the property of 
capitalists” (qtd in Gyory 186).
Whitman and European Symbolists.  Hartmann favors intense subjects, sexuality and 
death, but more than that, the impasses and failures of his poems show that sexuality 
and death are in some way unrepresentable, constitutively absent for Hartmann.  At the 
same time, Hartmann attempts to write a poetry directed at the self at its most intense 
and indescribable, a self that is not a consistent social agent, but a fragmentary, partly 
absent paradox.  Understanding selfhood as something knowable only in heightened 
situations, and for that reason only fleetingly present, emphasizes selfhoodʼs absence, 
its impossibility.  That Hartmannʼs work has this perspective makes it sound curiously 
like late work, artistic expression directed toward death.  But then for Hartmann, it isnʼt a 
biological death that his work addresses, but a social death.  What Orlando Patterson 
described as the condition of sociality for slaves:  unable to ““in his own right to any 
legitimate social order,” the slaveʼs public existence is denied in itself and only exists 
through his or her master (Patterson 5).  A kind of disavowed existence persists in 
slavery according to Patterson.  And while the restriction of immigration is not slavery, it 
did establish Chinese immigrants as categorically illegal.  This categorization creates 
what Mae M. Ngai calls an “impossible subject,” a subject “whose inclusion within the 
nation was simultaneously a social reality and a legal impossibility” (Ngai 5, 4).  
" Late style, in the manner that Edward Said sought to emphasize it, describes on 
one level the manner that the body is always implicated in cultural production, that the 
broad dimensions of personal life situate a work into clichés of timeliness: in youth 
origins are created; after youth works address narratives of growth and fulfillment, and 
finally late works address death.  And at this superficial level, Hartmannʼs early work 
and Whitmanʼs late work would have nothing to do with each other.  But for Said, truly 
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challenging late work is not a completion of these initial moments of creation, but more 
like their negation.  Using Theodor Adornoʼs reading of Beethoven as an example, Said 
writes that late Beethoven, and I argue the late Whitman as well, saw his early work--
Said describes it as “vigorous and organically whole” (10)--as an impossibility.  Instead, 
synthesis itself comes to be seen as “the vestige of an individual human subject sorely 
aware of the wholeness, and consequently the survival, that has eluded it 
forever” (Rose Subotnik qtd in Said 11).  In other words, late work marks the profound 
humbling of an art that was directed toward universality or wholeness.  
" Whitmanʼs sense of his early workʼs unfulfilled status can be gleaned from his 
late life assessment of it.  Whitman comments “I sometimes think the Leaves is only a 
language experiment” (qtd in Matthiessen 517).  This quotation might be just one of any 
number of suspect authorial comments except that in establishing Whitmanʼs canonicity, 
F. O. Matthiessen leans heavily on this characterization to make Whitman a kind of 
modernist.12  But then such an assessment stands in stark contradiction to what in 1855 
is pointedly not a noncommittal project of experiment, but a poetry directed at 
immortality--after all, the “greatest poet” must open “the eternity which gives similitude 
to all periods and locations and processes and animate and inanimate forms, and which 
is the bond of time” (LG 23).  That such an ambitious statement turns into “only” an 
experiment indicates Whitmanʼs late style: a sense of individual limitation, a refusal of 
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12 Matthiessen reads Whitman as a kind of modernist, whose work is not formless, but actually highly 
formal in that the poemʼs use of language is both what determines the poemʼs overt content, and reveals 
what is paradigmatically American about Whitman.  Matthiessen even reads Whitmanʼs approach to 
language, that it is not “ʻan abstract constructionʼ made by the learned” but that words were “the product 
of human events and customs, the progeny of folkways,” as being against the grain of nineteenth century 
conceptions of language, which tended to divorce mind from body, and therefore see language as not 
materially-determined (Matthiessen 517, 518).
transfiguration.13  In Whitman, this realization takes the form not only of comments that 
distance him from the polemics of 1855, but also his late poetry, which even he 
characterizes as “little tags and fringe-dots (maybe specks, stains)” (LG 637). 
! Whitmanʼs late work therefore repudiates the ambitions of his early work and in 
so doing challenges the synthetic imagination of that earlier work.  All periods and 
locations and time itself are not finally subordinated to poetic speaking.  Instead, to late 
Whitman such utterances are just not possible.  In the late poem “Good-Bye my Fancy,” 
death is not part of a mystical whole, but rather a fragmenting silence, as opposed to 
something like “Song of Myself” which famously proclaimed it just as lucky to live as to 
die, as though life and death could be equally made present.  Adorno notes that “The 
power of subjectivity in the late works of art is the irascible gesture with which it”--
subjectivity--“takes leave of the works themselves” (qtd in Said 10).  Furthermore, 
“Touched by death, the hand of the master sets free the masses of material that he 
used to form; its tears and fissures, witnesses to the finite powerlessness of the I 
confronted with Being, are its final work.”  We might then generalize that what ultimately  
characterizes late work is this engagement with a disabling negativity of such scale, 
connected not to the “I” but to what overwhelms and exceeds it, that no pretense of 
overcoming it is convincing.  Thus, something like identity in both race, as in Hartmann, 
and cultural-nationalism, as in early Whitman, can only be regarded as failures and 
incompletions, not as something to be strongly or convincingly avowed.  !
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13 This late Whitman, who registers his own failures, is not the monumental figure of American open form 
poetry; instead, in Nelsonʼs analysis, twentieth century poets have had to rediscover Whitmanʼs failure in 
their own work, to a similar refusal of transfiguration and affirmation.
! Whitman and Hartmannʼs refusal of identity appeals to personality, and this sort 
of intervention opposes the logic of Chinese Exclusion, what I argue is an attempt to 
deny personhood by using identity to connect race and nation.  Restricting immigration 
is a solution to racial division because it deflects that division to a border beyond the 
nation.  But this sort of deflection only defers the problem of race and identity, which 
resurfaces in a transnational context.  
! For the American context I examine, the transnational dimension of race is 
obvious in the colonization of the Philippines.  But I read this colonization as a 
transformed colonialism, a colonialism meant to address anticolonialism.  Considering 
that the originary mythology of the US is itself based on an anticolonial struggle, it 
becomes less paradoxical to characterize US colonialism as a colonialism justified by its 
own critique.  This new colonialism differs from an older version in a shift from a rhetoric 
of civilization to one of education, meaning that the colonial subject was enjoined not to 
become American, but to see him or herself as the subject of an educational process 
that affirms his or her own Filipinoness (ironically defined by US policy and rule).  
According to Julian Go the educated self relates to the stated goal of US colonialism, 
which is the surpassing of colonialism itself in political independence, by making 
government “parallel with individual self-government […] Power had to circulate in and 
through sovereign individuals, rather than being imposed upon them” (Go 43).  And as 
Meg Wesling points out, part of the ideology of American education was that a nationʼs 
distinct character should be learned as moral instruction (Wesling 44).  So then Filipinos 
were asked not only to hold US values, but to hold those values to the extent that theyʼd 
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articulate their own Filipino-ness in the terms of an American discourse of educational 
self-fashioning.  
! Thus another form of identity emerges, which like an anticolonial colonialism, is 
enabled by its own critique.  Identity, at least for Filipinos under colonization, becomes 
not simply what one is, but rather what one must be made into through education.  This 
version of identity is what I read Marianne Moore and José Garcia Villa as challenging 
in the textual form of their impersonal poetry in my second chapter.  Thus “Textual 
Ethics and the Didactic Subject” reads the idiosyncratic religious poetry of Villa as a 
challenge to identity under tutelary colonialism in that Villa takes the truth of identity not 
to be its eventual attainment, but its defining inability to be attained.  In this, as Moore 
notes in a review of Villa, Villa strikes an ironically deep American chord, that of 
Puritanism, which Moore sees a repudiation of the kind of Americanness that would 
claim to know what is right to do, in other words, the kind of Americanness that can 
engage in a colonialism that appropriates anticolonialism.  
! If Villa takes the logic of tutelary colonialism not to its ideological stopping point 
but to its logical end, Moore can be said to do a similar thing in her didactic poems of 
the 1940s.  For both poets, these similar projects require a conception of the poem less 
as something to be interpreted, in that interpretation requires the poem to be explained 
in some other discourse, and thus implicitly denies the unending metaphysical 
emptiness both poets are interested in--Villa explicitly in his religious poetry, Moore in 
her project of didacticism in which modernist impersonality becomes self-critique.  Thus 
Villa and Moore can both be thought of as taking up what Robert Kern describes as the 
project of high modernism, creating a literary “style concerned with presentation rather 
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than interpretation, so that reading might become seeing, or direct encounter, and 
language might become reality, pure experience” (Kern 5).  I finally argue that what is 
superficial to both Villa and Moore, their poemʼs odd textual styles, should be seen as 
central to their joint ethical concern: to oppose exploitation by insisting on the 
unknowability of selves.
" In the first half of this dissertation, identity is a presumed relation to power that is 
withheld from minorities and its critique emerges as attempts to point out identityʼs lack, 
first by invoking the self, then by embracing negativity.  In the second half of the 
dissertation, we notice a drastic shift.  Identity is no longer associated with hegemonic 
power, but with specific social positions.  In other words, identity politics emerges.  I 
argue that we should understand this change as the audacious project that ethnic 
politics attempted in the 1960s and 1970s:  the appropriation of racist discourse to 
oppose racism, an obvious example of which is the construction of Asian American 
panethnicity from the racist pejorative “Oriental.”  
" To make a racist reduction of diversity into otherness a positive ground for 
identification works only through a radical critique of racism: a demonstration that racist 
discourse can be appropriated.  But that critique means that even in its affirming mode, 
identity is not the natural category racism, or even anti-racism assumes.  In my third 
chapter, I argue that itʼs this crisis of meaning that the ethnic poetry of the 1960s and 
1970s addresses.  “Pain, Sex and the Reality of Ethnic Nationalism: Amiri Baraka and 
David Rafael Wang” suggests that more than just subordinate poetry to politics, Baraka 
and Wang attempt something more ambitious.  Their work recognizes that a politics of 
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identity is fragile because identity is so immaterial.  That immateriality needs to be made 
material, and Baraka and Wang attempt this through pain and sex.
! I argue that Barakaʼs poetry of the sixties is not just incidentally violent; violence 
is central to what he attempts.  Like Moore and Villa, Baraka attempts to give a poem 
immediacy, through the special province of literature, the imagination.  For Baraka the 
imagination becomes the way that an immaterial identity can be realized because it is 
through the imagination that unreal sensations are made present.  But then for the 
imagination to operate in this way, not to just be fanciful, its sensory aspect must be 
stressed.  I follow Elaine Scarryʼs argument on pain in describing pain as sensation 
without object, Scarry points out how hard it is to describe what pain feels like, which 
then makes violence a way to imagine sensation through the very thing that most 
affirms reality--our personal immersion in the world of sense.  
! Wang deliberately imitates Baraka and claims him as an influence, and they both 
share the problem of making identity real.  Wangʼs bisexual pornographic work 
supplements Barakaʼs violence in its account of identification.  In Wangʼs poetry, sexual 
desire is contradictory, a wanting to have but also a wanting to give up that shows 
identity to be fluid.  But then Wangʼs attempt at explicitness, I argue that he tries to 
convert sex from intimate relation to external object, is an attempt to limit the potential of 
personal interiority to challenge identity.  After all, in creating a sexual response from an 
external source, what pornography shows is the derivativeness of something that might 
otherwise be taken to be intrinsically personal--sexuality.
! The attempt at appropriating identity that I see Baraka and Wang as exemplifying 
nonetheless does finally fail to avoid the problem with identityʼs symbolic logic, that it 
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requires exclusion.  Thus the initial embrace of identity in ethnic nationalism canʼt 
overcome identityʼs constitutive ambivalence.  In my final chapter, “Postmodern 
American Ethnicity: Linh Dinh with Walt Whitman,” I propose a concept for 
understanding identity as both impossible and necessary.  I adapt Gilles Deleuzeʼs 
theory of a body without organs to propose an Americanness without organs, which I 
demonstrate through a reading of Whitmanʼs ideal of Americanness, evident in his 1855 
Leaves of Grass, read with the contemporary work of poet and blogger Linh Dinh, 
whose work takes up Whitmanʼs project.  
" What Whitman proposes that Dinhʼs work also suggests is an account of identity 
not as an abstract unity, but as a shifting multiplicity.  This key revision to the notion of 
identity at first seems like it would lack a basis in what defines identity, similarity-- 
consider the closeness of the words identity and identical.  But what emerges from 
Whitman is an understanding that an identity based on multiplicity is actually an identity 
based on the immediacy of experience, specifically on temporality.  After all, time 
presents a model in which unity is not made at the expense of richness; a single 
moment connects and holds a bewildering diversity--as Whitmanʼs paratactic poetic 
technique suggests.
" But then Whitman, and the Whitmanian tradition of poetry that this dissertation 
examines, is not just about the multiplicity of experience, but also about transcendence.  
The critique I have so far offered of identity is a version of this tension insofar as identity 
is also torn between what we experience as selfhood, and what that experience means 
at a larger scale, although multiplicity changes the terms of this ambivalence.  Dinhʼs 
work, though not stylistically similar to Whitman, nonetheless is similar in its immediacy 
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and multiplicity.  But the key difference is that for Dinh transcendence is finally not 
possible.  Instead, if we experience the self as multiplicity, we are always in process, 
engaged in a kind of continuing self-fashioning.  That context makes identity not a 
consistent, unvarying concept, but a shifting provisional adaptation of competing 
identifications.  Thus I propose that the Body without Organs provides an analytic for 
understanding dispersed identity in Dinh, and also a way to conceptualize identity 
without having to decide between exclusion and dissent.  
! Lastly, my dissertation ends with a conclusion in which I consider Theresa Hak 
Kyung Chaʼs Dictee, a text that Lowe sees as a repudiation to an aesthetic of narrativity 
and realism that instead exemplifies “an aesthetic of fragmented recitation and episodic 
nonidentity.”  But rather than see Dictee under the analytic of a challenge to identity, the 
mode that the first half of my dissertation is in and thus a reading of Dictee I am 
ultimately in support of, I want to suggest that Dictee also presents a version of identity 
that reading the text as disjointed does not show.  If we read what seem to be narrative 
disjunctures not under the assumption of narrativity, but of lyricism, what emerges is a 
text marked less by fragments than by moments of poetic closure.  What this series of 
closures suggests, I argue, is something like an “identity without organs.”  Thus I 
conclude by applying the analytic my dissertation culminates in to a text made canonical 
through its embrace by ethnic studies critics.  
! The stakes of my project are ultimately related to the problem of racism in that 
identity constitutes raceʼs underlying logic.  Balibar comments “racism is not receding, 
but progressing in the contemporary world” (Balibar 9, original emphasis).  This claim is 
all the more provocative since he writes it with the understanding that our concept of 
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racism comes from the Holocaust and  slavery, and therefore he implies that now, we 
face a racism that is worse in that it is more widespread and more dispersed.  
Understanding the labile quality of identity as what enables racismʼs dispersed, mutating 
character suggests the difficulty of, on one hand, opposing racism, but also the 
inevitable challenge to racism built into the instability that all identity bears, compared  
to something sometimes thought to be universal, though by no means uniform: 
selfhood.  
"
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Chapter 1
Late Style and a Critique of Identity:  Late Whitman and Early Sadakichi Hartmann
! That Sadakichi Hartmann is a marginal figure, not widely studied and not recently 
published on,1 is something of a surprise since in terms of dates of active writing, he is 
among the first American of Asian descent writing, definitely the first publishing poetry.2  
Moreover, he was decidedly not an unknown figure in the sphere of his literary culture at 
large.  He had personal relationships with Walt Whitman, Stéphane Mallarmé, Paul 
Heyse among others in the 19th century, and Ezra Pound and George Santayana both 
admired his work in the 20th.  By the 1920s he was involved in Hollywood, playing the 
role of the court magician in Douglas Fairbanksʼ The Thief of Baghdad (1924).  And 
finally, his friendship with the John Barrymore, W. C. Fields circle in the 1930s was 
made into a bestselling memoir, Gene Fowlerʼs 1954 Minutes of the Last Meeting.  
! Retrospectively, perhaps the area Hartmann found the greatest success in was 
art criticism, and Jane Calhoun Weaverʼs book, Sadakichi Hartmann Critical Modernist: 
Collected Art Writings (1991), attempts to draw attention to his once prominent criticism, 
but as Weaver notes, “the period of Hartmannʼs greatest activity [1890-1915] has not 
yet attracted great scholarly interest among art historians” (1) and Hartmannʼs histories 
of various artists are sometimes marred by plagiarism (18).  Nonetheless, that 
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1 According to the MLA International Bibliography, the last English language journal article published on 
Hartmann appeared in 1980.  
2 Yone Noguchi, another early Japanese American poet, first published in 1895 in the journal The Lark, 
(The Lark 1:1, May 1 1895) while Hartmannʼs first publication was a broadsheet poem “To America” from 
1886 according to a biographical synopsis in Hartmannʼ
Hartmannʼs art criticism was well known suggests that his aesthetic pronouncements 
might recover a particular strand of early Asian American artistic practice.  
" One example of Hartmannʼs art criticism, an 1894 essay on American art, builds 
to intense praise for Whitman, even mimicking Whitmanesque parallel clauses:
If you are a realist read W. Whitman, that great democratic spirit, who had 
all the universe for his country, whose muse embraced our republic in 
rugged, rhapsodic lines, who related the most minute peculiarities of life 
and soared to the most sublime regions of the spirit. Never did the New 
World produce a poet so independent and individual.  He knew but little of 
the refinement and technicalities of art, he did not believe in abstract 
beauty, but every page of “Leaves of Grass” and “Specimen Days,” 
contains innumerous inspirations ready to burst their bounds and overflow 
imagination.  The sooner Walt Whitman becomes a household book in 
every artistic family, the better for our American art.  (73)
The logic of his argument shows a looseness thatʼs characteristic of Hartmannʼs 
criticism, moving from Whitman as an inspiration to realists to a paradoxical assertion 
that though Whitman isnʼt directly useful for artists, he could be an inspiration to “every” 
young artist.  But then even as Hartmannʼs prose wanders in loose associational half 
connections, he insistently asserts Whitmanʼs transcendence.  Whitman records “the 
most minute peculiarities of life” but whatʼs significant is not these details but that by 
evoking emotion from the mundane, Whitmanʼs poetry inspires artists to “burst their 
bounds and overflow imagination.”  Hartmann is obviously trying to be ruggedly 
rhapsodic himself in this kind of statement, but if so, his point is only that much more 
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emphatic:  why Whitman is important is that his work surpasses the bounds of the self, 
even outstripping that privileged romantic faculty, the imagination.
! Hartmannʼs pronouncement might well seem to not say very much.  His comment 
suggests what Robert Pinsky calls “the romantic persistence,” a long continuity of 
seeing the figure of poet in terms similar to how Hartmann sees Whitman.  “The 
romantic poet is attracted through intense perception, to dimness.  The more actively he 
perceives the natural world he loves, the more alienated he is from it, for its quality is to 
perceive nothingness” (Pinsky 49).  Pinskyʼs point is not so much historical, but 
thematic, and thus general.  And thematically, not only Whitman, but Hartmannʼs own 
work can be seen as “romantic.”  However, my point is not simply to put Hartmann into a 
general category of poets who can be said to use a romantic style, broadly conceived.  
Instead I attempt to read Hartmannʼs style into his historical circumstance.  I argue that 
his particular attraction to alienation, negativity and intense perception is an 
appropriation of romanticism that should be understood through history, specifically as a 
cultural response to the discourse of Chinese Exclusion.  
! The first step to understanding Hartmannʼs pseudo-romanticism, and his 
connection to Whitman, would be to understand his conception of nationality.  
Nationality, as Mae M. Ngai observes, will eventually become the preeminent context to 
understand not only territories and people, but the notion of rights themselves.  And 
though she quotes Chief Justice Earl Warrenʼs 1958 comment that “Citizenship is manʼs 
basic right, for it is nothing less than the right to have rights,” the fact that inalienable 
rights are effectively displaced from an eighteenth century conception of universal 
human rights to rights that emerge only through citizenship in a nation suggests the 
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scale of this transformation and its obvious long foreground, to misuse Emersonʼs 
comment on Whitman (qtd in Ngai 10).  The importance of race and nationality is 
apparent as early as an 1870 naturalization bill in which Senator Charles Sumner 
“offered an amendment to strike the word ʻwhiteʼ from” the bill and thereby to depart 
from the nationʼs first naturalization law signed by George Washington in 1790 (Gyory 
50-51).  Andrew Gyory notes that the bill was rejected, then approved, then rejected 
again twice (52).  This ambivalence shows that a discourse of racial equality that 
followed in the wake of the Civil War still exerted some appeal, even while fears of racial 
disunity persisted and ultimately triumphed.  Additionally, a “similar amendment 
specifically allowing Chinese to be naturalized also lost,” which reveals that under the 
question of naturalization, the question of whether Chinese immigrants should be 
accorded the full status of citizen was already explicitly raised and rejected (52).  
# Though he immigrated in precisely the year that the Chinese Exclusion Act 
passed, 1882, Hartmann did not make Chinese Exclusion an overt part of either his 
poetry or his cultural criticism.3  But some of his prose, a memoir and a work of art 
criticism, does put forward a critique of nationality as immaterial, and undecidable.  In 
fact, given Whitmanʼs importance to Hartmann that he begins his book Conversations 
with Walt Whitman (1895) with an account of nationality implies that nationality was a 
central concern, at least to a young Hartmann.  
# As Hartmann records it, Whitman would not have regarded him as an American 
poet, remarking upon their first meeting, “And you are a Japanese boy, are you 
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3 Hartmann lists 1882 as the year of his immigration in an outline that accompanied his unfinished 
autobiography in typescript in Box 27 of his archive at University of California Riverside.  
not?” (Knox 66).4  Hartmann seems to take this question as something of a sign of 
Whitmanʼs perceptiveness, noting in parentheses that with the exception of small boys, 
Whitman was “the only person I met in those years who recognized my nationality at the 
first glance.”  And while this comment seems to suggest that Hartmann also sees 
himself not as primarily American but Japanese, his response to Whitman is a 
complication of the question and not an answer to it.  “My father is a German, but my 
mother was a Japanese and I was born in Japan.”  This response seems to affirm that 
he is indeed Japanese, especially in the way Hartmann narrates this exchange after his 
parenthetical remark, except his connection to Japan occurs in the past tense verb 
“was.”  And while his father is German in the present tense, this nationality both applies 
and doesnʼt apply to Hartmann in that he doesnʼt claim to be German, merely the son of 
a German.  Whitmanʼs response to this answer is reticent acceptance, “Hʼm--Come 
in” (67).  
" If Whitman actually doesnʼt get Hartmannʼs nationality right at first, itʼs interesting 
that Hartmann nonetheless endorses Whitmanʼs guess as a form of recognition and 
thus essentially correct.  Whatʼs implied is that there is a stronger form of mistaken 
identity more often attributed to Hartmann, which here goes unstated.  The date of this 
meeting, November 1884, occurs between the first Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 and a 
stronger prohibition in 1888 that excludes “all persons of the Chinese race” (qtd in 
Takaki 111).  So the context for Whitmanʼs interrogation of Hartmannʼs race is increasing 
anti-Chinese racism.  That Hartmann is only too pleased to distance himself from the 
Chinese suggests not only the extent to which Hartmann practices ethnic 
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4 According to George Knox, Whitman sometimes referred to Hartmann emphasizing his nationality, at 
one point even referring to him as “that damned Japanee.”  See Knox 48, n 10.  
disidentification, “the act of distancing oneʼs group from another group so as not to be 
mistaken and suffer the blame for the presumed misdeeds of that group,” but also that 
the difference between Hartmann and Chinese-Americans is decisive (Espiritu 20). 5  
That Whitman can see the difference proves that the difference is real; it can be 
identified based on close inspection by a careful observer--or rather not so much by 
observation than by intuition, not only Whitman, but very small boys also see him as not 
Chinese.  That this differentiation occurs at this subtle, but immediate level of 
knowledge suggests that what differentiates a Chinese American from a Japanese 
American bears the objective reality of nature, not a potentially changeable difference in 
culture.  
" But when Hartmann does resort to the supposedly natural basis of nationality, 
parentage, he actually has no answer for what his nationality is, only a series of 
relationships in time, which then does suggest that nationality is at least partly 
contingent on time or development.  In fact, the temporal quality of these relationships 
takes on a subtle emphasis in the shifting verb tenses that describe his relationship to 
his parentsʼ nationalities.  Nationality becomes a negotiated and ambiguous term, under 
which an apparently natural meaning disintegrates, so that in the end itʼs up to Whitman 
to determine what to take away from Hartmannʼs genealogy.  
" If the ostensibly neutral term “nationality” is ambiguously between nature and 
culture, I want to draw out the implication of racial difference behind this term.  Indeed, 
Whitman seems only tangentially concerned with Hartmannʼs race, and he certainly 
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5 As Yen Le Espiritu points out, the common practice of differentiating among Asian immigrant groups 
characterized a historically specific response to racism that is a far cry from the panethnic Asian American 
consciousness of the late twentieth century.  Itʼs perhaps an obvious point to make that Hartmann doesnʼt 
fit the rubric of late twentieth century Asian Americanness.  
doesnʼt bear only negative prejudice toward Hartmann, at one point remarking to 
Horace Traubel, “I expect good things of him—extra good things” (Traubel II 321).  And 
if we look at Hartmannʼs overall narrative of his first meeting with Whitman, race does 
emerge as a unifying theme, but only in light of what Hartmann admits is his selective 
memory of the meeting, implying that itʼs Hartmann more than Whitman who is invested 
in race.6  
" Hartmannʼs preoccupation with race in the larger discourse of Chinese exclusion 
shows that even if racial classification is enigmatic, it is nonetheless of central 
importance to Hartmann. Considering the Chinese Exclusion Act, Takaki notes that 
“support for the anti-Chinese legislation was national, coming not only from the western 
states but also from states where there were few or no Chinese” (111).  The fact that 
anti-Chinese sentiment was independent of an actual Chinese immigrant presence 
suggests that the issue is on the one hand abstract, but for that reason all the more 
immediate a problem to Hartmann.  Takaki explains the widespread support for Chinese 
exclusion as “symptomatic of a larger conflict between white labor and white capital.”  
That Chinese Exclusion operates at an abstract level, in a theory of ethnic 
categorization inflected by economic anxiety, and Takakiʼs analysis suggests that the 
abstraction of racial category slips into further abstractions of economic forces in such a 
way that Hartmannʼs specific ethnicity seems on the one hand a challenge to this 
discourse but also surpassed, made irrelevant by it.  
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6 Hartmann states that he was too caught up in Whitmanʼs “appearance” and “milieu” to “remember much 
of this first conversation” but interestingly, he describes Whitmanʼs appearance in racial terms as “a 
spiritually deepened image of contemporary Americans.”  Also he inserts a moment from a later meeting 
in which Whitman remarks “I never forget that my ancestors were Dutch” (Knox 67).  
! Takakiʼs explanation of why Chinese exclusion was so popular has passed into 
critical orthodoxy, but the structure of this historical narrative suggests something more 
complex than logical causation.  While Takaki reviews the economic problems of the 
1870s as among the causes of wide support for Chinese Exclusion, the effects of 
exclusion are far-reaching and significant.  According to Ngai, the passage of this first 
immigration law “produced the illegal alien as a new legal and political subject” (4, 
original emphasis).  Her specific wording, that the law creates a new subjectivity as a 
legal status shows that exclusion maintains a dual significance as both abstract 
category and personal attribute.  Indeed the ambiguity between the problem of race and 
concrete people who are attributed that race and hence that status as social problem, 
goes some way in explaining why as soon as 1892 leaders who led the effort to pass 
Chinese exclusion, like Denis Kearney, “began to attack the Japanese as another 
ʻOriental menaceʼ” (Azuma 37).  
! If the new legal status of illegal immigrant lacked concrete specificity, its definition 
would potentially be still up for grabs.  Indeed Eiichiro Azumaʼs analysis analysis reveals 
that the Japanese American elite consciously tried to position themselves in relation to 
the discourse that defined the Chinese racial formation.  “Ironically both [Japanese] 
diplomats and the immigrant elite agreed with the exclusionists on the key point that the 
ʻinferiorʼ quality of Japanese laborers and prostitutes paralleled the excluded Chinese.”  
Their own complicity with the rhetoric of exclusion was meant to emphasize that 
Japanese American merchants and community leaders were more like whites than 
Chinese immigrants, especially since the Japanese represented a modern nation-state.  
Furthermore, as Azuma points out, the class that Japanese migrant laborers were 
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drawn from often were thought of as an ethnic minority in Japan, as less Japanese than 
the elites.7  In this distinction Azumaʼs analysis of the diplomatic agenda of imperial 
Japan, which was carrying out an expansionist foreign policy, is important.  
" According to John Namjun Kim, the Japanese of the early twentieth century, 
especially “the Kyoto School of philosophy [...] regarded what we today call Japanese 
imperialism not as a system of subjugation but as a project of cosmopolitan liberation 
from European imperialism” (Kim 74).  Kim is explicit in acknowledging that Japanese 
Imperialism should not be regarded as “a movement toward global liberation” at any 
stretch of the imagination (75), but its theorization, especially in the figure of Miki 
Kiyoshi, the subject of Kimʼs essay, is an important example of a particular anticolonial 
theory.  Miki posits a unique position for Japanʼs cultural identity and therefore its 
international position based on a rejection of both the West, which Miki sees as 
undergoing a crisis of fragmentation after World War I, and Chinese Sino-centrism 
which he sees as what consigned China to atavistic degeneration.  In Mikiʼs thought, 
Japan avoids these problems through its cosmopolitanism.  As he reads history, Japanʼs 
reliance on first Chinese culture and then Westernization shows “that Japanese culture 
consists in nothing more than the absorption and preservation of the most ʻexcellentʼ 
aspects of foreign cultures” (Kim 87).  It is precisely because what characterizes Japan 
is not positive attributes but rather critical distance, that Japan has a mandate to expand 
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7 Azumaʼs analysis accounts for the relative recent advent of the Japanese state, so that it is only in the 
1870s that a governmental sense of Japanese citizenry arose.  Given that Japanese immigration began 
in 1885, that a sense of Japanese identity would be uneven among emigrants is a reasonable conclusion.  
And in fact, Azuma suggests that it is “only after the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 did the state 
achieve any notable integration” of rural Japanese peasants (26).  
across Asia.  Indeed, in Mikiʼs thought, such expansion amounts to the spread of a 
potentiality rather than the imposition of an imperial power.  
" Drawing from historical documents, Azuma presents evidence that a form of 
immigrant cosmopolitanism also existed in Japanese American communities, but as one 
might expect, these communities tended to more strongly assert “Japanese-white 
likeness, East-West parallelism” (8).  Although Hartmann was not part of the west coast 
Japanese immigrant community, the thesis of his 1903 history Japanese Art focuses on 
establishing a Japan-Europe parallelism, arguing that the evolution of Japanese art can 
be understood as a version of the evolution of western art, in which “primitive art was a 
religious art” succeeded by a renaissance such that “the glorious epoch of the 
Fukugawa Shogunate corresponds to the age of Louis XV” (Hartmann vi).  
" Around the 1908 Gentlemanʼs Agreement, in which Japan agreed to end 
emigration of laborers to the US, Hartmann produced The Whistler Book which Weaver 
calls “the most graceful exposition of Hartmannʼs ideas” (Weaver 4).  At first gloss, it 
might seem odd that when anti-Japanese racism succeeds in barring immigration that 
Hartmann focuses on a figure from the 1890s and refines the implied cosmopolitanism 
of Japanese Art into something less political and more aesthetic.  But then we know that 
Hartmannʼs preoccupation with race emphasized its intangible character, an intangible 
character present in the lawʼs own inconsistency.  According to Ngai, the defeat of 
Sumnerʼs 1870 amendment meant that in naturalization law, only two races where 
specified, black and white, and the bar to citizenship in the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act 
“remained outside the main body of naturalization law” (Ngai 37). And though Hartmann 
himself was naturalized on October 12, 1894 in the Superior Court of New York City the 
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fact that he was naturalized as that outcome became increasingly unlikely for people of 
Japanese descent must have cast that naturalization as something less than a full 
conferral of all the rights of US citizenship.8  That very ambiguity, that he may or may 
not be barred from citizenship, means that what otherwise should be the most concrete 
determinant of an individualʼs social identity is actually something inferred and 
interpreted, and thus something that does relate to aesthetics.  Thus, his turn toward the 
aesthetic is not a repression of the political but as a response to it.  The Whistler Book is 
Hartmannʼs attempt to bracket the explicitly political for a deeper and more transcendent 
sense of what Japanese culture is like.9  
" The Whistler Book does not seem to be about race in any obvious way. 
Hartmann opens the book, which has the long subtitle “A Monograph of the Life and 
Position in Art of James McNeill Whistler, together with a Careful Study of his more 
Important Works,” with an oddly vague but also personal account of the white 
chrysanthemum which we are told is Hartmannʼs favorite flower.10  Why is it his favorite? 
“That is more than I can tell.  The unconscious movements of our soul activity cannot be 
turned into sodden prose” (Hartmann Whistler 1).  Hartmann proceeds in a digressive 
manner for another page before asserting: “those human beings who are sensitive to 
the charms of the chrysanthemum [...] must hail from the same country in which my soul 
41
8 A statement that Hartmann made on March 11, 1942 protesting being classified as a Japanese alien 
enemy, specifies when he was naturalized.
9 Hartmannʼs sense of what characterizes Japaneseness has a parallel logic to Mikiʼs, both depending on 
the capacity for Japan, as a modern Asian nation, to challenge attributes meant to designate Asia and the 
West.  
10 This section of the book was printed separately in The Stylus Volume 1 Number 1, December 1909.  
The Stylus was a “magazine devoted to art and self-expression” that Hartmann edited with a focus 
“exclusively to Sadakichi Hartmannʼs works” (The Stylus 1:1, prefatory pages). 
abides” (2).  Only at this conjunction of nation, soul and aesthetic experience does 
Hartmann bring in Whistler:  “Whistler was busy all his life painting just such white 
chrysanthemums.”  Itʼs clear that the chrysanthemum represents Hartmannʼs 
connection to Whistler, and that the abrupt transition from his poetical disquisition on 
white chrysanthemums to Whistler veils an assertion that he and Whistler are the same 
nationality.  
" What this nationality might be is specifically addressed in the last chapter of the 
book.  Hartmann notes that on a concrete level, Whistlerʼs nationality isnʼt obvious, 
“three nations--England, France and America--claimed him as their own” (234).  And in 
the end, Hartmann doesnʼt argue for a particular answer to the question, though his 
interpretation of Whistlerʼs American nationality is interesting.  Hartmann acknowledges: 
“Of course, one can simply settle the matter by saying that as he was born in American 
of American parents, he is an American” (236).  But the rest of the discussion makes 
plain that this simplification of nationality by birth ultimately settles nothing.  Hartmannʼs 
logic here explicitly reprises what is implicit in his earlier answer to Whitman on the 
same question, emphasizing the undecidability of nationality by showing the inadequacy 
of the most common definition.   So instead of settling the question of nationality, 
Hartmann shifts the question to the national character of art, and here, he asserts for 
Whistler a Japanese-Americanness.  
True enough his subject matter was, with the exception of “LʼAméricaine” 
and a few portraits, strictly Continental.  But the spirit was strictly 
Japanese and--American.  Or, I would rather say, his form of art 
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conception was Oriental, but the essence, the under-rhythm of his 
personality, was after all American. (237)
Part of the suddenness of this statement would be mitigated by Hartmannʼs earlier 
analysis of Whistlerʼs technique in which he imagines Whistler could “not come out 
boldly and say: ʻthis is the Japanese way of doing things.  I disengage the poetical 
significance from an object or fact in Eastern fashion.  I have learned this from the 
Hiroshige printsʼ” (62).  And then to clarify, Hartmann goes on to place Whistlerʼs “wit 
and sarcasm” as explicitly American (238).  But nonetheless it is significant to note that 
Hartmann is indeed claiming Whistler as Japanese American, not on a concrete level 
which after all decides nothing and is almost insignificant, but in art.  
$ Hartmannʼs assertion of a Japanese American cultural identity for Whistler 
anticipates the arguments that two challengers to Asian exclusion would mount before 
the Supreme Court in the 1920s.  Analyzing Takao Ozawa v. U.S. (1922) and U.S. v. 
Bhagat Singh Thind (1923), Ngai notes that both Ozawa and Thind made their cases 
through two arguments, first “on the grounds of their adherence to American ideals,” or 
their cultural identity, and second by arguing that “within the terms of the law”--the 
naturalization law that specifies only white and black races--”they were white and 
therefore also racially eligible for citizenship” (43).  This second, racial argument was 
made by appealing to the discourse of scientific racism; Ozawa cited anthropological 
findings that “identified the Japanese as Caucasian or white” and Thind claimed that 
“because marrying outside of caste in India is strictly forbidden” he was “a pure 
Aryan” (Ngai 44, 45).  Deciding these cases against Ozawa and Thind, the court 
therefore had to disavow scientific racism and its construction of race as real and 
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verifiable by shifting the definition of white from science to “the understanding of the 
common man” (qtd in Ngai 46).  In so doing, the court ironically showed that race was 
immaterial and cultural.  But more significant than just the cultural aspect of race, the 
finding itself emphasized the dimension of power that underlies how race is defined.  
! If nationality becomes the means by which individuals are endowed with rights, 
the power to deny nationality because of race turns into the power to impose 
domination, potentially even total domination.  To potentially be denied US nationality 
and yet to live in the US is then to face what Orlando Patterson calls “social death,” to 
belong to a community without a recognized social position within it (Patterson 38). 
Pattersonʼs larger project is a monumental comparative study of slavery across time 
and geography, and thus he makes huge claims.  One such claim is that the nature of 
social death must be mediated culturally, and that one such representation of social 
death is what he calls an “intrusive” form of social death.  “In the intrusive mode of 
representing social death the slave was ritually incorporated as the permanent enemy 
on the inside--the ʻdomestic enemy,ʼ” (39). Thus, even though Asian exclusion was not 
slavery, it did make possible a social death.  
! Iʼve suggested that Hartmannʼs awareness of his own potential social death 
motivates an intensely aesthetic understanding of nationality, but whatʼs not yet clear is 
that social death is a decisive part of his poetry.  The extent to which Hartmannʼs poetry 
responds to a form of nonexistence isnʼt fully clear until itʼs read in the context of 
Hartmannʼs idolʼs poems on death, Whitmanʼs late work. 
!
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Late Whitman and Personality
! Michael Moon makes the argument that throughout his career, Whitman was 
preoccupied with using text as a means of creating an almost physical contact between 
bodies, and thus implicitly his writing has always been intensely personal.  That this 
textual embodiment is “impossible” is something that Moon readily acknowledges, but at 
the same time the impossibility of capturing actual physical presence in a poem 
motivates Whitmanʼs revisions, specifically in his substitutional, paratactic poetics.11  For 
example, in analyzing Whitmanʼs 1855 Leaves, Moon describes how Whitman attempts 
to represent physical presence by using an allegory of the poetʼs relation to nature to 
depict a fluid form of identity that connects poet to reader.
A relation of mutual specular doubling links “poet” and “geography”: he 
“responds to his countryʼs spirit” not only by “incarnat[ing] its geography” 
but by in turn endowing the countryʼs “rivers and lakes and natural life” 
with specular male bodies, mirrors of his own and those of other “fluid” 
men.  (75)
Whitman uses allegory to depict fluid identity, but this fluidity comes at the cost of a 
bodyʼs physicality, and thus its singularity as well.  What Moon recognizes in Whitman is 
an emphasis on the specular, that vision allows for the kind of transformation his verse 
enacts, as opposed to a more concrete experience of the body.  Such physical 
experience is more intractably singular, because after all direct sensory perception is 
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11 Moon notes that Whitmanʼs revisions also track with the development of cultural discourses of the body 
in the nineteenth century and that this shifting historical ground necessitates Whitmanʼs continued open-
ended engagements with trying to place the body in poetic discourse. 
limited to senses arising from a single body, and thus if Whitman attempts to convey the 
personal, he doesnʼt do it in his best known work.  In fact, itʼs only when Whitman 
abandons an attempt to incarnate the whole of a nation that Whitmanʼs work turns 
genuinely, and problematically personal.  It turns toward death and becomes late work.
" Moon ends his study with the 1867 version, even as he acknowledges that 
“Whitman effectively redirected the patterns of meanings in each of the successive 
editions of Leaves of Grass” including the edition of 1891-92 (1).  This would hardly 
qualify as an omission since critics have tended to either ignore or dismiss Whitmanʼs 
late poetry.  For example, although he evaluates the poems in a somewhat outdated 
insistence on literary value, M. Wynn Thomasʼs contention that the late work shows that 
“Whitmanʼs powers [were] long and steadily in decline” (Thomas 3) is hard to 
meaningfully contest given the contrast between something like “Song of Myself” 
against Whitmanʼs fragmentary short poems in the last two annexes.  These last poems 
are further marginalized by Ed Folsom and Kenneth M. Priceʼs observation that the 
“deathbed” edition is not really an edition at all, but rather “a reissue of the 1881-2 
edition with supplemental material” (Folsom and Price 127). 
" But in his essay “Whitmanʼs Aging Body,” Benjamin Lee argues that Whitmanʼs 
late work is not simply a diminished form of his earlier poetry, but instead should be 
read as developing Whitmanʼs thematic of the body.  Lee finds that in contrast with 
Whitmanʼs earlier, metonymic method, in which “the body exists [...] as the privileged 
site of sympathy and sensual contact between poet and reader” (Lee 39), the late 
Whitman shifts to metaphoric language that ultimately invokes an absence.  Lee reads 
this absence as taking up Whitmanʼs project of communicating physical experience 
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since his own physical experience becomes more and more characterized by “the pain 
of aging” and a failure of communication, and no longer by the possibility of partial, 
serial substitutions that characterized his earlier metonymic physicality.12  Lee illustrates 
this significant stylistic shift in Whitmanʼs poetry by first examining the late poem “As I 
Sit Writing Here,” which he reads as a poem that refuses identifying the poetʼs selfhood 
with the body.  Then, another late poem like “The Dismantled Ship” goes on to mark a 
more explicit metaphoric logic, intensifying the gap between self and body through the 
displaced figure of the ship.  Notably, nowhere in “The Dismantled Ship” is Whitmanʼs 
physical state explicitly mentioned, so that this brief, seemingly descriptive portrait of an 
object is implicitly, but not directly, metaphoric.  
" Leeʼs use of metaphor to characterize what Whitman is doing is a somewhat 
strong usage of this term, but one that is nonetheless apt since itʼs obvious that the 
pathos of a poem like “The Dismantled Ship” lies in the unstated comparison to 
Whitmanʼs body.  Leeʼs thesis is that this absent comparison “speaks to us of painʼs 
power to alter language” and ultimately invoke the body (39), but interestingly later 
poems tend to sometimes drop even the implied comparison with the physical body.  
These poems might well take Whitmanʼs metaphorical rhetoric further than the poems in  
his first annex (1888), focusing not on comparison but on rhetorical transformation itself.  
Or to put it another way, these even later poems go beyond invoking painʼs inability to 
be communicated to broach the absence in any communication.  
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12 Leeʼs claim that physical pain would become central to Whitmanʼs experience makes biographical 
sense since Whitmanʼs physical ailments were intense by the late 1880s.  David S. Reynolds notes that 
upon his death, the “autopsy revealed that Whitmanʼs doctors had vastly underestimated the extent of his 
maladies,” which Reynolds lists in a full paragraph, before concluding “He had suffered, it seems, from 
almost everything but a heart problem” (Reynolds 588).  
! The title poem of the second annex (1891), “Good-bye my Fancy” is brief and 
fragmentary, and it departs from even the implied metaphoric of “The Dismantled Ship.”  
Instead the poem seems to oddly insist on its status as a blank utterance, since its 
content is a repetition of the poemʼs title, which is also the title of the annex, along with 
not only a long parenthetical, but also a footnote.  
! ! Good-bye * my fancy--(I had a word to say,
! ! But tis not quite the time--The best of any manʼs word or say,
! ! Is when its proper place arrives--and for its meaning,
! ! I keep mine till the last.) (LGV 732)
In this poem, the most emphasized text, the title and verse, are also the least 
meaningful.  The parenthetical comment that forms the rest of the poem raises the 
question of temporality as a time that is deferred, while also dividing the saying of a 
word, unsaid in the poem, from its meaning, which is withheld “till the last.”  But how 
exactly this parenthetical relates to the phrase “good-bye my fancy” is unclear and since 
it is presented in the text as an interruption, the relation may well be tangential.  
! The footnote of the poem detaches the poemʼs clearest signifier of time from its 
temporality.  The note begins “Behind a Good-bye there lurks much of the salutation of 
another beginning” - in other words, the note serves to qualify good-bye to mean also 
hello--not to mark finality in time, but indeterminacy.  The placement of the note, mid-
phrase, also serves to suspend the sentenceʼs progress in time by interjecting the 
supplemental text to make the experience of reading the sentence discontinuous.  
! But despite the poemʼs temporal difficulty, the footnote and parenthetical 
commentary also supplement the main poem with an element of the personal.  The final 
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lineʼs idiomatic phrasing suggests that the deferral of meaning has a capricious air to it 
and the noteʼs second paragraph also strikes an informal tone:  “Why do folks dwell so 
fondly on the last words, advice, appearance of the departing?”  Ultimately, if the poem 
coheres, it coheres insofar as the reader grants the poet his caprice to withhold, or 
rather than caprice, his fancy.  And it is perhaps this less stable effect, this collusion 
between reader and poet against the difficulty of the poem that suggests why this annex 
is suitable to conclude Leaves of Grass.  
" But while the second annex is the last set of poems in Leaves of Grass, Whitman 
appends a prose afterword too.  Folsom and Price note that as an afterword, “A 
Backward Glance Oʼer Travelʼd Roads” is symmetrical to the 1855 preface.  “If the 
preface is brash, irreverent, and forward looking, ʻA Backward Glanceʼ is dignified, 
conciliatory, and retrospective” (127).13  As the bookʼs conclusion, Whitman attempts to 
sum up Leaves of Grass in this essay, first in terms of its purpose: “to articulate and 
faithfully express [...] my own physical, emotional, moral, intellectual, and aesthetic 
Personality, in the midst of [...] current America” (LG 444).  Central to his purpose is 
“Personality” which he capitalizes and modifies with the particular word “aesthetic.”  This 
goal of personal expression is then qualified in the second explanation Whitman offers 
of the book, its situation in terms of literature as a whole.  Itʼs in this mode of 
contextualization that Whitmanʼs notion of “aesthetic Personality” gains specificity.  
Whitman writes that among “the worldʼs reading” there are “dozens more” poems that 
“transcend (some of them immeasurably transcend) all I have done or could do” (LG 
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13 Folsom and Priceʼs contrast between the preface and “A Backward Glance” seems to reiterate what 
Benjamin Lee noted about the relative valuation of early Whitman versus late Whitman.  It is not that late 
Whitman repeats early Whitman and is therefore not essential reading, but that the late Whitman is no 
longer original.  
447). His use of “transcend” turns out to be somewhat facetious since the specific 
qualities he sees these other poems surpassing his own in are “pictorial talent, dramatic 
situation and especially [...] verbal melody.”  Beyond these technical concerns, Whitman 
uses the term “aesthetic” to refer to not only “the objects in Nature” and “all special 
exploitations of the mind and soul [...] but the quality, just as inherent and important, of 
their point of view” (447, original emphasis).  Following this statement Whitman appends 
a note that calls point of view “the last essential reality, giving shape and significance to 
all the rest” and moreover, he attributes this sense of point of view, as that which is 
transcendental, or at least transcends poetic device, as Immanuel Kantʼs.  
" The Kant note seems to be more rhetorical than explanatory however.  Whitman 
certainly doesnʼt use Kantʼs terminology much less provide references to specific works.  
Whitman does not explain why point of view should be the “last essential reality” and 
instead lets the phrase hang, ambiguous but strongly worded.  But what does seem 
significant about Whitmanʼs use of Kant here is his use of Kantʼs categorization of reality  
into “objects in Nature” and “mind and soul” with point of view serving as a mediating 
faculty between these two categories.  
" To Kant, objects in nature and the concepts with which to organize experience 
have no necessary relationship, or in Kantʼs words “the sensible cannot determine the 
supersensible” (Kant 32).  But this profound division, which Kant characterizes as a 
“great gulf”, nonetheless belies our common experience.  After all, we do not labor to 
make sense of the ordinary diversity of our empirical experience.  For that reason, Kant 
argues that we presuppose some connection between our experience of objects in 
Nature with mind and soul, even if such a connection is both not demonstrable to 
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reason and not based in observation.  This presupposed connection grounds nature 
with thought through “purposiveness.”  Kant begins by accepting that an objectʼs reality 
may well differ from our cognition of that object.  But so long as our concept “contains 
the ground of the actuality of this object” (17), this is, that a concept has some minimal 
basis in fact, then our concept is at bottom real.  Kantʼs crucial point though, is that this 
basis in the actual is reflective, “obliged to ascend from the particular in nature to the 
universal” (16) in a speculative fashion, but nonetheless, as long as even a small 
element of our cognition of an object is part of that object, we can intuit that connection.  
And this concept that connects phenomena to laws is what Kant terms “purposiveness.”  
" Itʼs important to emphasize that in purposiveness the presupposition occurs in a 
subjunctive verb tense, as what will have been: purposiveness is a potential that is 
reconstructed from the actual, through reflection.  Purposiveness then has a decidedly 
untimely character, neither an actual precursor to experience in that it is always 
assumed and never experienced, nor properly a result of sensation.  This account of 
temporality suggests that a poem like “Good-bye my Fancy,” which prolongs its time 
through deferral while also denying the sequential aspect of time, takes the poem out of 
experience even as it claims the immediacy of the particular. That passage out of 
experience is what Whitman calls “the last essential reality,” which means that what 
Whitman privileges as most real is not what we sense, but something “supersensible,” 
to use Kant, that sense suggests.   Thus, this poem makes the point other of Whitmanʼs 
late poems do, that the internal experience of the self is incommunicable, but it makes 
that impossibility itself the subject of the poem, as the poemʼs reticent suspension.
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! Not that I mean to suggest that “Good-Bye my Fancy” explicates Kantʼs theory of 
how sense perception leads to cognition, nor do I mean to claim some kind of major 
importance for the poem.  In fact, itʼs minor status is why such a poem in Whitmanʼs late 
phase can seem transcendent.  Because the poem is fragmentary, its emptiness 
gestures toward a more radical emptiness, that of death, but does so in the properly 
Kantian manner.  According to Theodor Adorno, death appears in art as 
incompleteness: “it leaves only fragments behind, and communicates itself, like a 
cipher, only through the blank spaces from which it has disengaged itself” (qtd in Said 
9). Understanding Whitmanʼs late work as late work in this sense, as artwork that shows 
death, means that something like Whitmanʼs comment in “Backward Glance” that his 
poetic technique is only secondary to a concern for “the last essential reality,” which 
after all seems like an excuse for not exerting himself to make a poem good, actually 
proposes how finally in Whitmanʼs late poetry, he does attempt to make poetry a form of 
intimate connection, what Moon saw as the impossible aim of Whitmanʼs entire oeuvre.   
This more complex sense of the connections between Whitmanʼs comment and his late 
poetry is possible through one last turn toward Kant.  
! Kant poses the question of whether pleasure in perceiving an aesthetic object 
precedes cognition, which seems a drily technical concern.  However, the stakes of this 
question is nothing less than whether subjective experience is communicable, since itʼs 
not sensations and objects that are communicated, but concepts (Kant, Guyer 102).    
Here Kant addresses Whitmanʼs foundational problem, whether the body can be 
disseminated as text.  And to Kant the answer is yes, but only under the special 
condition under which both perception and cognition are in agreement, in other words, 
52
in an experience of the beautiful (96).  Interestingly, an experience of the beautiful 
proceeds by a logic of subtraction.  Whether something is beautiful depends on 
“satisfaction or dissatisfaction” according to Kant, but a satisfaction that is “without any 
interest” (96, original emphasis).  In other words, a beautiful object enables a sense of 
satisfaction that has a subjective component removed from it and in fact, Kant suggests 
that this subtraction itself has a pleasurable aspect.14  So when Whitman proclaims in 
“Good-Bye my Fancy” that heʼll “keep [his] till the last” this withholding becomes crucial 
for the possibility of making a private pleasure communicable, and therefore makes this 
poem about how the incommunicable is paradoxically invoked and made known.  
" As though to suggest a revision, Whitman returns a fourth time to the phrase 
“good-bye my fancy” in the final poem of the annex, this time marked with an 
exclamation point, as though to symbolize emotion.  Indeed, in contrast to the reticence 
of the first poem, the first lines of this poem directly offer the poem to a kind of 
sentimental conventionality that detractors of Whitmanʼs late work characterize it with.  
The term “fancy” is given an immediate metaphorical referent in the second line: “Good-
bye my Fancy! / Farewell dear mate, dear love!” (1-2), and this connection proves a 
tempting line for interpretation. The banal potential of situating the “good-bye my fancy” 
phrase in romantic love is made obvious in the 1951 Joan Crawford movie, Goodbye, 
My Fancy.  Kenneth Price notes that a recitation of Whitmanʼs poem occurs in a scene 
in which the filmʼs protagonist, Agatha Reed, reunites with a forbidden love from college. 
“They recite together ʻGood-bye My Fancy!ʼ  [...] Agatha then rips up the old [departure] 
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14 The pleasure in what everyone finds gratifying is called the “agreeable” in Kantʼs terminology.  See p. 
95.  
note and says ʻHello my Fancy!” before they share a long kiss” (Price 49).  Clearly, what 
had earlier suggested temporal ambiguity can now be read as a failure of will, seeming 
more like melodrama and less like a broken poem about death.
" Against such a reading, one might want to read the poemʼs more intimate 
pronominal address and its reference to a lover with Whitmanʼs likening of the soul to a 
lover in the fifth section of “Song of Myself.”  Certainly this connection seems affirmed in 
the sixteenth line of the poem, which figures “you” as something supernatural.  But then 
this late poem eschews the earlier poemʼs erotic contact for an assumed relation 
between the relative abstraction of merely being called a lover, and where in “Song of 
Myself” the profusion of detail comes to define the capaciousness of love, the silence in 
this late poem becomes something uncertain.  Whitman precedes the conclusion of the 
poem with a sequence of three anaphora:
" " May-be weʼll be better off and blither, and learn something,
" " May-be it is yourself now really ushering me to the true songs, (who 
" " " knows?)
" " May-be it is you the mortal knob really undoing, turning [...] (15-17)
What most emerges from these lines is uncertainty since each line begins with its 
emphasized “May-be.”  But in contrast to the paratactic effect of these “May-be”s, the 
three lines actually trace a kind of progression.  First, line 15 begins in optimism while 
also suggesting that the poemʼs goodbye is really a hello to something new to be 
learned.  From here, line 16 intensifies the previous lineʼs optimism and transforms the 
promise of learning into an imminent discovery of truth.  But then the penultimate line of 
the poem returns the sense of good-bye as an ending against the suggestion of line 15, 
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a transition that the previous line prepares us for via the parenthetical rhetorical 
question, “who knows?”, which we note also strikes the colloquial tone Whitman favored 
in the first “Good-bye my Fancy” poem.  And the net effect seems to reprise that earlier 
poem in that the good-bye is also a hello, not as a synthesis but as an inconsistency.  If 
thought of as a hello, Whitman suggests that nonetheless the mortal knob is being 
undone, and if as a goodbye Whitman suggests there might be something unforeseen 
to come.  
! Perhaps the question to ask in light of Moonʼs point that each of Whitmanʼs 
successive revisions reconfigures meaning at the level of the book itself is what ending 
Leaves of Grass with this poem suggests.   Insofar as it seems to rewrite the first 
“Good-Bye my Fancy” poem, “Good-Bye my Fancy!” suggests that what was withheld in 
that poem is now in some way being expressed, perhaps in the figure of the “you” 
explicitly and somewhat intimately addressed here.  But then this reading only 
emphasizes how the poem fails to live up to the “best of any manʼs word or say.”   So 
then if anything, these two poems seem to emphasize the anticlimax of heaping two 
annexes and a concluding essay onto a work that kept refusing its ending by 
reappearing in newer versions.  It becomes hard to resist the prevailing attitude that 
even Benjamin Lee could at best suspend and not counter, that Whitmanʼs late poetry 
shows Leaves of Grass ending with the gradual extinguishing of Whitmanʼs poetic 
power. 
! But then if Moon is right and “the generative contradiction at the heart of Leaves 
of Grass” is “the desire to imbue a text with full physical presence” (Moon 73) the falling 
into silence and fragmentation at the end of Leaves of Grass must be read as an 
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intensified attempt to put the body into writing, particularly its vulnerability to time.  
According to Shierry Weber Nicholsen, Adornoʼs aesthetic theory similarly places the 
work of art in time, so that the initial aesthetic unity of a work comes to give way under 
the pressure of history.  “History has uncovered and made evident the original contents 
within the works; they are visible solely by virtue of the disintegration of their gestalt-like 
unity in the form of the work” (Adorno qtd in Nicholsen 35).  So then emphatically 
publishing his late poetry implies that Whitman insists on emphasizing aesthetic failure 
as a mode of the particularity of the text, its real, mortal status.  
" Toward the end of  “A Backward Glance” Whitman writes: “No one will get at my 
verses who insists on viewing them as a literary performance, or attempts at such a 
performance, or as aiming mainly toward art or aestheticism” (LG 456), and this 
disavowal of the aesthetic is meant as an avowal that Leaves of Grass is “an attempt, 
from first to last, to put a Person, a human being (myself, in the latter half of the 
Nineteenth Century, in America,) freely, fully and truly on record.”  But then Whitman 
also makes the claim that something that served as the “bases and object-urgings 
toward those ʻLeavesʼ from the first” is “the word Suggestiveness” (451-2).  And here itʼs 
not that Whitmanʼs particularity is fully and truly on record, but rather that the “reader will 
always have his or her part to do, just as much as I have had mine” (452).  Betsy Erkkila 
characterizes “the active role of the reader required by Whitmanʼs indirect method” as 
paradigmatic of his aesthetics (Erkkila 91), and it follows that if the reader has to 
actively construct the text as much as Whitman himself did then Leaves of Grass is a 
form of mediation which must be aesthetic insofar as it presents an object for others to 
make personal meaning of.  
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! Hartmannʼs aesthetics also emphasize suggestiveness, although as Weaver 
points out Hartmann never codified exactly what he meant by this term.  Hartmann did 
insist on “poetry and feeling in art as a necessary adjunct to the beautiful” and referred 
to art of this kind as being in “the suggestive style” (Weaver 27).  That Hartmann linked 
aesthetic beauty with poetry and feeling indicates the decisive influence on Hartmann of 
Whitmanʼs desire to also connect his human specificity with the possibility of literary 
expression.  This is not to say that Hartmann merely adapted Whitmanʼs emphasis on 
the suggestive in his art criticism.  “The suggestive style was one of poetic mysticism 
and psychological intensity” writes Weaver, “Hartmann characterized it as embodying 
the poetic idea [...]; above all, he emphasized that the art of suggestiveness rested on 
canons of ancient oriental art” and so suggestiveness was “opposed to the Western 
classical tradition which resulted in a ʻcraze for originalityʼ” (27).  Repudiating originality, 
Hartmann seems to be close to the late Whitmanʼs no longer innovative verse, to an 
emphasis on how what canʼt actually be communicated might yet be conveyed in art.   
One difference is that Hartmann sees unoriginal creation as not inherently American as 
Whitman seemed to, but instead as specifically Oriental, a claim that explicitly connects 
questions of aesthetics to cultural representation.  
The Orient in Hartmannʼs Early Poetry
! Hartmann was boldly unafraid to proclaim his expertise on Japan: a handbill for 
his lecture “A Plea for the Encouragement of American Art” notes that his book 
Japanese Art “has popularized Oriental esthetics perhaps more than any book of the 
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day;” and from 1904 to 1906 he was giving a lecture titled “Japan, As It Really Is.”  But 
Japanese Art relies heavily on secondary literature, especially W. G. Astonʼs A History of 
Japanese Literature (1899), and in a letter soliciting bookings (at the fee of $100 per 
lecture) Hartmann quotes a blurb from Boston Evening Transcript15 which asserts that 
his “half Japanese parentage gives him free entrance to the Japanese heart.”  
Hartmannʼs reliance on a preexisting discourse of Japan and a sense that authentic 
knowledge is a matter of blood suggests that an actual lived relationship to Japan is in 
some way irrelevant, and this substitution of a cultural idea of Japan for contact with 
Japan is problematic, or in some way irrelevant, that to Hartmann the Orient is really 
more an idea.  
" As Edward Said notes in the influential text Orientalism (1978), just this sort of 
disregard of the difference between discourse and its inevitable fallibility characterizes 
not only Western institutional knowledge about Asia, but also overlaps with Western 
political power over the Orient.  Said states: “the Orient (ʻout thereʼ towards the East) is 
corrected, even penalized, for lying outside the boundaries of European society” 
through “a process that not only marks the Orient as the province of the Orientalist but 
also forces the uninitiated Western reader to accept Orientalist codifications” (Said 67). 
Hartmannʼs popularization of Orientalist codifications and his invocation of his Oriental 
essence would thus seem to be complicit with Orientalism.  But Hartmannʼs later 
comments in support of anti-colonialism and his sense that Western aesthetics would 
be improved by an embrace of Japanese artistic practice seems to mean that Hartmann 
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15 This is a paper that Hartmann frequently wrote for in the 1890s.  
opposes the larger project Orientalism.16  One conjecture to make might be that 
Hartmann engages the discourse of Orientalism, partly seduced by its veneer of 
mastery, and partly as its subject and this ambivalent position is articulated in 
Hartmannʼs sense that the aesthetic of the Orient has a negative force, a force that 
dissolves or surpasses attributes.  That aesthetics provides a way to challenge the 
authority of Orientalism is a paradoxical result of Hartmannʼs own Orientalism.    
" In the first eight pages of George Knoxʼs 1976 book The Whitman-Hartmann 
Controversy, Knox relates Hartmannʼs origin three times, that he was born around 1867, 
“the son of a German trader and [...] a Japanese mother, Osada, who died in 
childbirth” (5), and that “in 1882 [he] was sent to America by his ʻvenerable father,ʼ 
supposedly at the instigation of his new stepmother” (13).17  Knox relates these facts 
with scholarly neutrality, but itʼs hard not to wonder: why repetitively invoke this origin 
story?  
" In what is ostensibly a biography of Hartmann, the 1954 bestseller Minutes of the 
Last Meeting, Gene Fowler also relates Hartmannʼs birth, with the difference that Fowler 
presents the tale in the style of a novel, with direct and indirect quotation, and 
interspersed by comments.  At a moment of high sentimentality, as “his mother lay 
dying” Hartmann says that she “had given him his Japanese name, and explained that 
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16 Hartmann writes: “Anybody familiar with colonization and not a raider himself should feel ashamed of 
belonging to the white race” (White Chrysanthemums 117).  
17 George Knox is credited with catalyzing the resurgence in interest in Hartmann in the late 1970s.  
According to his obituary ”Professor Knox literally invented the field” of Hartmann studies.  “University of 
California: In Memoriam.” http://content.cdlib.org/view?docId=hb267nb0r3&chunk.id=div00031.  
University of California Academic Senate.  1999. 
ʻsadaʼ meant ʻvirtue,ʼ and ʻkichiʼ meant ʻgood fortuneʼ” (Fowler 51).  What follows this 
wrought account is something Fowler seems to intend as comic relief:  
“The moniker means ʻGimme some dough,ʼ” said [W. C.] Fields. 
“Gentlemen,” said [John] Barrymore, “Sadakichi is the mating call of rabid, 
though sacred monkeys, playing among the acorn towers of Angkor 
Wat.” (51)
These comments are both racist, and something else.  Fieldsʼ comment, that 
Hartmannʼs name means “gimme some dough” might not pertain to ethnicity, but to 
biography since Hartmann actually did frequently solicit his acquaintances for money.  
And Barrymoreʼs comment, with its mock complexity, might also be intended to parody 
Hartmannʼs tendency to assert cultural pronouncements supported more by opinion 
than argumentation.  But then both comments are predicated on the incomprehensibility  
of Hartmannʼs Japanese name, its foreignness, along with the supposition that this 
foreignness can nonetheless be translated by two white males.  All of which makes this 
a scene of bonhomie and racial difference.  
# After this interruption, Fowler quotes Hartmann as saying “Her body was 
cremated in Kobe [...] where the Kutobiki waterfalls spray the mountain slope.   Her 
relatives, still scandalized by her marriage to an Occidental, strewed her ashes along 
the dusty road for donkeys to walk over.”  Saburo Ota, a Japanese scholar who 
conducted research on Hartmann in the 1970s, has shown several historical 
improbabilities of Hartmannʼs account, not the least of which is the rareness of donkeys 
in Japan.  That the donkeys are an invented detail makes Hartmannʼs own narration, 
with its prosodic detail intended to excite pity, not the sober counter-narrative against 
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Fieldsʼ and Barrymoreʼs racist joking, but part of a broader context of Oriental 
representation that all three participate in.  Hartmannʼs special concern though is 
sentiment.  
" Hartmannʼs early poem “To My Mother” (1887) returns to the story of his birth and 
understandably sentimentalizes his mother in a somewhat elevated diction:  
" " A womanʼs death created me, must therefore not
" " My love hang over all the world! - Poor mo-
" " ther, my life shall expiate thy premature demise. (lines 1-3)
The worst effect of this awkward enjambment is that the divided word “mo-ther” might 
enact the poetʼs interrupted relationship to his mother, as though to force the merely 
denotative letters of the word into a form of connotation.18  And similarly, a sense of 
forced connection arises in the asserted logic between the first and second lines: if his 
mother died in childbirth, then as her child the poetʼs love must “hang over all the world.” 
Hartmannʼs unelaborated logic repeats the vagueness of what his motherʼs death 
means, both are foggily abstract.  Both of these attempts to enact the content of the 
poem at the level of its form end up showing the limits of both at the poemʼs 
melodramatic ambition. 
" Significantly, the poemʼs failings converge around the “mo-ther” who functions 
both to excuse the poemʼs elevated language and metrical lapses, as symptoms of 
emotional intensity, as well as to explain the poemʼs illogic, since it is obviously meant to 
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18 Early drafts of this poem show Hartmann composing it in long prose lines, which suggests that dividing 
“mother” is perhaps not intended as an enjambment.  However, in the typescript that seems to present 
the most finished version of the poem, line 1 extends into the right hand margin further than where the 
uninterrupted “mother” would have reached.  Also, Hartmannʼs capitalization of “My” in line 2 suggests 
that he is establishing line breaks and that the stanza is not simply one long prose line.  
emote and not reason.  But in this role, “mo-ther” works by exceeding the bounds of the 
poem, by making the poem about an emotion we accept insofar as the poemʼs actual 
status as a poem is both flawed and self-consciously poetic.  
" No wonder then that in a 1922 comment Hartmann defends the poem as “an 
honest overflow of sentiment, not yet trimmed like boxwood in a gentlemanʼs garden.”   
Hartmannʼs defense strikes the same note as Whitmanʼs defense in “A Backward 
Glance:” an assertion of the aesthetic personality as that which exceeds or overflows 
cultured craft, and therefore is expressed in imperfect poems.  But not all mistakes 
affirm this aesthetics of honesty.  In the second stanza Hartmann romanticizes his 
motherʼs grave “under the hills / Of Kobe” (4-5), by enlisting natureʼs gifts 
" " [...] to beautify thy grave,
" " While winds and birds sing everlasting funeral
" " Rites to thee, my mother dear. (6-8)
Hartmann writes that this material was “unfortunately chosen” because of its cultural 
blindness: that in 1887 with his “German middle-class sentimentality” he wrongly 
assumed that his mother was interred instead of cremated.  This time Hartmann offers 
no defense, and in fact, concludes his 1922 comment with this reflection:  “The saddest 
of all this matter is that I have never been able to greet the land of my birth” (Early 
Poems 2).  With this admission, Hartmann confesses that “To My Mother” isnʼt based in 
any way in Hartmannʼs actual experience, neither of his motherʼs death nor of the Japan 
he associates his mother with, while also re-inscribing the longing with which the third 
stanza closes the poem.  
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! The unknown that the dead “mo-ther” represents in Hartmannʼs poem works in 
something of the same way as the ambivalent figuration of the Whitmanʼs fancy in 
“Good-bye my Fancy!”  With the shift to imagining his mother as a grave in Japan, 
Hartmann draws an abstract death into a more legible materiality, just as Whitman 
seems to address a lover in his poem.  But where “Good-bye my Fancy!” ends by 
enacting a progression that affirms unknowing, an affirmation that takes place partly 
because of Whitmanʼs folksy tone, in Hartmann the unknown is negative in that the 
emotional effectivity of the poem comes about only through the pathos of Hartmannʼs 
mistakes, and despite his later attempt to excuse this particular lapse, the poemʼs effect 
depends upon his lack of a real relation to Japan.  
! In fact, as though registering the error of the second stanza the poemʼs final 
stanza explicitly acknowledges what Hartmann reiterates in his 1922 comment - that he 
has not been to Japan: 
! ! The day will come when I shall kiss that sacred soil, 
! ! And to the floweriness that from thy ashes rose,
! ! Each kiss shall tell the secret of my life [...] (9-11)
As in the later comment, that Hartmann hasnʼt been to Japan turns from a fact to a 
displaced potentiality with the difference that in 1922 Hartmann is less certain that heʼll 
ever actually “see the country which he most longed to visit” (Early Poems 2).  But in 
either case the anticipated visit to Japan isnʼt ever an actual relation to Japan, a point 
that the stanzaʼs sustained image, of Hartmann kissing the Japanese soil, tries to bridge 
63
through sentimental intensity.19  But whereas kissing the ground is an image of 
concretion, since what is more solid than the ground, in the next lines this solidity turns 
vague.  In line 11, we are still in the moment of the kiss, but in the previous line the soil 
being kissed is also somehow the “floweriness” from “thy ashes.”  Kissing the soil is 
sustained through these three lines only because Hartmann substitutes floweriness for 
flowers, so that he might well be kissing the floweriness of the soil or possibly flowers.  
Perhaps even more importantly, this substitution makes Hartmannʼs lack of knowledge, 
that he wouldnʼt know that flowers would not sprout from a nonexistent grave in Japan, 
irrelevant.  His focus is not on flowers, but floweriness, and not on Japan but 
Japanness.   
" But because the poem is about his Japanese mother, Japan canʼt be made 
inertly abstract.  The figure of a suffering Japanese woman in Japan seems to suggest 
what would become the powerful Madame Butterfly myth.20  Addressing the Japanese 
Club of San Francisco in 1916, Hartmann states that although “he knew nothing about 
his motherʼs birth [...] he would most prefer to believe that he was the son of a romantic 
woman like Madame Butterfly” (Ota 3).  As in “To My Mother” Hartmannʼs remark shows 
a sense of Japan as mood and not actuality, but this comment seems to make the 
importance of a suffering Japan more explicit.  
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19 In his 1922 comment, Hartmann ends by comparing himself to Friedrich Schiller, writing “Will my fate 
be like that of the author of ʻWilhelm Tell,ʼ never to see the country he most longed to visit” (2).  This 
obviously European reference interestingly equates Schillerʼs distance from Switzerland with Hartmannʼs 
distance from Japan.  On one hand this reiterates the cultural blindness of Hartmannʼs “German middle-
class sentimentality” which erased the specifically Japanese content the poem aimed for, but on the other 
hand, the connection emphasizes that Hartmann is not solely Japanese and is quite at home in a German 
context.  
20 John Luther Longʼs “Madame Butterfly” is from 1898, but Pierre Lotiʼs novel Madame Chrysanthemum 
is contemporary with Hartmannʼs poem, both from 1887.  
! Yet Hartmannʼs mention of Madame Butterfly here is not straightforward.  As 
Susan Koshy points out, the Madame Butterfly type is by no means a static archetype.  
In fact, Koshy suggests that the most prevalent image of Madame Butterfly, Giacomo 
Pucciniʼs, had to be revised to purge itself of troubling critiques against imperialism in 
Asia and that historically, the Madame Butterfly storyʼs purportedly sympathetic view of 
Asia in the early twentieth century was sometimes taken to be just that, actual 
sympathy.  Furthermore, the setting of Madame Butterfly takes place in a modernizing 
Japan, as opposed to a generalized Orient.  In this context, the Madame Butterfly figure 
“goes from being the unknowable object to the suffering subject in the asymmetries of 
power produced by Japanese entry into modernity” (Koshy 32).  So then itʼs not that 
Madame Butterfly represents only the romantic trope of suffering femininity, but that this 
suffering is tied to specific geopolitics.  
! Hartmannʼs poem is also suggestive of international power, but only suggestive.  
The first lines move from a specific death to a nebulous love that must “hang over all the 
world” (2).  Then, the final line of the poem concludes the ambiguous phrases of the first 
stanza by moving from soil to an explicit address to the personaʼs mother: to “Thee I 
owe what I may give of Beauty to this world” (12).  This line doesnʼt meaningfully clarify 
the relationship between his Madame Butterfly-like mother and his aesthetic sensibility.  
In ending, Hartmann doesnʼt further address his mother, but instead appeals to his own 
desire to be an artist, augmented with a complex mediation between mother and world.  
At first, one might read this turn as bearing an incipient elitism, that as he has somehow 
been consecrated as a great poet, but such a reading is undermined by this poemʼs 
mood of melancholy.  As line 11 makes clear, that the poet draws beauty from his 
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motherʼs death isnʼt obvious, but “secret.”   The freighting of symbolic beauty with the 
elegiac makes the project of giving “Beauty to this world” implicitly failed but thus only 
more beautiful.  And the poemʼs failure to explicitly connect Hartmannʼs motherʼs death 
with his poetic aestheticism shows that the figure of his mother bears a residue of the 
political that is meant to remain outside explicit statement.  
" And yet, this moment of repression seems exactly where to focus attention.  
Hartmannʼs pronoun use insistently addresses his mother as “thee” in elevated diction, 
but the poem opens by invoking mother in her most general aspect, as simply a woman, 
perhaps because it would be both grammatically redundant and oddly confusing to say 
“My motherʼs death created me.”  So the phraseʼs clarity depends on suspending for a 
moment the poetʼs relationship to his mother in favor of her status as a female.  This 
generalization only appears at the beginning of the poem but it nonetheless suggests 
that the intense emotion of the poem can be put abstractly into relationship with 
“woman,” as the more general category of mother.  And since the poem operates on the 
suggestive level of the abstract, the intense emotion that somehow makes the world a 
substitute for the mother, seems as though in its logic of unstated transference, the 
desire to give beauty to the world as an expression of love can be rooted in love for 
women in general and not only mother.  In other words, what abstraction enables is the 
breach of the incest taboo, risked but ultimately repressed in this poem in limiting 
abstraction to mother, and excluding the broad category of women in general through 
even more sentimental insistence on the figure of the mother.  
" Itʼs interesting to note that in 1887 Hartmann felt able to imaginatively generalize 
the specific Japanese context away, but that in 1922 he must address the reality of 
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Japan as culturally separate and unknown.  Even in this acknowledgment, the purpose 
of the 1922 comment is a defense of the poem as mistaken but genuine.  In short, 
Hartmann asks us to substitute the emotion that the poem takes pains to evoke for the 
poem itself.  But in reading the poem this way, we must also suspend both Hartmannʼs 
failure to represent Japan and the sexuality that mobilizes the intensity he means to 
invoke.  In Fowlerʼs memoir, Barrymore at one point calls Hartmann “a living freak 
presumably sired by Mephistopheles out of Madame Butterfly” (Fowler 7), and this quip 
seems to characterize Hartmannʼs animosity toward his father with the tragic fantasy his 
mother represented.  But perhaps more significantly, it suggests the romantic 
subjectivity Hartmann seemed invested in, one in which failure connotes genuineness.  
" Because the most concrete moments in the poem, the motherʼs death, the hills of 
Kobe and the soil and flora of Japan, turn out to be vague, inaccurate and totally out of 
the direct experience of the speaker, the final effect of the poem is an odd emptiness.  
In this emptiness, this early poem of Hartmannʼs seems curiously like late style: a poem 
that is interrupted by what is impossible for it to represent: an authentically Japanese 
identity.  And like Whitmanʼs late work, Hartmannʼs early poem doesnʼt merely omit the 
void it canʼt express, it becomes about that very void.  The poemʼs most blatant missing 
connection, its transformation of desire for the mother to desire for the world, is not quite 
sexual, which after all would render that absence in some way present at the level of 
content.  Instead, the unknowable mother is at the heart of a whole series of abstract 
exchanges, and her unknowability is somehow the motive of a more general desire, its 
cause.  Jacques Lacan briefly refers to the Oedipus Complex as a “cultural intervention” 
that “decisively tips the whole of human knowledge into being mediated by the otherʼs 
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desire” (Lacan 7).21  Culture, as Patterson suggests, is the means by which oneʼs 
position of power or powerlessness is made natural.  What Hartmannʼs slight tilt toward 
the Oedipal suggests is that the intimate self is not original, because it is not fully 
present.  Absence makes everything somewhat foggily interchangeable.  Thus, even the 
self who feels an most intense emotion based on absence is not fully unique.  Lacan 
suggests that desire, which is a drive based on absence, is cultural, and thereby makes 
power part of the deep truth of subjectivity.  
" “To My Mother” registers two important features of Hartmannʼs other symbolist 
poetry; first, that intense emotion and the intimacy it implies is the aim of his poetry and 
then second, that the revelation of this intimate self nonetheless has a cultural aspect, 
something that renders the text as a poem, and Hartmann as a poet, significant.  This 
poem shows more failings and impasses, and even tries to poeticize failure, but in the 
work I now turn to, Hartmannʼs focus on sexuality enables him on the one hand to write 
about something that bears intensity at its basic biological level, and on the other, is a 
cultural mode for whatʼs intimately personal.  
Racial Sexuality in Hartmannʼs Symbolist Poems
" According to Hartmannʼs autobiography, one of his late nineteenth century poetry 
readings in Bostonʼs Chickering Hall provoked a career-killing scandal as he veered into 
sexually themed material (“My Second Boston Season” 1).  While Hartmann doesnʼt 
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21 Lacanʼs remark on the Oedipus Complex that I am referring to is from his famous essay “The Mirror 
Stage as Formative of the I Function as Revealed in Psychoanalytic Experience.”  Thus the specular 
image of the infantʼs wholeness contrasts with his or her real physical limitations and directs desire toward 
the wholeness that the mirror image possesses.  
record exactly what poem prompted what outraged response, instead portraying himself 
as entirely engrossed in giving the reading, we might turn to a verse from his manuscript 
Naked Ghosts, which he dates 1887-1892:
! ! The gates of virginity are yielding to the nervous longing of youth, the halls 
! ! of womanhood are widening with natureʼs sublime truth. (4: III).
Hartmannʼs elaborate metaphor for sex seems almost humorous, or else bathetic, but to 
characterize it in this way is to miss its odd mixture of explicitness with the self-
consciously artistic.  The awkwardness of the metaphor, that we move from gates of 
virginity to halls of womanhood, isnʼt necessarily just a mixed metaphor; it also suggests 
a graphic movement from vulva inward to vagina.  But more interestingly, the verse 
depicts stages of female arousal in concrete terms, but also as responses to male 
penetration which is abstracted as “nervous longing.”  Apparently, a “society pet” 
Hartmann describes as an old actress “opined that one did not mention anatomical 
details, no matter how symbolic, in the presence of ladies” (“My Second” 1).  This 
comment provokes the question to whom Hartmann gave this reading, and in the text of 
a newspaper write-up he quotes from, it becomes clear that his audience was “mostly of 
the female element” and “well up in the social-literary set.”  Ann Laura Stoler narrates 
what she calls a “familiar” historical narrative that might explain why Hartmannʼs sexual 
poems read out in front of an upper class, largely female, and presumably white 
audience was provocative.  Stoler writes that as discourses became increasingly 
focused on social health, especially in the wake of imperial discourse, “child-rearing” 
became a matter of imperial and racial duty, and white women became “the bearers of a 
more racist imperial order and the custodians of their desire-driven, immoral 
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men” (Stoler 35).  In other words, the figure of the white woman as the subject of sexual 
desire and not its morally restrained object, was deeply threatening to precisely the 
most bourgeois conceptions of femininity.  
! The write-up goes on to record that as Hartmann read, “Young girlsʼ cheeks 
began to crimson, and matronsʼ faces to become set.”  And that by the end of the 
reading, “The feelings of the few men present may be imagined.”  That the male 
reaction is left unstated now raises a genuine question.  Was the spectacle of a mixed 
race man exciting a physiological response from women young and old the cause for 
outrage, or salacious interest?  Given that a violent male reaction would emphasize the 
scandalous nature of the reading, which the article seems to focus on, one might 
reasonably conclude that the male reaction was more prurient than prude, and 
moreover, since Hartmannʼs poems are indirectly symbolic, their generalizability might 
have been more conducive to vicarious imagining than distanced judgment.  
! Indeed, at least in the poem I cite above, Hartmann even risks an effusive 
overstatement and explicit male worship, which shifts focus onto female sexuality more 
than on a competitive male threat.  An idealization of masculine desire comes with the 
apparent conversion of “the nervous longing of youth” to “natureʼs sublime truth.”  The 
poemʼs shifting metaphor of female arousal implies a corresponding shift in the male 
terms, which would exalt the male penis as “natureʼs sublime truth.”  But rather than 
neatly follow this logic, the image turns into a moment of excess.  If the verse describes 
female arousal, at first the causal response is clear: the gates yield to longing.  The 
second clause is much more ambiguous.  Although the halls widen, this verb isnʼt 
necessarily transitive, as yielding is.  The possibility that widen may be intransitive 
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suggests that the halls may themselves widen, not in response to male penetration but 
through female arousal.  In this reading, “natureʼs sublime truth” wouldnʼt have to be 
read as a phallic metaphor, but rather as something more general, the mechanism of 
sexual arousal itself and for that reason a more general notion of sex.
" What seems pornographic about Hartmannʼs poem is not that it depicts sex, but 
actually the metaphorization that sex undergoes in the poem.  After all the sex in the 
poem is all too generic, and in a way uninteresting, except that it is clumsily draped in 
overstated imagery.  The particularly pornographic quality is the poemʼs formalization of 
sex into a “sublime truth.”  Frances Ferguson notes that pornography isnʼt just 
exposure; it “offers up not sex but the sexiness of sex. [...]  Its various procedures 
revolve around creating an ictus, or emphasis, that converts visibility into 
perspicuousness” (21).  Hartmann creates this emphasis through a clumsy metaphor 
whose own clumsiness makes sex overly visible even as it makes sex abstract.  
" But this conversion of sexuality into “perspicuousness” depends somewhat on 
context, since as the old actressʼs comment makes clear, there is at least the pretense 
of masking of the sexual content in symbolism without which Hartmann probably would 
not have attracted a large female audience in 1888 Boston.  Also, Hartmannʼs 
suggestions that sex is actually something abstract and sublime seem neutral enough, 
but situated in the rise of discourses on miscegenation the sense that sex is important 
and untenable could take on a political implication.  As Koshy notes, the post-Civil War 
period was when “Southern Democrats coined the term miscegenation to denigrate the 
black quest for political equality, deploying a sexual metaphor to connote a political 
threat” (Koshy 4-5).  Furthermore, Hartmannʼs physical presence itself suggests 
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interracial romance, “as the fruit and sign of forbidden desire” (18).  But then as Knox 
remarks, the poems seem “hardly ʻeroticʼ by current standards” (Knox 111), and 
probably not erotic given that among the print culture of the nineteenth century was 
widespread reading of pornographic books, at least prevalent among working class men 
(Reynolds 202).  So then Knoxʼs observation suggests either the stereotype of 
Victorian-era sexual prudishness or else something more immediate to the 
circumstance of the actual reading.  Stoler makes a suggestive point that seems to 
indicate that the answer is both a widespread cultural attitude about sex, and the 
immediate response of Hartmannʼs actual auditors.  She draws on Michel Foucaultʼs 
theory of the rise of sexuality in the nineteenth century to argue that as discourse on 
sexuality spread to be both an individual concern and a social one, the pressure toward 
normalization intensified into something all-consuming, both individual and social at 
once.  In fact, a special area of overlap of both the private and public sexuality became 
“a means of access both to the life of the body and the life of the species” (Foucault qtd 
in Stoler 34).  Given Hartmannʼs tendency to abstraction in his early work, that what is 
most personal is also depicted in general terms, Hartmannʼs sexual poems seem to 
offer a convergence between aesthetic theory and a political discourse that developed 
into a regime for managing sexuality in the twentieth century, which importantly, is 
refracted through race.  
# The title of Hartmannʼs manuscript that includes his erotic poems is drawn from a 
phrase in his poem “White Lady of My Desire” (1892).  The racial context seems 
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obvious on the level of the title, but the poem itself moves into the symbolic terrain 
Hartmann favors in these early poems.  
! ! Sleep on and smile thy radiant smile amid
! ! dawn-flowers, frail and white, while naked
! ! ghosts kiss thy bodyʼs soul as they pass in
! ! their magic flight, and I stand lone and
! ! shivering in the white and withering night. (1-5)
The two instances of whiteness in the poem are objectively descriptive, first as an 
adjective for “dawn-flowers” and second as a paradoxical description of night and itʼs 
notable that these descriptions are all peripheral.  The woman in the title exists in the 
poem only in the elevated second person address of “thy.”  The poemʼs overall effect 
becomes one of displacement, the descriptions of first the smile, the flowers, then 
ghosts and night are only suggestively related to the woman, but nonetheless seem to 
establish the poemʼs tableau as one that is weighted with its undescribed but most 
significant presence, the titular white lady.  
! Despite the possessive pronoun in the title, the persona figures in the poem more 
as a voyeuristic presence than agent; the sexual contact of the poem is on a spiritual 
level: between ghosts and a soul.  In fact, the speaker takes on an air of anguished 
isolation in the final lineʼs associational connection.  Nightʼs inversion into whiteness 
signals an intensity that canʼt help but act in metaphorical relation to the unfulfilled 
sexuality between the desired lady and the speaker, partly because they are connected 
in white surroundings.  There is after all an almost causal logic between the frail flowers 
and a night that is explicitly withering.  But rather than establishing a relation between 
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these two terms, itʼs important to note the ambivalence that figures the relationship but 
also points out its nonrelation, the capacity for metaphor to mix referents indefinitely, to 
constantly shift to the periphery.
" The lone poet of unfulfilled desire is a sentimental persona, but also as the 
witness of scene, the poet enacts a drama of viewing.  After all the intensity of the 
emotion in the poem arises not from sexuality but from watching, and itʼs on this level 
that whiteness bears the most emotion.  The progression of images in the poem 
suggests a kind of arrangement suspended in the syntax of the poemʼs single sentence, 
the odd metaphoric connections that nonetheless seem to return to whiteness.  The 
poemʼs emphasis on whiteness becomes finally an emphasis on form.  The poem is 
actually an imperative sentence, a command to sleep which is implicitly passive even as 
it suggests the poetʼs creative agency.  But as Leon Chai points out, even if a sense of 
form is “the ultimate result of aesthetic consciousness,” form itself “figures as something 
less than the whole of artʼs relation to life” (Chai 136-7).  This means that the formal 
awareness the poem develops through its trope of whiteness suggests something else: 
“the drama of human relationships that inform the spectacle” is actually “the highest 
possible ʻsubjectʼ for appreciation” (137).  And we return to something, the thematic of 
romantic suffering, that is essentially sentimental in its dimensions.  
" But as much as whiteness suggests a formal motif in the poem, its title explicitly 
establishes the woman as white.  As Koshy points out in her analysis of D. W. Griffithʼs 
movie Broken Blossoms (1919), the unfulfilled interracial love between the filmʼs gentle, 
spiritual Asian man and victimized white woman suggests not the immanent possibility 
of this kind of love, but its impossibility:  “romance operates a discourse of reciprocal 
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desire and compatibility that in plotting the tragic impossibility of union across Anglo-
Asian racial divisions naturalizes and entrenches them” (Koshy 69).  In other words, 
because of the emotional intensity of the failed romance, the sense that what really 
matters occurs at a more intense, more spiritual level, this poem, like Griffithʼs film, 
articulates the failure of connection at the material level of actual intercourse.  For that 
reason, the poem substitutes naked ghosts, as both nonexistent and immaterial, for 
actual contact.  
" One might be tempted then to read the nonoccurrence of sex in this poem as a 
way to mitigate the threat of miscegenation.  But then such a reading misses the 
particular prominence of sex in the poem.  Its metaphor of whiteness as an awareness 
of form suggests that the poemʼs sexuality might bear an emphatic effect beyond the 
mere visibility of sex, but as emphasis this effect will have to be indirect.  The poem 
does indeed seems to be about sexual visibility, with the woman as the object of the 
lustful gaze of the speaker.  But Hartmann effects a subtle transformation so that the 
woman comes to seem lustful herself.  From the first line, we are told she is 
unconscious and this detail at first seems to confirm her status as object, but in this 
unconsciousness she smiles and participates in sexual pleasure.  The net effect is that 
sexuality is part of her unconscious being, that she is suffused with sexuality.  The poem 
comes close to pornography insofar as its formal and descriptive effects begin to 
suggest a displacement from the poemʼs content to a sensibility that is sexual, but also 
abstract.  Itʼs this air of abstraction, the sense that nothing happens in the poem which 
makes it about a woman subordinated to desire, because sheʼs unconscious and still 
sexual.  Since she is strangely absent even as she expresses lust, the real subject of 
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the poem is not so much the woman herself but the enactment of a desire that moves 
into the realm of non-signifying, and therefore, the absence of actual sex becomes only 
secondary.  Arguably, the fact that the woman is overcome with desire connotes a racial 
threat all the more strongly, at least insofar as it depicts the white woman not as 
restricting sex to its purely moral and non-perverse function, racial reproduction, but as 
an end to itself, even if the poemʼs speaker is excluded from sexual contact.  
" So ultimately, a poem like “White Lady of My Desire” derives its air of sexual 
transgression not from the poet sentimentally lusting, but from a series of 
displacements.  In this it shares with “To My Mother” a quality of lateness common, 
paradoxically, to Hartmannʼs early poems.  Another 1892 poem that seems to address 
race in its title and takes up similar imagery is the more mythic poem “Melody in Black 
and White.”  Whiteness is used in a schematic, symbolic way, again associated with the 
womanʼs skin; “Gertrude” is described as being “as white as marble” (1).  But despite 
these similarities, the shift in “Melody in Black and White” away from the sentimental, 
first person perspective into something more allegorical suggests that this poem 
presents a case in which to explore Hartmannʼs Symbolist aesthetic at a greater 
intensity.  The poem is narrated from the third person as a romance between Gertrude 
and “Knight Death, who is her suitor” (2).  This figure is unavoidably awkward, not only 
by introducing an outdated chivalric context, but also as a personification of not only a 
cliched unrepresentable, but what all late work aims at: death.  
" But in noting whatʼs clumsy about the poem we also mark its intensification.  As 
Jim Hansen observes in his essay on allegoryʼs role in New Formalism, symbol is 
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ultimately mimetic.22  “As the key figure for tragic pathos, the symbol transmutes that 
which has been lost within the context of an individual work of art into an eternal, 
indivisible and essential unity” (Hansen 670).  Itʼs this sense that individual specificity 
leads into a transcendent ideal that affirms languageʼs ability to represent experience.  
The metaphoric displacements in “White Lady of My Desire” are ultimately rooted in the 
tragic air of the personaʼs lament.  But by replacing persona with a rhetorical figure, a 
personification, “Melody in Black and White” does not transmute itself into something 
that reads as unified.  Instead, it registers its different trajectories in such a way that its 
poetic representation feels inadequate.  Hansen notes, that allegory “becomes the 
formal feature [...] of the transient and the irretrievable” (671).
" Perhaps one instance of this poemʼs nonrepresentational quality is its more 
complex use of color.  Instead of adhering to the womanʼs whiteness, Hartmann seems 
to use contrast in a more pictorial mode, as in the third stanza:
She rends her robe to lure him to the ebon depth of her shame, but the 
naked knight desires no light from the darkness of his dame. (3)
Here darkness predominates in the description but it actually connotes two different 
things: first Gertrudeʼs vaginal opening and then more generally concealment.  
Hartmannʼs figural language enacts a smaller form of allegory that makes these two 
moments of darkness seem like two instances of the same sort of furtive shame, but the 
sexual emphasis of this stanza depends on Gertrudeʼs exposure, her attempt to use her 
own shame as a sexual lure.  Interestingly, Knight Death would rather have her stay 
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22 Hansenʼs claim that symbolism is mimetic uses the concept of mimesis to suggest representation, and 
draws from Walter Benjamin.  Benjamin emphasized the mimetic faculty over instances of mimesis, 
arguing that the “gift of seeing resemblances is nothing other than a rudiment of the powerful compulsion 
in former times to become and behave like something else” (qtd in Nicholsen 140).  
covered; the fact that she is performing for his gaze is ultimately more overt than what 
he wants, and draws a contrast with the unconscious woman of “White Lady of My 
Desire.”  
! What is so threatening about “the ebon depth of her shame?”  In commenting on 
Otto Weininger, Slavoj Žižek points out how Weiningerʼs theory of feminine sexuality, 
that woman “is sexuality itself” (Weininger qtd in Žižek 141), ultimately conceals an 
impasse at the heart of subjectivity.23  Žižek summarizes Weiningerʼs position in more 
detail as follows:
! ! Woman is not capable of a pure spiritual attitude, she cannot aim at truth 
! ! itself [...] When she seems to assume such a spiritual attitude, closer 
! ! observation never fails to discern a ʻpathologicalʼ sexual interest lurking in 
! ! the background (a woman speaks the truth in order to make an 
! ! impression on man and thus facilitate her seduction of him, etc.).  (138)
A similar pathology underlies the notion of shame in Hartmannʼs poem.  Gertrudeʼs 
willingness to expose herself reveals more than just her genitals, rather she shows the 
extent to which shame itself is a means of seduction.  Shame as personal emotion is a 
ruse that masks something more radical: her own embodiment of sexuality, which is to 
say, her own allegorical status as sex itself.  Needless to say, her sexuality exceeds the 
logic of normative racial reproduction.  
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23 According to the digitized version on Google Books, the work Žižek cites, Sex and Character was 
published in English translation in 1907.  My claim for connecting Hartmannʼs work with Weininger is only 
loosely historical and based on the possibility that an unelaborated form of Weiningerʼs sexism could well 
be part of Hartmannʼs cultural milieu fifteen years before Sex and Character appeared.  More historically 
problematic is the theoretical notion of subjectivity, central to Žižekʼs Lacanianism, which is definitely 
ahistorical to Hartmann, but I use it here only as a synonym for the general term “man.”  In other words I 
want to suspend the question of theoretical subjectification.
! In claiming Gertrude as an allegorical figure, we risk broadening the scope of 
allegory beyond a personification of Death to something more ambiguous.  Her proper 
name indicates not so much an idea as a person.  In fact, contrary to the abstraction 
that allegory is meant to embody, proper names are examples of definitional simplicity.  
A name is meant as a label and not as a description.  But as a simple marker, the name 
becomes not a sign but rather a pointer, merely an indication that Gertrude is there, 
without any claim as to what qualities characterize Gertrude.  For that reason, Paul de 
Man suggests that a name is actually a trope, which has “a substitutive relationship that 
has to posit a meaning whose existence cannot be verified” (de Man 56).  Precisely 
because whatever characterizes Gertrude is not in her name, while nonetheless being 
articulable by nominative convention, the name acts as the substitute for the person.  
De Man does not state that a name functions allegorically, merely as a trope, and this 
difference is significant.  His insistence that a name is not a sign is based on 
recognizing that what would be represented in a name, its meaning, has an unverifiable 
existence.  In other words, the personhood denoted by Gertrude infinitely exceeds the 
name.  
! In addressing allegory de Man first questions the force of language.  He 
concludes that the effectivity of language depends on two modes of persuasion, the 
rational persuasion of critique, and persuasion by pleasure which acts by fiat.24  These 
“two functions are radically heterogenous to each other” such that “the necessary 
choice between seduction and truth remains undecidable” (69).  And yet this is a forced 
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24 This distinction is perhaps clearer in considering the more immediate pleasure of asserting a position 
as opposed to carefully delineating it.  De Man notes that the rhetoric of pleasure is a discourse of power 
that “is pure performance” and “usurps the claim to epistemological rightness” from argumentation (68).
choice in that to not decide is to side with seduction, even as the real choice is still 
undecidable, which is an insight that skeptical reasoning enables us to make.  De Man 
remarks, “[t]he (ironic) pseudoknowledge of this impossibility, which pretends to order 
sequentially, in a narrative, what is actually the destruction of all sequence, is what we 
call allegory.”  So then to de Man allegory marks the moment of this forced choice, the 
uneasy combination of two incompatible levels.  
! In the fourth stanza Hartmann introduces the only explicit reference to music in 
the poem, which takes place as a metaphor. 
He squats upon the inky ground, and claws a deep hole with his clattering 
bones till the grave grows deep, till the grave grows wide to the music of 
her groans. (4).
At the descriptive level, Gertrudeʼs groans seem to indicate merely the repetition of a 
particular sound, but they are also in response to Deathʼs digging.  These two activities 
are similar, both repetitive and possibly rhythmic, but digging results in the grave 
becoming larger.  If rhythm suggests a sequence, and sequence time, then the growing 
grave makes an obvious metaphor for lifeʼs passage toward death.  That Gertrudeʼs 
groans are sexual is also obvious, and the stanzaʼs ending gesture seems to emphasize 
this aspect in order to keep it in view.  If the metaphor operates at these two levels, sex 
and death, the contrast between digging and music also becomes significant.  In 
contrast to digging Gertrudeʼs groans arenʼt productive and in that sense seem more 
purely to mark time than to culminate.  For that reason the groaning is more formal than 
digging, which is dependent on its specific activity.  The fact that groaning punctuates 
the growth of the grave in parallel with it but not partaking of it, suggests that the 
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ultimate importance of the grave is somehow beyond itself and that itʼs the music and 
not the hole that captures this significance.  
" Why should music be so significant in this poem about death and sex?  The 
poemʼs title implies an importance on the level of form, that each occurrence of white or 
black marks the motif that occurs in the way a melody does.  But also, music seems to 
confer a certain mood to the poem such that moments like Death digging to Gertrudeʼs 
sexual moans seem to symbolize something vague and unknown. Chai states that 
music makes “our experience of the passage of time [manifest] an inherent form” so that 
ultimately “music presents an analogy to our existence” (Chai 206).  Our experience of 
time can occur in two ways, either as a sequence of moments in a continuous flow, or 
as discreet events that seem to arrest time in memory.  Musicʼs structuring of time into 
form, in recognizably repeated moments that comprise a motif, enable the experience of 
time as moments.  But the ability of music to assume the status of a trope, to not only 
make us aware of time but to represent time itself as Chai claims it lets us do, depends 
on a chiasmic reversal.  
" At first it seems sensible to state that we experience a flow of sensations in the 
present, and that memory is outside this flow of sensation.  If the content of experience 
is sensation then the content of memory must be something else, not immediate 
sensation, but something more motivated by emotion, at least if what we remember 
doesnʼt just passively come before our senses, as with experience, but rather is stirred 
in some way.  Making these distinctions suggests a binary between experience and 
memory:
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! Experience ! Flow of time! !Sensation!
!      vs.!! ! ! ! vs.! ! !      vs.!
! Memory      ! Arrested moment ! Emotion
But then, a particular form of experience, an experience of something repeated, results 
in another mode of perception:
! ! a perception of the recurrence of a sensation [...] occurs only when the 
! ! actual sensation recurs.  We ʻexperienceʼ it, then, at the same moment as 
! ! the actual sensation.  But in addition the recognition itself, as a perception 
! ! of recurrence, specifically concerns the relation of one experience to 
! ! another in time. (Chai 206)
The experience of a sensation that reminds us of a prior experience enables us to 
actually experience two moments so that what we perceive of time is outside of time, 
which is to say that we experience not the flow of sensations, but the relation of two 
moments of time.  This means that the experience of the present moment becomes not 
merely sensory but also emotional, tied up with what prompts us into memory:
!
! Experience ! ! ! Flow of time! ! ! Sensation!
!      vs.!! ! ! ! vs.! ! !      vs.
! Memory! ! ! Arrested moment! ! Emotion
At the same time, memory is no longer the sensation of an isolated moment since that 
moment is now in relation to the present, and the relation of these two moments 
82
suggest a flow of time.  Furthermore the present sensation causes the memory and 
repeats the content of the memory itself, so that ultimately the experience of a motif, or 
a musical melody, entails a chiasmus that destabilizes the difference between memory 
and experience.  
! The significance of this destabilized binary is ultimately that the formalization of 
time through music makes possible a movement beyond either experience or memory.  
Itʼs this movement that de Man characterizes as the mode of allegory, a doubled relation 
to meaning that is finally irresolvable.  The music of Gertrudeʼs groans contrasts the 
finality of death even as it suggests that the process of dying is embedded in each 
moment of experience, in lifeʼs occulted present.  That these groans are carnal, 
suggestive of strong physicality and sensation, emphasizes the uneasy doubleness of 
the poem.  So then music in this poem establishes Gertrude as the properly allegorical 
figure, even more so than Knight Death because her sexuality pervades the poem while 
also withholding a final significance.  This significance, ironically, is the meaning of 
Gertrude not as a figure but as a life, since what is irresolvable about her, and her 
sexuality, is what experiential living means, or in other words, the meaning of life.
! The poemʼs conventional nature, that it is a poem of courtly love between knight 
and lady, affirms the allegorical status of Gertrude.  According to Žižek, the courtly lady 
is not meant to depict an actual woman, but rather an inhuman idealization (Žižek 90).  
As an inhuman ideal, the courtly lady generates anxiety, and itʼs this anxiety that 
Hartmannʼs poem resolves in its conclusion. “Melody in Black and White” ends by 
implying Gertrudeʼs death, but just as digging a grave has a metaphorically sexual aura, 
the final stanza takes on a pornographic emphasis.  The grave becomes “the nuptial 
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bed” (5) and at this moment Gertrude is made into an object, that is, into a properly 
inhuman courtly lady.   She is dragged down and “wrapt tight in her mantle of raven 
hair.”  That she is still somewhat clothed seems to recall the third stanza, that against 
her desire to be naked the Knight wants her covered, except itʼs not clothing she wears, 
but her hair.  Although described as a mantle, as an image being wrapped in hair 
suggests bondage.  These images of Gertrudeʼs helplessness conclude in the last 
clauses of the poem as a disavowal of her sexuality: “darkness embraces her sinful life 
under the moonlightʼs laughing glare.”  The sexuality which earlier in the poem 
intensified its effect is finally characterized as a sin, which Gertrude is punished for.  But 
this punishment is not the reestablishment of a rational, moral order, but rather the 
salacious excess of display; the moon watches in evident amusement, trivializing the 
intensity and destabilization that her sexuality seemed to carry.  Gertrudeʼs allegorical 
status and the anxiety it provokes becomes the poemʼs most pressing point of tension, 
and closure arises only when this generative rhetorical trope is confined and deprived of 
its power.
" Itʼs worth remarking on the typicality of a figure like Gertrude, especially within 
the context of Symbolist literature.  Sarah E. Maier lists various types of women 
frequently used in Symbolism but focuses on the figure of Salome as she appears in J. 
K. Huysmans, Gustave Moreau and Oscar Wilde.  Wildeʼs play Salome ends much like 
“Melody in Black and White” with Salomeʼs death, and thus with the similar effect that 
her death “allows fin de siècle culture to culminate its long, fantastic, ritualistic 
indictment of woman for her criminal demand for independent sexuality and 
desire” (Maier 222).  Maier argues that these depictions of Salome reveal a historical 
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shift from “sentimental and early Romantic literature [in which] the feminine is linked 
with an expressive aesthetic that provides a vehicle for the cultivation and articulation of 
feeling” to what under Symbolism becomes “parody, and the preoccupation with surface 
and style” (Maier 217).  This note of parody is a particularly distinct trait of Huysmans, 
according to Arthur Symons who quotes at length a passage from Huysmanʼs novel A 
Rebours (1884).  That Symons selects a passage depicting Moreauʼs painting of 
Salomeʼs dance affirms Maierʼs point on the significance of the Salome femme fatale 
figure.  
She was no more the mere dancing-girl who, with the corrupt torsion of 
her limbs, tears a cry of desire from an old man; who, with her eddying 
breasts, her palpitating body, her quivering thighs, breaks the energy, 
melts the will, of a king; she has become the symbolic deity of 
indestructible Lust, the goddess of immortal Hysteria, the accursed Beauty 
[...] (qtd in Symons 252)
Salomeʼs debased status as a sexual object becomes allegorical--note her 
transformation into personifications of lust, hysteria and beauty--and makes sex 
something that is both impermeable to meaning and destructive, a kind of negativity that 
stands in contrast to an earlier construction of feminine sensibility as an inherent 
closeness to genuine affect.  
" Like Salome, Hartmannʼs Gertrude also allegorizes sex, which means that she 
externalizes sexuality without also having the interiority that characterizes romanticism, 
and in departing from romanticism, Hartmannʼs work is not only a version of a 
nonspecific romantic persistence.  Behind sex, there is a radical void, the death of 
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meaning.  Thus, part of Gertrudeʼs status as a parodic allegory expresses de Manʼs 
sense of languageʼs irrational dependence on pleasure; the superficiality and 
nonmeaning that makes languageʼs referential quality possible is part of the pervasive 
emptiness that Gertrudeʼs sexuality gestures toward.   
" Also, itʼs important to note that the first successful law limiting Chinese 
immigration, and thus the first law to ever restrict what had before been an immigration 
policy whose openness was thought to express American democracy itself, was 
explicitly directed at controlling sex, the 1875 Page Law.  Analyzing the Page Law, 
Koshy notes,
Although prostitution was widespread in California and women of different 
nationalities participated in sex work, Chinese women were identified as a 
singular moral and public health danger: They were identified as carriers 
of unusually virulent strains of venereal disease and as corrupters of 
young white boys. (11)  
Koshyʼs observation suggests that what the Page Law affirms is a version of sex much 
like Hartmannʼs depiction of Gertrude, except what dehumanizes Chinese prostitutes 
isnʼt just a socially-empty form of sexuality, but the reading of a debased and empty 
sexuality as a property of race.  And as Hartmannʼs prose meanderings suggests 
above, race marked a kind of limit to national identity, a way that some people within a 
nation could be denied the status of nationals, and consigned to social death.  
" Koshy goes on to point out that the exclusion of Chinese women from the US 
based on their “imagined Oriental licentiousness” meant that “sexual contacts between 
white men and Asian women overseas emerged largely in the context of the sexual 
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license and power afforded white men in treaty ports, military bases, or as occupying 
forces in Asia” (11).  At the same time “immigration law made marriage the precondition 
for the continuation of these relationships in the United States.”  Here, the racialized 
sexuality of Chinese women mirrors sex under slavery.  In defining slavery as an 
extreme form of social domination, and social death as characterizing how slavery was 
culturally represented in slaveholding societies, Patterson suggests that some element 
of social death is present whenever domination occurs.  Patterson notes, 
There was little variation among slaveholding societies with respect to the 
sexual claims and powers of masters over female slaves: I know of no 
slave- holding society in which a master, when so inclined, could not exact 
sexual services from his female slaves. (Patterson 173)
What this common element of slavery “often resulted in [was] ties of affection between” 
male master and female slave (230).  Furthermore that affection was “reinforced when 
the slave woman bore a child for the master” to the extent that many societies 
“automatically freed the concubine--especially after she had had a child.”  Thus the 
status of Chinese women, subordinated to a racialized version of their social position, 
remarkably mirrored the general form of sex under social death, which after all, is not to 
be beyond the pale of society, but to be inconsistently incorporated.  
! That inconsistency becomes the great subject of Hartmannʼs early work, and 
what gives it a version of what Said diagnosed as the quality of late work.  And if the 
political context of Hartmannʼs work isnʼt obvious in the work itself, I argue that it is 
apparent in his workʼs fragmentation, and his perhaps surprising use not of Whitman in 
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1855, the ambitious Whitman, the Whitman who attempts to embody all of the US in 
verse, but of the Whitman he knew in the 1880s, obsessed in his poetry with death.  
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Chapter 2
Textual Ethics and the Didactic Subject: Marianne Moore and José Garcia Villa
! In a dense, perhaps contradictory review of José Garcia Villaʼs 1942 volume 
Have Come, Am Here, Marianne Moore begins with a global assertion, “Depth is not the 
fashion,” before going on to describe Villaʼs poems; they are “bravely deep” (Moore 
394).  Moore doesnʼt explain outright what she means by depth, but later in the review 
she makes a crucial distinction between obscurity and mystery, writing that “a poem 
deprived of its mystery would no longer be a poem” and to think otherwise is like 
“dissect[ing] a rose to determine its fragrance.”  Depth then, seems to be a quality of 
resistance in the text of the poem itself, a kind of gnomic, unforthcomingness.  To say 
that depth is not the fashion is not to say, as we might have initially assumed, that a 
certain kind of poetry has fallen into disfavor among the readers of poetry that the 
review is addressed to, since poetry itself is deep, but that a hostility to depth is more 
generally out there, somewhere in the culture.  
! Who hates depth?  This first paragraph also makes the reviewʼs only mention of 
Villaʼs race, describing him as a “new poet, ʻa young native of the Philippines,ʼ” whose 
“work is for the most part new to print” although the “final wisdom encountered in poem 
after poem merely serves to emphasize the disparity between tumult and stature.”  
Moore begins with an emphasis on newness and youth, and characterizing Villa in an 
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uncited quotation as “a young native of the Philippines” links youth to being Filipino.1  
Such a formulation canʼt help but recall William Howard Taftʼs infamous phrase “little 
brown brothers” in which the imperial rule of the Philippines was justified through 
tutelage--that through colonization, immature Filipinos would be made to learn self-
governance.  But then Moore repudiates such logic by characterizing Villa not as 
immature or unfinished, but as having “stature.”  Depth, it would seem, belies facile 
racial stereotypes.  
" Stature, if read into the loaded context of US Imperialism as I suggest, might 
imply a kind of completed self, since the supposed goal of tutelary colonialism was 
democratic self-governance.  So it seems contradictory for Moore to then say Villaʼs 
“poems about divinity,” which are the bulk of the poems in Have Come, Am Here, are 
“deadly to self-esteem.”  But Mooreʼs full meaning, and this is perhaps what she means 
by depth, would have to be that the truth of the self is a kind of humility, and indeed the 
review ends by citing three lines of Villaʼs, 
How shines my dark world
Upon the sun! and gives it
Light …
as “humilityʼs paradox.”  Here we might point out that Moore earlier associates “certain 
paradoxical avowals” in Villaʼs poems as what makes them “bravely deep.”  Thus, 
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1 Timothy Yu, in his much cited account of Villaʼs modernist reception, comments that Moore converts “the 
Filipino poet into the ʻChinese master,ʼ a move that identifies him with modernismʼs ʻChineseʼ inspirations, 
with subtext rather than text.  She curiously puts his actual national origin in quotation marks […] as if this 
information were irrelevant or of questionable veracity” (Yu 47).  Yuʼs concern in his essay is to bring out 
the orientalist assumptions necessary to making Villa a modernist poet, as opposed to a postcolonial 
poet, and insofar as my own argument in this chapter is that Villa intervenes in the problem of colonialism, 
my work in in sympathy with Yuʼs.  However, I donʼt agree that Moore simply substitutes China for the 
Philippines in her understanding of Villa, because Iʼm inclined to see Moore as enacting a similar position 
toward colonialism as Villa himself.  
stature means a kind of self-critique, in seeing oneself as dark, one actually produces 
light.  
! Moore, as her biographer Charles Molesworth notes, often used reviews to 
express “questions of self-definition” (Molesworth 162).  We might then see her 
meditation via Villa on depth as a kind of self-review, relating to her verse in the 1940s, 
whatʼs often called her didactic poems.  In fact, as early as 1936 Moore argues in a 
lecture that “depth of utterance is better than a pinnacle of self-sufficiency” (qtd in 
Molesworth 318).  Parts of this lecture show concerns Moore later puts into the essay 
“Feeling and Precision” (1944).  Her overall argument is that technique, or the precision 
of an utterance, entails a willingness to err, and itʼs this risking of imperfection that art is 
staked on, that also reveals the deep personal conviction beneath what seems singular 
in art.  
! But if this thesis seems to rehash high modernist idiosyncratic impersonality, 
Moore ends by invoking one of the most pressing moral crises of the twentieth century, 
the holocaust.  
Professor Maritain, when lecturing on scholasticism and immortality, spoke 
of those suffering in concentration camps, “unseen by any star, unheard 
by any ear,” and the almost terrifying solicitude with which he spoke made 
one know that belief is stronger even than the struggle to survive.  And 
what he said so unconsciously was poetry.  So art is but an expression of 
our needs; is feeling, modified by the writerʼs moral and technical insights. 
(402)
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This conclusion to the essay is enigmatic to say the least.  One approach to interpreting 
it might be to seize upon what Moore means to say about art through this quote.  If so, 
Moore makes what at first appears to be a bold assertion, “that belief is stronger even 
than the struggle to survive;” and this comment comes from an unexpected context: a 
professorʼs lecture, not an artwork.  But in departing from the explicitly artistic, in the 
paragraph previous to what I quote Moore discusses Rembrandt and Bach, Moore 
proposes that what art gives us is something beyond the question of emotion and 
technique.  That beyond, which constitutes artʼs purpose to Moore, is a concern that is 
ethical:  what does someone elseʼs suffering, unseen and unheard, have finally to do 
with us?  Moore ends with an expository summary of her views on art, but a perhaps 
better way to make sense of her turn toward history is to think of her opposition of depth 
and self-sufficiency.  Placing “belief” into poetry through Jacques Maritainʼs 
unconsciously poetic lecture suggests Mooreʼs ideas of depth, that mysteriousness 
which is part of poetry, and its opposition to a sense of self as self-sufficient.2  Instead, 
what all of Mooreʼs comments on depth, fashion and stature mean is an attitude of 
selfhood that subsumes itself for the sake of its own correction.  I call this the didactic 
subject, and its elaboration, in the work of both Moore and Villa, who shared her 
modernist literary circle, constitute these poetsʼ attempt to critique oppression, which to 
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2 The connection between Jacques Maritain and the holocaust is not accidental.  Maritain, as Richard 
Francis Crane points out, has a reputation of being an “outspoken critic of antisemitism” who is supposed 
to have advised Pope Pius XII to publicly denounce the persecution of Jews (Crane 25).  That Moore 
gives the topic of the lecture as “scholasticism and immortality” contributes to her tone of understatement 
even as Maritainʼs thought in the 1940s increasingly centers on the Shoah, in that his theological 
investigations turned toward struggling to answer how God could permit the evil of genocide.  And while 
he came to assert that Jews were enacting Christʼs sacrifice, he also strongly condemned “the bystander 
mentality that he sometimes saw in the democratic world” (42).
them was tied, more and more, to an understanding of the world as solely material.  But 
then what the didactic subject means in its historical context is hardly unproblematic.
! US colonization of the Philippines forms the immediate historical context into 
which I want to situate my analysis in this chapter, but this context can be read in at 
least two ways.  Sometimes, critics tend to emphasize the continuity of US colonialism 
with colonialism in general, which is to say, it is an imposition of the colonizerʼs culture 
and extirpation of native culture for the purpose of establishing dominance, culturally 
and economically.  But then this critique is one that is already in circulation in the late 
nineteenth century and one that proponents of the annexation of the Philippines 
addressed.  What they created, at least in rhetoric if not in policy, was an anticolonial 
colonialism, which positioned US colonialism against European colonialism by 
assuming not necessarily the universality of US culture in all its manifestations, but the 
importance of native cultures for achieving self-rule.  Its goal wasnʼt the direct governing 
of a global empire but rather an attempt to make such governing obsolete, through the 
spread of democracy.  But itʼs possible to see this American form of colonialism 
cynically; is it to be in Mark Twainʼs words, “a government according to our ideas” or “a 
government that represented the feeling of a majority of the Filipinos, a government 
according to Filipino ideas” (6).  But importantly, in either case, a more or less structural 
Americanness is imposed, either directly as in Twainʼs first option, or indirectly, as the 
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assumption that the genuine character of a nation resides in its folk, which also 
assumes the universality of the form of nation, arguably itself an American construct.3  
! This ambiguity is managed in the tutelary form of colonialism that takes shape in 
the Philippines, in what Julian Go stresses is a “semiotic system in-practice” (Go 4, 
emphasis removed).  What Go means is that the project of tutelary colonialism canʼt be 
thought of as being just one of political domination; it is also one that aims at a process 
of transformation directed, finally, at the level of culture and identity.  Go cites an official 
who remarks that the American colonial project should “serve as an instrument of 
instruction constantly at work training the habits, methods of thought and ideals of the 
people” (qtd in Go 7).  Thus, something like Mooreʼs suggestion of a didactic subject, 
one who engages in a humble self-questioning, becomes the kind of subject imagined 
by tutelary colonialism.
! Somewhat ironically, tutelary colonialism engages the moral use of art that Moore 
intends in the practice of didactic subjectivity, the kind of valorized humility of the 
incomplete subject.4  But then whatʼs notable in the practice of tutelary colonialism, at 
least in Meg Weslingʼs account, is the prominence of the literary as a tool for creating 
the kind of transformed subjectivity American colonization attempts.  
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3 In claiming that the modern sense of nation is American in origin, I mean to say that it is rooted in the 
relation between new world colony and old world Europe, as in Benedict Andersonʼs influential account of 
the origins of nationalism in Imagined Communities.  I deal further with Anderson and nationality in the 
chapter 4.  
4 Moore commented “I am inclined more and more to feel that MORALS in the old-fashioned Sunday-
school sense of the word” (original emphasis, qtd in Molesworth 318).  But then as “Feeling and 
Precision” should make clear, morals would not be unrelated to art.  She ends her comment by writing 
that morals “have a bearing on technique” so that we might conclude that an emphasis on mystery in 
poetry, and its hostility to self aggrandizement, is the moral technique Moore proposes.  
! Wesling first tries to explain the significance of literature in American education in 
the late nineteenth century.  What we witness is an emphasis on both morality and 
nation, especially in the paradigmatic example of Horace Scudder, a teacher and writer 
of childrenʼs readings, also the editor-in-chief of the Atlantic Monthly.  Scudder positions 
the literary as a replacement for religion in education, remarking that as schools 
became “more and more secularized […] it is to literature that we must look for the 
substantial protection of the growing mind against all ignoble, material conception of life, 
and for the inspiring power which shall lift the nature into its rightful fellowship with 
whatsoever is noble, true, lovely and of good report” (qtd in Wesling 88).  Scudder could 
thus be seen as intensifying an Arnoldian defense of literature, not only would literature 
be the best of whatʼs been thought and said, but in being the best it would supplement 
materialism with a sense that “the nature,” the inmost aspect of self, was actually 
immaterial.  This sense of the necessity of spirit is an important context for thinking 
about Moore and Villaʼs work in the 1940s, in that an overall crisis of materialism, and a 
turn toward metaphysics can be discerned in several cultural contexts and discourses.  
! For now though, we might ask a more grounded question.  Given that the 
dominant model for the education of racial others in the US had been that of industrial 
education, as in the Hampton Normal and Agricultural Institute and the Carlisle Indian 
Training School, where Moore worked briefly after college, why did US education in the 
Philippines embrace academic, specifically literary study?  Weslingʼs answer to this 
question runs through several steps.  First she locates the origin of a sense of 
literatureʼs transformative potential in the sentimental novel, which diffuses into 
American culture at large the assumption that “the white, middle-class home [was] the 
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center of civilized life” (81).  That sentiment is also behind the establishment of schools 
like Hampton and Carlisle; Wesling notes Harriet Beecher Stoweʼs involvement in an 
industrial school for freed slaves (82).  What that means is that the governing ideology 
behind such schools is the ideology of sentimentalism, that contact with white, middle-
class domesticity provides an irresistible model for righteousness for the racially 
benighted.  In the Philippines, direct contact with the American white, middle class 
couldnʼt occur materially; it would have to take the immaterial route, via literatureʼs 
spiritual critique of the all too material.5  
"   Moore and Villa are poets who have been difficult to reconcile with the critical 
paradigms one might want them to fit.  Moore avoids the autobiography and explicit 
politics that Kristen Hotelling argues are qualities critics define as feminist, thus making 
her seem not feminist (Hotelling 76).  And Villa, though he was once famous in both the 
US and the Philippines, has come to be seen as practicing an apolitical modernism that 
became “an easy target for charges of irrelevance, neocolonialism and elitism” 
according to Jonathan Chua (Chua 23).  But for Moore and Villa, the explicit positions 
that both sex and anti-colonialism would promote suggest a model of self completion 
which itself is problematic--perhaps even the deeper problem that belies sexism and 
colonialism.  The didactic subject, who renounces herself for the self to be, relies on a 
logic of self-otherness.  Whether this depth, as Moore would call it, suffices in the face 
of actual sexism and colonialism is a problem I attempt to explore in the remainder of 
this chapter.  
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5 Wesling also points out that another advantage to literature as a model of white normative domesticity 
for Filipinos was that literature could present “an ideal Americanism, the perfection of national culture to 
which no singular colonial representative could aspire” (11). 
Villaʼs Anticolonialism
!
! In addressing the inevitable question of Villaʼs diminished status, the political 
implication of his work seems partly to blame for why his work fell from fashion.  In the 
American context, that Villaʼs impersonal non-ethnic verse became marginalized by the 
1960s seems related to the rise not only of confessional verse, but a turn in avant-garde 
poetry itself toward questions of ethnicity.6  In the Philippines, Villa initially was a 
controversial figure who attained canonical status in the 1960s, but who by the 1980s 
was read as insufficiently anticolonial.  Recently Villa can be said to have undergone a 
resurgence, marked by Timothy Yuʼs important 2004 article on Villa and modernism, 
along with the 2008 Penguin edition of his collected poems.  The back cover of the 
Penguin edition notes that “Villa had a special status as the only Asian poet among a 
group of modern giants” and even this tagline suggests an incoherence in what Villaʼs 
poetry ultimately says about racial politics.  If his “special status” depends on his racial 
difference, it must be noted that race is not an explicit theme of his poetry.  In fact, Villa 
has been read as deracinated, as overly attached to a Western universalism.  So then, 
the two things that make Villa special are his race and his commitment to Western 
modernism and the relative acclaim he commands seems to depend upon which of 
these elements is prized at any given moment.  But what the narrative of Villaʼs 
reception reveals is an underlying assumption that modernity and Filipino ethnicity are 
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6 Timothy Yu speculates that Villaʼs reputation suffered in the turn toward autobiography in confessional 
verse in his essay “ʻThe Hand of a Chinese Masterʼ: José Garcia Villa and Modernist Orientalism” but he 
makes a much more comprehensive argument about the underlying focus on ethnicity in post-war avant-
garde poetry in Race and the Avant-Garde: Experimental and Asian American Poetry since 1965 (2009).  
I will have further comments on this book in the next chapter.
mutually exclusive, and it is precisely in dissenting from that assumption that Villa 
makes his strongest, anticolonial, anti-racist critique.  
! Comparisons between Villa and Carlos Bulosan are unavoidable in that the two 
writers are roughly contemporaneous and both Filipino American modernists.  However, 
Bulosanʼs form of modernism is the opposite of Villaʼs.  Where Villa focuses mostly on 
developing an idiosyncratic modernist style, Bulosanʼs modernism “is driven more by a 
rejection of colonial narratives of power than by a need to subvert preexisting literary 
genres or norms” to use Joshua L. Millerʼs words (Miller 241).  Miller focuses, 
interestingly, not on Bulosanʼs much read America Is in the Heart (1946) but on his 
earlier collection Laughter of My Father (1944) which was “an immediate best-seller 
upon publication” (238). The title story of this collection appeared in December 19, 1942 
issue of The New Yorker and it is clear why such stories would be popular, but also why 
Bulosanʼs work becomes important in a political context.
! Bulosan writes with an understated wit while lightly invoking folkloric and 
anthropological norms.  Narrated in an economical first person, Bulosan inserts a few 
macaronic words, pala pala is a dancing pavilion, in the midst of a story about trying to 
please his father (Bulosan 24).7 Additionally, as Miller points out, the story which 
supposedly relates how Bulosan came to emigrate to the US, ends up as a satiric 
critique.  The sentimental content of the story is intended as an “indictment against an 
economic system that stifled the growth of the primitive” (Bulosan qtd in Miller 244).  
Bulosan describes his town as “fifty grass houses perched on a low hill” and all of the 
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7 Although Laughter of My Father is published as a collection of short stories, in The New Yorker 
Bulosanʼs story appears as an essay, not as fiction.  The boundary between autobiography and fiction is 
notably blurry in much of Bulosanʼs fiction, including America Is in the Heart.
villageʼs residents are “farmers, because their ancestors had been farmers” (Bulosan 
24).  In the Philippines in the 1930s, about three quarters of a workforce of four million 
had low paying agricultural work, roughly like what Bulosan describes, according to Luis 
H. Franciaʼs 2010 book A History of the Philippines: From Indios Bravos to Filipinos 
(Francia 173).  And although independence was essentially promised to the Philippines 
in the 1934 Tydings-McDuffie Act the commonwealth status imposed upon the 
Philippines enforced an economic dependence on American goods.  Bulosanʼs writing 
condemns colonialism, not through strident argument but in an engaging emotional 
register that is more apparent in Laughterʼs folkloric pretenses than in the more direct 
condemnation of racial injustice and colonialism in America Is in the Heart.  
" Granting that Bulosan is “a foundational Asian American writer,” as Miller puts it 
(238),Villaʼs relatively marginal status seems related to the fact that Villa has the 
opposite orientation to literature and politics as Bulosan.  According to Jonathan Chua, 
Villaʼs criticism initiated a distinction between literature and propaganda which 
previously “did not exist as a category separate form the act of writing” (13).  Thus, Villa 
provides terms with which to denigrate cultural nationalist work, in that stories Villa 
objected to were often moral tales of Filipino essence intended to discourage American 
influences, as Chua writes (9).  Villaʼs critical prose, which took the form of polemical 
explanations for his annual lists of the best Anglophone Filipino writing, would be read 
as politically regressive.  The criteria Villa applied to rank literature wouldnʼt be seen as 
universal as Villa claimed, but “American or Western, inevitably carrying the biases 
specific to their origins and history while appearing to be universal and timeless” (Chua 
13).  
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! But calling Villaʼs critical standards American or Western implies that what Villa 
seeks in his criticism, a cosmopolitan Anglophone Filipino literature, is impossible.  The 
possibilities of literary creation are either to invoke a non-modern ethnic essence or to 
concede to colonization.  But the falseness of this opposition becomes clear in 
considering Bulosanʼs modernism.  After all, the ethnographic folklore of Bulosanʼs tales 
arenʼt a fantasy of authentic Filipino-ness but a reflection of that fantasyʼs painful 
untenability, and the properly critical dimension of Bulosanʼs work depends on seeing it 
motivate not nostalgia, but a more just future.  Similarly, if Villa seems to be insufficiently 
Filipino, one must ask what implicit notion of Philippine identity is being invoked.  In 
reading a series of Villaʼs annual commentaries, we notice that he evaluates Filipino 
literature in a narrative of development, this means that the ultimate aim of his criticism 
is to see the best Filipino writing attain the status of the best of literature itself, and in 
this, Weslingʼs comments on the use of literature as an embodiment of the best of a 
culture to justify tutelary colonialism canʼt be ignored.  Still, Villaʼs work implies that the 
Filipino-ness of Filipino literature is not a defined substance, but a process of 
becoming.8  Villaʼs modernist style should not be read as universalist or blankly 
cosmopolitan, but as attempting to create a Filipino literary identity that is not primarily 
nostalgic, even while it problematically depends on a didactic subject. 
! I argue that Villa should be read as what Matthew Hart calls a “synthetic 
vernacular” poet.  Hart uses “synthetic” to signal “a poetʼs attempt to sublate the tension 
between local languages and the ʻdesperate attempt at a new inclusivenessʼ” (Said qtd 
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8 Villaʼs use of his supposedly universal standards of good literature often entail a slippage between 
referring to the best Filipino writing and the best literature.  In a comment in 1936 Villa explicitly writes “My 
concernment with the Philippine short story is a concernment of love for the Short Story itself” (Critical 
Villa 167).  
in Hart 9).  The combined term of “synthetic vernacular” suggests that a departure from 
the fetishization of an originary ethnic essence in an attempt to root an as yet 
unfounded identity in particularity.  As much as Villaʼs verse is about mystical seeing, as 
in the verse Moore cites, this transcending vision is not blankly unconditioned.  What 
makes Villa seem like a poet of the high modernist notion of universal literature, his 
focus on innovative technique in usage and in reversed consonance, should also be 
read as an attempt to represent his own difference from colonizing, standard English. 
And in his obvious concern for how Anglophone Filipino literature develops, Villaʼs 
formalism is an attempt to “embrace the formal and ideological complications between 
the universal and the particular,” as Hart puts it. 
" To make a further point on the stakes of recovering Villaʼs anticolonialism I want 
to draw attention to Villaʼs class position.  Villa was among the political elite and not, as 
Bulosan was, part of the agrarian proletariat.  Miller points out that Bulosanʼs stories 
satirize and condemn not only colonial administrators but also “Filipino 
aristocrats” (Miller 244).  This connection of US Imperialists and the Filipino upper class 
underlies the assumption that Villaʼs cosmopolitanism is really a form of imperialism, but 
it also has a complex history.   Villaʼs father was a physician and chief of staff to Emilio 
Aguinaldo, the nationalist military leader who appointed himself the president of an 
independent Filipino government at the end of the Spanish American War, but who was 
forced to take the oath of allegiance to the US when he was captured in 1901.  Although 
Aguinaldo was then marginalized, political power for the next decades remained 
concentrated in his circle with US colonial policy giving progressively more power to the 
existing political class of the Philippines under tutelary rule.  Manuel L. Quezon, the 
101
president of the Philippines through World War II had been a lieutenant in Aguinaldoʼs 
army and initially attained power through US sponsored elections in 1907 (Francia 67).  
" But if this historical synopsis suggests that the authentically Filipino perspective 
is local and democratic, itʼs surprising to note that the American colonial state in the 
Philippines also regarded the so-called “average native” as the real Filipinos.  That rural, 
working class Filipinos supported resistance tended to be read not as a genuine 
complaint against US imperialism, but as a rejection of feudal conditions maintained by 
the Spanish culture of imperialism and the native elite.  In his analysis on the archive of 
the Philippine Commission, Daniel P. S. Goh argues that rather than proceed from the 
“Orientalist representations that saw the native as ʻincorrigibly inferiorʼ and ʻradically 
differentʼ” the Philippines were more often situated in a Darwinist context (Goh 115).  
Reading Filipino society as feudal “simultaneously recognized and disavowed cultural 
difference” in that while native Filipinos were backward, as in Taftʼs famous rhetorical 
figure of the little brown brother, they have the potential to become fully modernized like 
the US itself.  
" Given the two orientalisms, one that consigned Filipinos to permanent 
backwardness, the other tutelary, how should we read statements by the Filipino 
political class that seem to accede to colonialism?  For example, the Philippine 
Assembly wrote a resolution which states “on behalf of the people of the Philippine 
Islands [The Assembly conveys] to the President of the United States, their profound 
sentiments of gratitude and high appreciation of the signal concession made to the 
people of the Islands” (qtd in Go 170, Goʼs emphasis removed).  Is this the mark of an 
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oriental corruption about which nothing can be done, or is it an attempt to manage a 
new political context?
! To see the Philippine Assemblyʼs resolution as merely endorsing colonial policy 
presupposes that the aims and intentions imported from a context of early twentieth 
century American progressivism was articulable to a briefly independent Spanish colony  
in Asia with, obviously, a very different history.  Stated in this way, it should be more 
persuasive to argue that the collision of US colonial discourse with the already 
developed Filipino context would be a complex process in which the Assemblyʼs 
statement is neither purely American nor purely Filipino.  Focusing on the political elite 
of the Philippines under American colonialism, Go argues that the discourse of 
colonization is not unproblematically transferred, nor is it just a means of violent 
coercion.  Instead, “colonized groups tame the otherwise disruptive force of foreign 
intrusion while nonetheless accepting some of its terms” (Go 9).  Thus, the statement of 
gratitude to Theodore Rooseveltʼs concession to allow an American controlled form of 
self government uses the discourse the US introduced in a particular Filipino context.
! Goʼs work focuses not only on the Philippines but also on another colony the US 
seized in the wake of the Spanish American War: Puerto Rico.  Goʼs comparative 
approach shows that when the US set up a similarly devised House of Delegates in 
Puerto Rico, rather than meet with sycophantic praise, the establishment of this 
governing body met with boycott and protest.  And while it might be tempting to attribute 
this difference to large scale explanations on how Puerto Rico and the Philippines are 
different, US policy was very similar in both colonies, as were local patronage systems.  
Instead, what Goʼs analysis shows is that a more specific difference determined the 
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diverging paths of Puerto Rico and the Philippines under US rule.  What seems 
particularly decisive is that under Spain, Puerto Rico had essentially a one party 
government, while no such party system reigned in the Philippines.  This factor meant 
that when the same US-influenced multi-party government was established it was more 
disruptive for Puerto Rico than the Philippines.  
! Notably absent in explaining the difference between Puerto Rican resistance and 
Filipino acceptance is an account of popular anticolonialism.  In fact, while armed 
resistance persisted into the nineteen teens in the Philippines, no such violence greeted 
American occupation in Puerto Rico.9  So instead of continuing to privilege a notion that 
the authentic folk of a dominated colony is its majority, laboring class, it becomes 
important to consider how elite classes adapted discourses to their own contexts and 
not to simply read their response as a weak acquiescence to US power.  In fact, that the 
political elite were regarded by the US as exploitative and corrupt matches up with an 
assumption that their role under colonialism should be simply condemned.  Instead, if 
we fully take Goʼs point, that anticolonial and postcolonial politics are much more 
complex than a binary between power and resistance then itʼs plausible to suggest that 
part of Villaʼs current marginal status can be explained because his attempt to forge a 
cosmopolitan Filipino literature in English shows the mixing of discourses and contexts 
but has been misread and turned invisible.
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9 Francia points out that the 1902 declaration that the Philippine American War was over was justified only 
by the surrender of two insurgent generals, General Malvar and Aguinaldo, but violence persisted in other 
parts of the Philippines almost a decade past the official end of the war.  See pp. 154-160.  Go discusses 
the Puerto Rican reception to US forces as an attitude of overall welcoming across “[n]early all sectors of 
Puerto Rican society” (Go 55).  While Goʼs point is that much of the native context between the 
Philippines and Puerto Rico are the same, he does analyze the difference in initial response to US 
occupation in chapters 2 and 3.  
! In that case, Villaʼs rejection of nationalist literature which most obviously breaks 
with a popular anticolonial localism--the kind of writing we would recognize as political--
is also a rejection of his own marginalization in US colonial discourse which is 
historically rooted in early twentieth century progressivism.  And as a double rejection, 
Villaʼs conception of literary English as something defined more by form than content 
can be understood as something of a “determinate negation” to use Hegelʼs language.  
Hegel contrasts a skepticism that sees nothingness as the result of thought from a 
deeper perception that nothingness characterizes the process of thought itself.  
Confining negation only to the result creates an empty nothingness that “cannot get any 
further [...] but must wait to see whether something new comes along and what it is, in 
order to throw it too into the same empty abyss” (Hegel 51).  Skepticism as Hegel 
defines it here is at bottom conservative in that novelty is reduced to sameness, the 
sameness of negativity.  On the other hand, Hegel defines determinate negation as 
nothingness “which has a content” but in this paradoxical statement which seems to 
suggest that nothingness really is something, what really defines determinate negation 
seems to be its form.  Determinate negation is meant to explain the “necessary 
progression and interconnection of the forms of the unreal consciousness” (50).  So if a 
series of forms shows a movement away from error then its content isnʼt the particular 
errors which must be recognized as mistakes, but rather nothingness.  Nothingness is 
then a mistake to be realized, present through the entire series of gradual correction.  
The end result is thus not an empty negativity but rather the arising of “a new form” 
which is formal in that it is the “transition [...] through which the progress through the 
complete series of forms comes about of itself” (51).  
105
! Villa, in his polemical essays directed at the reading public at large, is obviously 
not so theoretical, but like Hegel he is concerned with a process of refinement and 
concludes that form best describes this process, while a focus on shifts in content is 
blind to the larger movement.  “All art moves towards the refinement of its form: art 
assumes the stature of art, not because of what it says, but because of its form” (Villa 
226, original emphasis).  While Villa phrases this assertion as a general aesthetic 
principle, the essay itself is an argument on poetry, and the immediate purpose for his 
pseudo-Hegelian observation is to reject the idea that the embrace of the “proletarian 
trend” in Filipino poetry represents “a sign both of intellectual and esthetic enlargement.” 
In definitively stating that the content of poetry is ultimately secondary, Villa argues that 
the uses of language are subordinate to language itself.  Implied in that argument is an 
unstated corollary that poetic language moves toward a negation of languageʼs prosaic, 
utilitarian function.10 Villaʼs conception of the separateness of the poetic from both prose 
and from the content of poetry finally rejects the particular dimensions of English as the 
colonial language.  As Martin Joseph Ponce observes, Villaʼs condemnation of realist 
prose carries with it a rejection of the use of English in colonial education as what is 
merely utilitarian (Ponce 8).  Villaʼs sense of the negativity of poetic language is then 
finally a rejection of colonialism as well.  
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10 Villa actually ends the essay with a long quote from Virgil C. Aldrich, who at first romanticizes the idea 
that a writer might just as well escape out of the ivory tower as escape into it.  But as his hypothetical 
writer becomes seduced into writing what sounds like 1930s protest poetry, he concludes that such a turn 
is a failure.  Instead, Aldrich claims “The artist, as artist, cannot wholly abandon the ivory 
tower” (emphasis removed).  But ultimately Aldrich strikes an ambivalent note in which the “practical 
motives” that characterize the real world outside the ivory tower “makes puppets of us all.”  Villa does not 
further comment on the quote, but that it ends by asserting the ultimate determination of “us all” by the 
“social milieu” suggests that artʼs transcendence is really a false consciousness.  
! To be consistent with his theory of English as a potentially universal language, 
Villaʼs aesthetic theory in the early 1940s has to also be strongly anti-representational.  
And in his increasingly radical renunciation of content, in 1941 he proposes a poetry 
that may have “no subject matter at all” (228), Villa doesnʼt conclude that poetry must 
then ultimately also be empty, but instead bases poetry in metaphysics.  In praising the 
poet Nick Joaquin, Villa describes Joaquinʼs poems as endowed with “great 
metaphysical seeing [...] which knows how to express itself in great language” and then 
also reveals a “genuine first-rate Mind” (229).  It should be pointed out that these terms 
donʼt seem to privilege metaphysics. Indeed Villa goes so far as to praise the lowly 
pragmatic quality of skill in about equal terms as metaphysical vision and the personal 
quality of intelligence, before finally hedging his claim that Joaquin is great by writing 
“he is potentially our greatest creative writer” (original emphasis).  The status of being 
potentially great rather than great is explained in the fact that Joaquin has not yet 
written much, which seems to make the point minor.  But if mere quantity can disqualify 
a writer from greatness it seems clear that what Villa considers a great poet is not a 
matter of artʼs capacity for self refinement, that it actually has a lot to do with real 
limitations: language, thought, skill, and even publishing with its implicitly market-driven 
logic.  
! If Villa gets drawn into the work aspect of artwork despite his commitment to artʼs 
nonutility, its distinction from propaganda, then to some extent a totally idealized art is 
unthinkable for Villa, even with an appeal to the powerful discourse of Western 
universalism.  Six years before his essays on Filipino poetry, Villaʼs compromised view 
of artʼs transcendence finds roughly similar expression in Martin Heideggerʼs attempt to 
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isolate what defines the artistic quality of art.  According to Dominick LaCapra, the 
context for Heideggerʼs thought is “an uncertain interregnum, a ʻno longer and not yetʼ 
after the departure of the old gods and before the hoped-for coming of the 
new” (LaCapra 123).  In other words, Heidegger is “paradoxically waiting for some ʻbig 
bangʼ in culture and existing after it, especially after what Nietzsche famously called the 
death of God.”  That Nietzsche ushers in a new era imbues philosophy with a lingering 
potential, even in the context of the broad upheaval characterized by a discredited 
Christianity that casts doubt on the tenability of universal Western discourse.  So when 
Western universalism fails Villa, the fact that Heideggerʼs comments on art respond to 
the diminished status of that very same universalism means these two different writers 
converge in a shared, widespread metaphysical disappointment. 
# Heidegger begins “The Origin of the Work of Art” (1935-6) with what seems to be 
a specialized and limited inquiry, the “question concerning the origin of the work of art 
[which] asks about the sources of its nature” (Heidegger 17).  But as neutral as this 
opening sounds, the fact that the essence of art is something that needs analysis to find  
it implies a deeper problem at the basis of knowledge; and through this problem the 
essay can be said to address the possibility of meaning itself.  Regarding art, Heidegger 
initially seeks to ground the origin of art in its “thingly character,” but then suggests such 
a turn is a dubious analytic reduction (19).  He points out that privileged terms like art or 
God are difficult to regard as mere things.  But even so, the “thingness of a thing is 
particularly difficult to express” (31), which puts the basic attribute of objective existence 
into a kind of metaphysical immanence.  If Heidegger initially acknowledges an idealist 
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bias against mere things, his review of “Western thought” shows that the philosophical 
tradition itself fails to adequately theorize thingness.  
! Heidegger implies that thought has a kind of destitution, first in epistemological 
obscurity and then in the failure to understand even concrete objects.  But pointing out 
the limits of thought affirms a paradoxical convergence of essence and object that 
corresponds to a religious perspective.  Heideggerʼs turn in the mid 1930s is toward a 
convergence of poetry and philosophy according to LaCapra (123), but this turn itself 
might be contextualized in the crisis of late modernism.  Like Heidegger, the theologian 
Reinhold Niebuhr surveys philosophical metaphysics to suggest that the western 
worldview has reached an impasse in his book The Nature and Destiny of Man (1941).  
Niebuhr comes to argue for a specifically Christian perspective, claiming that what is 
paradigmatically Biblical about Christianity is that “both the transcendence of God over, 
and his intimate relation to, the world are equally emphasized” (Niebuhr 135).  As a 
result the finite reality of the world should neither be denigrated nor subsumed to 
idealism.  Instead, the human capacity for self-transcendence must be regarded equally 
along with “the final limit of our own consciousness” (140).  Arguing that this sense of 
transcendence with limitation distinguishes Christianity from other religions, especially 
mystical traditions, puts a perhaps surprising emphasis not on the possibility for 
universalization, but on the opposite, the affirmation of limitation.  And though Villa, 
Heidegger and Niebuhr should be thought of as occupying very different positions in 
national and historical contexts, their thought turns inward in what I argue reflects a 
diffuse but perceptible crisis of materialism.  
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Villaʼs Sacred, Queer Poetry
! Have Come, Am Here is a difficult volume to summarize.  Villa makes use of two 
broad divisions “Lyrics” and “Divine Poems,” but what differentiates lyrics from divine 
poems is not clear.11  “Lyrics” are further divided into four loosely thematic sections.  
The first section forms an overall introduction to the book, with poems that are 
thematically and formally similar to what comes in “Divine Poems” along with a few that 
work as suggestive, partial ars poeticas.12  By shear numbers, religious poems 
predominate but these poems are idiosyncratic and vary in tone so that itʼs not obvious 
to say that Have Come, Am Here should be read as a book of religious poetry.  Instead 
the case can be made, and indeed I argue it, that Villa engages religion in the context of 
metaphysical thought at the moment of late imperialism in the 1940s that both 
Heideggerʼs and Niebuhrʻs thought is part of.  
! If the book as a whole is hard to characterize, then the task of offering a 
paradigmatic example of Villaʼs poetry is similarly difficult.  Mooreʼs dense, associational 
review seems to take up almost accidental examples of Villaʼs poetry in the midst of 
struggling to convey what the poems as a whole mean.  In a New York Times review, 
Peter Monro Jack explicitly picks a poem at random before coming to claim that if “one 
isolated the philosophy of the poems it would be to say that the poet brings God to 
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11 Villa includes a note on his version of rhyme, reversed consonance, but in this prose addendum he 
doesnʼt explain the ostensibly more content derived distinctions between lyric and divine poems in his 
lexicon.  By 1949ʼs Volume 2 Villa seems to have broadened what he calls “Divine Poems” to include 
poems without as recognizably biblical or religious content, thus suggesting that in the earlier volume this 
distinction is not definitionally precise.  
12 Itʼs been suggested that the plural of “ars poetica” should be “artes poeticae” but according to Merriam-
Websterʼs Encyclopedia of Literature (1995) ars poeticas is valid (p. 74).
him” (BR 12).  Jack uses the impersonal first person pronoun to introduce a hypothetical 
division of philosophy from poetry in what would ostensibly summarize Villaʼs poems, 
but even in this heavily qualified claim, Jack does seize upon what makes Villaʼs poems 
seem to fit Heideggerʼs sense of art.  The work of the poems is to draw the divine back 
into a destitute world.  Or to put it in terms closer to Niebuhrʼs, Villaʼs poems show the 
immanent, divine quality of personal experience, specific to biblical revealed religion.
" The book opens with a poem that mentions God about halfway through, but 
whose real topic is the unspeakable in poetry.  
It is what I never said,
What Iʼll always sing--
Itʼs not found in days,
Itʼs what begins 
In half dark, half light. (1-5)
The poem addresses the question of what Villaʼs poems are ultimately about, but not as 
a clarification.  Instead, the persistent subject of the poems is what Villa never states but 
always sings.  This distinction between speech and song recalls his opposition of the 
language of poetry and prose in his critical writing, and it implies that the topic of his 
poetry is poeticization, the transformation of content away from its direct, denotative 
meaning into an unstated, enigmatic, artistic experience.  
" The logic of the poem proceeds by mimicking a kind of negative theology.  In the 
first line, the poem clarifies what “It” is not and then after this strong negation, makes 
descriptive but not definitional statements.  The combined effect of both transcendence 
and this irrational uncommunicability suggests a sacred function for art which belies the 
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passing mention of God.  “It” is “Where the first flower dove / When Godʼs hands lost 
love” (8-9).  God is used in the poem to indicate a time which corresponds to a place, 
and while the precise action is ambiguous, “dove” is in the syntactical position of a verb 
even as the rhyme suggests that the word is a bird.  But despite this ambiguity, the 
specification of place and time make it clear that whatʼs divine is in what is concretely 
real.  By that logic anything specifically invoked in the poem takes on an implied divinity.  
And itʼs only by that accumulated sense of the sacred that what should read as a 
profound anticlimax in the poemʼs final line, “It” seems to be a “Wreath” (14), reads 
instead as a final metaphysically ambiguous statement.13  The “Wreath” must be 
something transcendent and inchoate, not an actual, mere wreath. "   
" But if the poems are really about this uncommunicable mystical beyond, the 
concreteness with which this poem ends in the image of the wreath reads as a kind of 
falling short, a disappointment.  In claiming that the “It” of this poem is in all of his 
poems, Villa suggests that a key element of the entire volume is that it is not quite 
divine.  Ponce detects a similar characteristic across Villaʼs broader oeuvre, which he 
provocatively labels as queer.  Ponce argues that for Villa queer is “an especially 
appropriate and elastic term that can be used to describe and elucidate the two most 
salient, overlapping features in Villaʼs work: his self-styled experimentalism and his 
thematization of non-normative erotics” (Ponce 49).  The sexual aspect of Villaʼs literary 
queerness is read by Denise Cruz as Villaʼs emphasis on questioning heterosexual 
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13 The final two lines of the poem read “O, but itʼs all of it there / Above my poems a Wreath” (13-14).  The 
assertion in line 13 that “itʼs all of it there” also adds to the sense that “it” canʼt be just a wreath.
reproductive eroticism by focusing on nonconsummation (15).14 But if the poems are all 
about falling short, then poem 1ʼs invocation of this generative principle, modeled on the 
mystical assertions of a negative theology, comes to seem overstated.  Whatʼs missing 
is a sense of religious ecstasy; apophatic assertions of the divine tend to have an 
irrational intensity, the certainty of high faith.  And itʼs this aspect of religiosity that Villa 
closes the first section of lyrics with.  
" The passionate intensity of that poem, numbered 16, comes when the speaker 
has contact with God, which reduces the poet to a kind of giddiness reflected in line 9ʼs 
unpunctuated repetition: “And found Him found Him found Him.”  This excitement 
makes religious ecstasy queerly erotic, as the first line of the poem suggests.  Union 
with God begins in something at least associationally ascetic, a “desire to be Nude” (1). 
Villa sets off “Nude” with the slight orthographical mark of unusual capitalization and in 
Villaʼs polemics on writing in English itʼs notable that he uses the religious term “grace” 
to connote a not necessarily grammatical externalization of poetic essence (Critical Villa 
269).  “Nude” then, suggests something other than mere nudity in an attempt to call 
down some sort of poetic sacredness into language.  
" Villaʼs attempt to make language bear this spiritual otherness isnʼt totally 
removed from the colonial context.  Though Villaʼs essays take pains to seem technical, 
he bases the judgments he makes on Filipino literature on versions of the same criteria 
repeated across various essays, his argument against merely correct English suggests 
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14 Cruz refers to and builds upon Ponceʼs analysis.  She emphasizes critical comments Villa made 
against the melodramatic love story, especially in Filipino prose while analyzing short stories from Villaʼs 
1933 collection Footnote to Youth: Tales of the Philippines and Others.  Later I address a similar poetics in 
Moore, which Benjamin Kahan also reads as queer, though with Moore, her textual strategy of 
nonconsummation is one of celibacy.  
the extent to which his aesthetics break with the tutelary goal that still persisted in 
newspaper prizes for Anglophone Filipino writing - to demonstrate acculturation to 
American English usage.  So then “Nude” in this line, along with the lack of punctuation 
in line 9 must be read in this anticolonial context along with the enigmatic religious 
valences Villa is invoking.  
! Nudity in this poem has a density that its capitalization indicates, and it is only 
partly salacious.  In discussing an earlier, more overtly sexual poem that also begins by 
invoking nakedness, the first line is “I am naked,” Ponce reads nudity as an explication 
of “Villaʼs own poetics” (Ponce 82).   This earlier poem, “Song of a Swift Nude” (1929) 
goes so far as to portray sex:
There was a man clung to me and he was big
and tall and his arms were as wrought iron.
The muscles of his body rippled as he sowed 
his song into me and I quivered bravely.
He was weak when his song was ended and I
became strong with it. (qtd in Ponce 79)
This poem was part of a collection called “Man-Songs” that Villa published in the 
Philippines Herald Magazine under a pseudonym which led to his conviction for 
“obscenity and corruption of public morals” as Chua notes in his endnote for Villaʼs 
selection of the best Filipino stories of 1929 (Chua 48).  Chua points out that Villa saw 
himself as innocent, and his defense of “Man-Songs” is that the public misread the 
poem.  “If the physicalities involved in my poems are offensive to [the public], why canʼt 
they go deeper?  I am sure they will find something beautiful behind.  Unearth, unearth.  
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Do not be prudes and you will soon see in a new light” (Villa qtd in Ponce 81).  What 
makes Villaʼs verse seem obscene is a kind of naive reading that fails to engage 
sexuality.  Instead, Villa intends his poems to be read in a metaphorical becoming 
Naked.  Ponce writes “To ʻunearthʼ [...] connotes spiritualizing, making not-of-this-earth, 
a process of divinization that [...] his later poetry repeatedly performs” (Ponce 82).  
# In comparison to “Song of a Swift Nude” poem 16 seems downright tame, but 
nonetheless the sexual context is present in the later poemʼs first line as in the earlier.  
In fact, the first line of poem 16 is perhaps more erotic than the declarative opening of 
“Song of a Swift Nude.”  Rather than just announce nudity, poem 16 links it with 
subjective desire: “In my desire to be Nude” (1).  That this line forms only a dependent 
clause adds to the suggestiveness of the desire to be nude, and in incompletion, this 
line is more erotic in the expectation that this desire will lead to some act.  But then in 
contrast to “Song of a Swift Nude” Villa shifts away from sexuality by the second line.
# Line 2 answers the first unexpectedly, turning the desire for nudity into the act of 
dressing: “I clothed myself in fire.”   The rest of the first quatrain takes up the fire image, 
with the last two lines listing destruction of walls and a roof, with the consumption by fire 
as a kind of becoming Nude, so that the fire “Burned all these down” (4).   If the fire 
consumes what is notably external, the clothing of fire works as a paradoxical avowal, to 
recall Mooreʼs words.  And the tension between clothing and an agent of purification, 
fire, recalls Villaʼs defense of “Man-Songs,” nudity is a purification to essence, not a 
dwelling upon the surface.
# Out of this purifying fire, which connotes purgatory, the speaker “Emerged myself 
supremely lean / Unsheathed like a holy knife” (5-6).  Unsheathing implies getting naked 
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and if we start with this association first, that the self turns into a knife is a reasonable 
extension of the metaphor.  But as the poet becomes an object, specifically a tool, by 
the next line, tool use, that definitively human trait, is attributed to God.  All of these 
transformations seem to come together in an allegory.  The human undergoes a 
purification which reduces him to an essence.  This essence is a tool of Godʼs.  In other 
words, the allegory treats the Christian trope of surrendering to Godʼs will.  
" To Heidegger the status of tools, or equipment as he calls it, is important in 
thinking of the inherent existent quality of things in general.  As I stated earlier, 
Heidegger points out that the thingly character of objects is oddly elusive.  For that 
reason, something like equipment, which is categorically defined by its utility to our will, 
should be less resistant to our thinking than pure objecthood.  An advantage of 
theorizing not things but equipment is that the nature of equipment, “the equipmental 
quality of equipment” has an intuitive essence, “its usefulness” (Heidegger 32).  In fact, 
when an equipment is most purely functional, it disappears into its use so that we donʼt 
even think of its separate existence.  But then equipment is also vulnerable to time: “A 
single piece of equipment is worn out and used up” (34).  What remains is what 
Heidegger calls “reliability,” which is meant to also suggest that an equipment lies ready 
to be used.  What finally defines equipment is actually a kind of double existence of both 
usefulness and thingly existence.
" At the end of the second quatrain Villa turns away from the knifeʼs erasure in 
Godʼs will with a syntactical stutter that corrects line 7 with line 8.  As I noted, the 
speaker emerges from the fire
Unsheathed like a holy knife.
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With only His Hand to find 
To hold me beyond annul. (6-8).
Villaʼs punctuation in these lines goes against expectation.  In line 7, “with” continues 
the thought from the previous line, even though that line is end stopped; and though this 
line ends enjambed, because it seems to complete line 6, one is tempted to read an 
unmarked period at “find.”  In that case, line 7 suggests a kind of resting that its content 
also implies.  The entire trajectory from desiring to be Nude seems to rest in the quest 
that has “only His Hand to find.”  But then “to find” does not actually conclude the 
thought; in fact, it is replaced by the start of the last line of the stanza, in which His Hand 
isnʼt merely found, but actually holds.  The difference marks a change in volition, not 
what the speaker finds, but what God does, but at the same time the speaker goes from 
a knife to a person, even as the personhood implied by the first person pronoun stays 
close to object status in Villaʼs use of the objective case; the holy knife has both a 
oneness with Godʼs use and its own existent status “beyond annul.”  
" Villaʼs language use helps to establish the ambivalent effect of this quatrainʼs 
divine connection, and its idiosyncratic use should recall Villaʼs expository claims on 
poetic language.  He definitely sees language as a medium, as something that mediates 
access to a poetic essence beyond the words themselves; and this access depends on 
the words being set off from common usage, what Villa derisively calls “Bourgeoise 
ratiocination--the process of ordinary logic” (Critical Villa 255).  But then the very fact of 
Villaʼs nonstandard use invokes nonliterary contexts.  Babette Deutsch explicitly 
connected his poetic voice with his nationality: “The fact that he is a native of the 
Philippines who comes to the English language as a stranger may have helped him to 
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his unusual syntax” (qtd in Yu 48).  And Peter Monro Jack casually characterizes Villaʼs 
diction as bearing “a kind of foreignness [...] as if he were making up his idiom in each 
poem instead of writing absent-mindedly in the way of the ordinary versifier” (Jack 
BR12).  "
" We might be inclined to read these critical pronouncements from the 1940s as 
simply racist, but part of the estrangement in Villaʼs poetic language does suggest a 
type of vernacular use of language, one that Pascale Casanova argues has a kind of 
structural presence in world literature.  Casanovaʼs thesis in The World Republic of 
Letters (1999; 2004), is that against a solely national perspective, literature can be 
thought of in relation to other literature.  Specifically, Casanova traces the intertextual 
relation between texts from writers peripheral to great literary capitals, as the young 
Filipino Villa would be, to those who write, or have their work consecrated in places 
such as Paris, New York, as the later modernist Villaʼs work would be in the 1940s.  
Casanova sees this relation between literary backwater and literary capital as one in 
which “dominated” writers, to use her adjective, attempt to wrest creative autonomy 
away from literary centers through aesthetic innovation.  Reading Alajo Carpentierʼs 
early polemics on magical realism, Casanova quotes his comment that Latin American 
writers must eschew imitation and instead “find methods of construction capable of 
translating with greater force our thoughts and sensibilities as Latin Americans” (qtd in 
Casanova 253). That Carpentier focuses specifically on form and not content suggests 
his similarity with Villa, a similarity we read as significant not based on nationality, but on 
relative position in what Casanova calls, as her title indicates, the world republic of 
letters.  And based on this sense that a new form makes possible the expression of an a 
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marginalized content, not in imitation, but on its own terms, we can read Villaʼs 
modernist style need not as universalist or blankly cosmopolitan, but as attempting to 
create a Filipino literary identity that is reflected in its difference from standard English, 
even standard literary English.  
" Villaʼs stuttering use of verbal infinitives subtly makes the language waver even 
as the “to find / To hold” replacement spreads the poem into a metaphysical 
expansiveness.  As I noted, “to find” marks a subjective, personal narrative that ends as 
a religious experience, which negates the self in “To hold.”  Whatʼs more is that this 
absorption has a curious intermediate status, as a metaphor for equipment that is 
between use and thing.  Itʼs interesting to note that the infinitive form of a verb is its 
basic, unconjugated form, the form of the verb that lies ready to use in the potentiality of 
its reliability. Heidegger remarks a verb not in specific reference to a noun “remains 
indeterminate and empty in its meaning that [...] can fill and determine itself ʻaccording 
to the situationʼ” (Metaphysics 95).  And while Villa uses these verbs specifically, they 
carry the valence of this indeterminate potentiality.  Heidegger goes on to a fragment 
from Goethe to consider the status of language: “Over all the peaks / is peace” (qtd in 
Metaphysics 94).  Focusing on the status of the verb “is” Heidegger claims that this “ʻisʼ 
simply cannot be paraphrased” but “not because it is too complicated and hard to 
understand, but because the verse is said so simply.”  In other words because there is 
an irreducible, object-like quality to the sense of this word, it has “a rich manifoldness of 
meanings” (95).  And sensing this universal scope in a single word creates the 
potentiality for a spiritualness that isnʼt nostalgic for doctrinal faith and possibly is 
relevant to the technologic, material world.  
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! In regarding equipment Heidegger comes to an interesting convergence with 
Villa.  From equipmentalityʼs doubleness, both object and use, Heidegger proposes that 
two definitive movements can be discerned.  On one hand, the merging of object into 
use suggests its creative aspect that reveals an intuitively persuasive sense of what 
defines the tool.  This Heidegger calls “setting up a world.”  On the other hand, the toolʼs 
lying ready, its resistant objective status suggests the objectʼs mysteriousness, and in 
Heideggerʼs terms, this aspect of the tool is self-secluding, which he calls “setting forth 
the earth.”  Finally, what defines equipment and in generality all works including art, is 
this doubleness and its prevailing trope is one of concealment and unconcealment - of 
nudity.  
! Heidegger intends this trope of concealment and unconcealment to be broadly 
applicable, indeed universal.  After establishing that “setting up a world and setting forth 
the earth” is what is central to work and artwork, Heidegger shifts terms and restates his 
question as not about the essence of art, but “how does truth happen in the fighting of 
the battle between world and earth?  What is truth?” (“Work” 48).  While Heidegger 
begins intuitively connecting truth with unconcealment he ultimately concludes that truth 
is profoundly ambivalent, that we might not be able to tell truth from untruth.  And in that 
truth as unconcealedness contains its opposite, concealment, the “nature of truth is, in 
itself, the primal conflict” that we see at work in art (53).  Villa ends poem 16 with one 
last metaphoric transformation, from knife to poem.  Such a move is characteristic of 
Villaʼs religious poems, as poem 1 showed.  But what might seem to be an assertion of 
closeness between religion and poetry might instead be read, via Heidegger, as the 
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religious content of language, especially poetic language with its manifold, 
unconcealing, world-opening character.15  
! Finally, at the level of language Villaʼs poems attempt two related objectives.  
First, he tries to construct an Anglophone Filipino literature that shouldnʼt be read as 
assimilative even though it doesnʼt engage a backward-facing fantasy of an authentic, 
pre-colonial identity.  Its goal, and this is the second objective, is to create that Filipino 
poetry as a transcendent, spiritual essence.  Religion is a discourse of the sacred with 
sacredness as something that is nonrational and yet inherent in the world, in objects.  
This quality of immanence in both language and other equipment helps to clarify that 
Villaʼs verse enacts a kind of synthetic vernacular that has universal aspirations, 
universal not in the sense of a secular philosophic account, but in a religious sense. 
Representations of Animals
! Mooreʼs review, with its rhetorical figure of a “hogs-hair brush in the hand of a 
Chinese master,” makes a metaphor of poetry to painting, but it does so through a 
problematic detour that equates Villa to a Chinese master, a comparison all the more 
121
15 Heideggerʼs nazism isnʼt directly in evidence in “The Origin of the Work of Art,” nor in Introduction to 
Metaphysics (1935).  Both of these works stem from courses he gave in the mid 1930s, arguably 
reflecting a turn away from directly ideological work.  As LaCapra suggests, Heideggerʼs notion that 
origins represent a lost authenticity is a view sympathetic to conservative revolution, and perhaps the 
deep struggle Heidegger uses to characterize the essence of art and truth implies a justification for 
violence.  But if so, these readings arenʼt central or definitive to understanding Heideggerʼs claims, which 
after all, are continuous with a line of thought begun prior to his involvement with nazis.  
" But if as LaCapra argues, the division between human, animals and the animal in humans has 
“consequences or implications [...] for interactions both among humans and between humans and other 
species,” then what might be important in explicating the ethical content of Heideggerʼs thought is the 
status Heidegger assigns to animals (LaCapra 150).  LaCapra points out that “Heidegger claims that the 
animal, like the plant, has no world,” essentially, it is all earth (128).  This opens up a more troubling 
possibility for a deeper, implicit racism possible from Heideggerʼs metaphysics.  I take up the question of 
the ethical status of animals in the next section of this chapter.  
complicated in that it is directed toward technique, and not overtly race.16  The comment 
actually refers to specific poems, Villaʼs “leopard poems” which have the effect of 
paintings.  And while she leaves this point at a mention, Villaʼs poems of objects, Moore 
lists “watermelon, yellow strawberry” and “giraffe” along with the leopard, tend to be 
depicted almost childishly, without regard to sense.  That Villaʼs poems do not depict 
objects as just uncomplicated things puts his work in sympathy to Mooreʼs, especially in 
regard to the animal poems Moore is known for.  Even in depicting real animals or 
objects, Moore tends to complicate depiction and not simplify it.  For that reason, both 
poets might bear out Jean-Paul Sartreʼs comment that imaginary or fantastic objects “do 
not appear, as they do in perception, from a particular angle; they do not occur from a 
point of view ... they are ʻpresentableʼ under an all-inclusive aspect” (qtd in Stamy 62).  
Villaʼs poems could be regarded as paintings not as representations of something real, 
meaning that the poem contains a total perspective, a full knowledge.  And to Moore the 
painterʼs accuracy is a form of restraint charged with personality, which makes paintings 
a tempting rhetoric figure because of their ambivalent state between object and person, 
universality and its limit.
# There are two leopard poems in the third section of Have Come, Am Here, and in 
neither poem is the leopard merely an animal.  The leopard is more abstract in poem 
36, which begins with a conceptual assertion: “The distinction is in Fire and Division:” 
before continuing after a colon to the “Ferocious and beautiful Leopard that thrives / On 
the rose-imagination” (1-3).  This opening connects the leopard with fire, at least in 
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16 I address Mooreʼs Orientalism in more detail in the next section.  My mention of it here is meant to 
show how this overt instance of Orientalism is tied to an underlying logic that isnʼt directly racial, but 
related to representation of objects and the perspective implied by possible approaches.  
connecting the distinction of the first line with the images of the next two if not also by 
echoing William Blakeʼs “tyger.”  And if the next stanza is opaque, “Supreme visionary 
Guard begetting poetry: / Magnetizer to Confrontation till the archives / Cry in 
luminosity” (4-6), the third stanzaʼs connection of the leopard with fire recalls fireʼs use 
in Poem 16, as an agent of purification or unconcealment. When Villa writes “leap, 
Leopard-mind, / Bring figuration of Fire” (7-8) the word play in “leap” and “leopard” 
connects a more abstract version of the leopard, its mind, with an action, leaping.  But in 
that the mindʼs leap is to create a linguistic version of fire, what the poem entreats is 
that the leopard leave the language material of poetry, its “archives” for “luminosity,” the 
consumption of language in its spiritual other.  
" The leopard as a leopard is only minimally invoked in poem 36, present only as 
far as a cliche of being ferocious and beautiful.  The other leopard poem, poem 33, is at 
once more visually focused on the leopard; and eyes are a recurring image.  The poem 
opens not by describing or presenting, but in positing:  “I think, yes, a leopard in Dufy 
blue would / Be incomparable” (1-2).  Villaʼs reference to “Dufy blue” is no longer 
obvious, but it seems to be a reference to fauvist painter Raoul Dufy whose works 
tended to use a bright blue.17  In any case, making the leopard blue amounts to making 
the leopard unreal, in fact, deliberately unreal in order to be “incomparable.”  In as much 
as the leopard is meant to be singular, the speaker also maintains an individual 
prerogative: while the poemʼs first words “I think, yes” seems incidental, through this 
clause the conceit of the poem is offered as a personal fancy.  If the leopard isnʼt literally 
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17 I found a reference to “Dufy blue” in a 1971 New York Magazine article by Albert Goldman in which 
Lenny Bruce is supposed to have “had this thing that every room in which he camps over night should be 
painted Dufy blue--rhymes with goofy blue” (36).
ekphrastic, the unreality of its color and the speakerʼs act of imagining suggests that the 
description of this leopard is put onto the page in order to create its image.  The poem 
has the effect of a painting.
" The next sentence also spans a line break and while it seems visual in nature, 
Villa introduces something nonvisual, death, except death is what the leopardʼs eyes 
see.  Continuing from the conceit of imagining an incomparable leopard Villa continues: 
“Provided his eyes are green / And see death like two flowers” (2-3).  Because the poem 
focuses on play, imagining the leopard, its ability to see death seems like one more 
improbable trait that says more about the poetʼs imagination than death.  In fact, if these 
lines are really more about the imaginative faculty then the content of the poem isnʼt 
really the leopard, but the speaker.  But then eyes that see death recalls the verse 
Moore cites for its puritanical seriousness, “I saw myself reflected / In the great eye of 
the grave.”   If so far the poem has been a playful imagining of a leopard, the terms of 
its imaginings are themselves subject to play, as the leopardʼs eye goes from something 
that is seen as color, to something that sees death, even if death itself appears as “two 
flowers.”  
" The transition from the first stanza to the second is marked by three sharp 
changes.  First the abandonment of a description of the leopard, as though in describing 
its color and eyes the image is complete.  Second, abandonment of the easy colloquial 
tone, replaced by awkward syntax which registers linguistic difference.  And finally the 
speakerʼs perspective shifts from viewing the image from outside it to entering the 
image:  “Myself would / Bring him me all in dazzling gold” (3-4).  This last thematic shift 
is perhaps most striking in that it enacts the abasement of the speaker from a creator 
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who judges the aesthetics of his creation, its incomparability, to a gift or sacrifice.  The 
rest of the second stanza emphasizes that in this abjection is an acceptance or 
embrace of death:  “Lie / At his feet for Godʼs sake awaiting death.  The / Blue paw will 
have its incomparable law” (4-6). 
" If death seems trivial in the first stanza, it can be seen as merely two flowers, the 
second stanza treats death as a complex and more profound disruption.  What precisely 
causes the tonal and thematic shifts in the two stanzas isnʼt clear, but it is notable that if 
the imagined leopard can be fully comprehended in a way that real leopards canʼt, it is 
nonetheless adequately described at just color and eyes.  Gilles Deleuze and Felix 
Guattari describe the face in similar terms, as a surface with holes (Deleuze and 
Guattari 167).  But to them, the face is not a visual metaphor for a theory of meaning, 
though it seems that way at first.  The surface is “a white wall upon which” signs are 
inscribed, with the hole as a black hole of “consciousness, passion,” so that the 
combined face seems to symbolize a whole meaning: both sign and person who uses 
that sign in an intersubjective context.  But the face is not just a metaphor since it plays 
a real role in communication; and in discussing faces, or faciality, Deleuze and Guattari 
even insert free-indirect discourse on how someone might read a face:  “He looked at 
me queerly, he knitted his brow, what did I do to make him change expression” (115).  
" Because faces question signification, as in the intersubjective speech Deleuze 
and Guattari imagine, the face itself is beyond any given sign.  In this sense the face 
would be “postsignifying” to use Delueze and Guattariʼs terms.  And signification, the 
account of signifieds and signifiers, creates the appearance of knowable, full signs 
insofar as what is signified exceeds the sign, because this excess “reimparts the 
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signifier, recharges it or produces more of it” (114).  But as a result the “ultimate signified 
is therefore the signifier itself, in its redundancy or excess.”  Redundancy because if the 
sign corresponds to some real entity it represents it is strictly speaking a double, and 
excess because the sign refers not to real entities but other signs in the matrix of 
signification.  So finally, the face is like the ultimate signified: it is also redundant to what 
is said, but seems to offer the truth or meaning of whatʼs said, as excess.   
" And to return to the question of why the leopardʼs face is complete and 
instantiates a radical turn in the poem, we could say that the face crystallizes the sense 
that signification aims beyond itself.  And after our confrontation with the face, the 
distancing of the leopard image, in the form of the speaker who points out the imaginary  
quality of the poem, can be dismissed because the stakes of this poem, as with the 
others weʼve looked at, is to finally go beyond language.  Transitioning to the third 
stanza, Villa writes “The / Green eyes incomparable words” (6-7).  This sentence 
fragment testifies to the postsignification of the face, which is to say that through eyes, 
Villa raises the question of knowledge, as a single word that is beyond all words, a word 
that would be “incomparable.”  
" Using Deleuze and Guattari in analyzing Villa departs from the tight historicism of 
this chapter, but itʼs not my intent to take for granted a historical consistency that would 
guarantee that different ideas from different contexts can be yoked together by virtue of 
sharing the same temporal moment.  Deleuze and Guattari emphasize that in any 
“given people, period, or language, and even a given style” different semiotic systems 
proliferate, so the question becomes one of which system predominates enough to 
characterize a historical moment.  An account concerned with excavating effaced, 
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minority discourses, as this chapter is, requires a means to penetrate beyond just the 
dominant.  But if their account of faciality seems too tied to its own context of 
poststructuralism, Deleuze and Guattari associate faciality in terms close to the 
metaphysical concerns of Niebuhr and Heidegger.  They write: “If it is possible to assign 
the faciality machine a date [such a date would be] the year zero of Christ and the 
historical development of the White Man” (182).  Why Christ?  Precisely because Christ 
represents the immanence of the ordinary; what Deleuze and Guattari call “the 
facialization of the entire body” (176).  
! Villa repeats the word “incomparable” throughout the poem as though 
establishing that the singularity of the imagined leopard justifies both the exercise of 
imagining him and the speakerʼs self-subordination to the leopard.  The poem ends in 
another paradoxical avowal: “compare me to your incomparability” (12).  But if this blue 
leopard has been imagined to be incomparable, the speaker should not compare 
favorably to the leopard, and so the last sentiment of the poem is one that is in awe of a 
created thing in its separateness from its creator.  
! But this awe should not be taken to be the sublime awe of nature common in 
Romantic poetry; and the difference between Villaʼs treatment of his leopard and 
something like John Keatsʼ treatment of the nightingale shows that Villaʼs playful tone is 
decisive.  Itʼs under the guise of humor that something like comparing the speaker to the 
incomparable leopard is paradoxical and not contradictory.  Cleanth Brooks claims that 
the success of gnomic utterances in poetry is not primarily their moral content, but their 
play, so that something like Mooreʼs tendency toward moralization makes her 
statements, Brooks cites “Art is unfortunate,” “punctuality is not a crime” as a few 
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examples, seem true and appropriate because of their “high level of concrete 
observation, the absence of cuteness, the refusal to talk down” (Brooks 181).  
! Helen McNeil writes that in Moore the “Romantic and modern terror at the gap 
between subject and object does not exist” (McNeil 547).  Instead, Mooreʼs work, 
especially her animal poems “used the material world as a means to abstraction” (546), 
which means that ultimately the “mindʼs meditative play merges with the object” (547). 
McNeilʼs comments suggest that the effect of Mooreʼs animal poems are remarkably 
similar to Villaʼs, that both write a poetry that attends to specificity in order to get beyond 
the specific into a larger transcendence.  Perhaps one way to phrase this concern would 
be Mooreʼs own “gnomic” comment: “The power of the visible / is the invisible” from “He 
ʻDigesteth Harde Yronʼ” (1941).  As Molesworth points out, this particular statement 
comes from Mooreʼs mother, though “the moral thought of the poem is indebted to 
Mooreʼs reading in Reinhold Niebuhr and Bliss Perry, among others” (Molesworth 308). 
! If the moral of “He ʻDigestethʼ” is in fact that the power of the visible is invisible, 
this line is hardly delivered with the directness of a fableʼs moral.  The lines are set up in 
the previous stanza by a similar phrase, but this does not add to clarity.  After Moore 
lists what seems to be opulent or ornamental uses of the ostrich, she writes that all of 
these examples “dramatize a meaning / always missed by the externalist” (47-8).That 
Moore does not state this meaning makes it tempting to feel as if a sufficiently 
sympathetic reader would know exactly what meaning is dramatized, but it seems more 
to her point that such a meaning itself cannot be externalized.  In other words, there 
seems to be an internal meaning to the decorative.  
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! But what complicates the sense that a use of ostriches for decoration is 
somehow good is the poemʼs disdain for men hunting ostriches in the third stanza, and 
the emphasis at the end of the poem.  The last stanza refers to the ostrichʼs status as 
one of the few not extinct big birds: “This one remaining rebel” (60).  Here the moral 
seems much more in line with a Sunday-school sense of morality, that man has been 
destructive.  But this condemnation seems to make something like serving “Six hundred 
ostrich-brains [...] at one banquet” exemplify not opulence but waste (42-3).  And if the 
moral of the poem is the importance of the invisible, how such a metaphysical statement 
relates to real instances of injustice seems to be what Moore avoids explaining in her 
claim that externalists will miss what she means.  
! Wallace Stevens glosses “He ʻDigesteth Harde Yronʼ” in the all Marianne Moore 
issue of Quarterly Review of Literature, which incidentally Villa edited.18  In fact, Stevens 
quotes the stanza that supposedly dramatizes internal meaning and writes: 
Here the sparrow-camel is all pomp and ceremony, a part of justice of 
which it was not only the symbol, as Miss Moore says, but also the source 
of its panoply and the delicacy of its feasts, that is to say, a part of 
unprecedented experience.  (145-6)
Stevens reads the significance of this stanza as a commentary on symbol.  But whatʼs 
notable about the ostrichʼs symbolic value is that it is experienced, real also.  The 
combination of the ostrich as symbolic and its real dimension is actually described by a 
word Stevens seems to use colloquially, ceremony.  The religious connotation implies 
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18 Stevensʼs essay also appears in his book The Necessary Angel: Essays on Reality and the 
Imagination.  
the aspiration Stevens has in using symbol, something that has a depth of meaning 
beyond merely substituting images for concepts.  
! Stevens goes on to offer an oblique example of Mooreʼs dictum on the invisible in 
the second section of his essay.  Here Stevens abruptly abandons literary exposition for 
an autobiographical fragment on his visit “last September [to] the old Zeller house in the 
Tulpehocken” (147).  After explaining that the Zellers are a family of religious refugees 
who settled in America in 1709, Stevens describes “the cross with palm-branches 
below” that hangs above their door as what shows “that the house and those that lived 
in it were consecrated to the glory of god [sic].”  And while the cross is clearly symbolic 
the consecrated life turns into a romanticization of “their laborious lives” which is “happy 
in the faith” (148).  This narration is capped off by a moral: “Their reality consisted of 
both the visible and the invisible.”  That Stevens comes to this idea not through the 
poem but through his experience is perhaps the model of internal dramatization that 
Moore has in mind.  Nonetheless, the explicit meaning would then be that life needs to 
be suffused with religion.  
! If such a meaning accords with the late modernist crisis of meaning that Iʼve 
been tracing through Heidegger, Niebuhr and Villa, it canʼt be said to predominate in 
Mooreʼs poem.  After all, the ostrich is symbolic not of faith but of justice.  And Moore 
only asserts the symbolism of the ostrich.  The first mention occurs in the first stanza:
! [...] the large sparrow
Xenophon saw walking by a stream--was and is 
a symbol of justice. (5-7)
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Xenophon is occupied not with the symbolism of the ostrich, but a practical account of 
its habitat and speed (Xenophon 24).  That the ostrich represents justice is just part of 
what Moore adapts in her own descriptive account, and typical of Mooreʼs poetics, the 
poem is more interested in description than establishing a literary symbol.  By the 
second mention, the symbolism of the ostrich is consigned to the past “anciently / the 
plume of justice” (23-4) and brought to bear not on the ostrich, but just his plume.  
" But the fact that the ostrichʼs symbolism is both cited and external shouldnʼt 
suggest that the symbol is therefore unimportant.  In fact, such a move is characteristic 
of Mooreʼs poetic ethos.  Miller writes that Mooreʼs position between feminine 
sentimental poetry and a poetry of masculine authority is shown in Mooreʼs 
acknowledgment of “the contingencies of her perspective and positioning” (Miller 27).  
That the ostrichʼs symbolism is cited and therefore at a distance is the honest 
expression of Mooreʼs acknowledgment of the mediatedness of her experience of the 
ostrich and a refusal to write a poem of mastery.  
" So while the poem is primarily descriptive, its mode of description doesnʼt readily 
affirm McNeilʼs point on Mooreʼs sense of the continuity of subject and object, in that the 
object is treated with an acknowledgment of its separateness.  But then Stevens argues 
that “He ʻDigestethʼ” is only superficially factual.  At a deeper level it isnʼt so much a 
description of the ostrich but “an abstraction” (Stevens 144).  What the poem seeks to 
describe is not the “fluctuating facts of the world” but a “communion with objects which 
are apprehended by thought and not sense.”  This process, which Stevens describes as 
ascetic, is how Moore attempts to incorporate real things into a poem, or as she 
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famously put it in “Poetry” (1921), there can be “imaginary gardens with real toads in 
them.”     
! Stevens draws from British philosopher H. D. Lewisʼs essay “On Poetic 
Truth” (1946) and the platonism he sees at work in the poem is also part of Lewisʼs 
essay.  Lewis takes pains to explicate Platoʼs expulsion of poets from the republic, on 
the one hand affirming, as Stevens does, that ascending into abstraction is an 
experience of truth, of something rarefied but ultimately familiar “in the sense that it is 
akin to our own minds” (Lewis 149).  But then on the other hand, Lewis writes 
approvingly of poetryʼs concreteness and even its unfamiliarity: “poetry has to do with 
reality in that concrete and individual aspect of it which the mind can never tackle 
altogether on its own terms, with matter that is foreign and alien in a way in which 
abstract systems [...] can never be” (154).  The key to Lewisʼs commentary is the 
implication that poetry supplements what an asceticism must leave out:  
For the grip by which abstract conceptions cohere and by which our 
thought is enabled to pass from one truth to the other, as in a system of 
geometry, presupposes some principle which cannot be itself explained in 
that way, and whose nature can only by discerned by a noesis, a glimpse 
or intuition. (149)
Lewis argues that Plato must exclude poets from the republic because in his rationality 
Plato must disavow his nonrational, poetic presupposition.
! Lewis concludes his essay in a manner that reflects his unease with Britainʼs turn 
away from global empire and a sense of Western cultureʼs lateness.  Reasoning that 
poetryʼs power derives from its capacity to dishabituate, Lewis writes that modern poetry  
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faces the distinct challenge of trying to present something new in a very rich tradition, 
and that “poetry in the Georgian decades was living on its capital” and for that reason 
was moribund (164).  But this crisis is not restricted to poetry, if anything, poetry reflects 
the exhaustion of Western humanism at large.  Lewis cites Niebuhr as a theologian who 
articulates “the need to infuse into the ages of enlightenment an awareness of reality” - 
reality in the sense of poetryʼs individual, nonsystematic reality, “a reality that forces 
itself upon our consciousness and refuses to be managed and mastered” (165).  
" Finally, Mooreʼs practice of a poetry that is both abstract and idiosyncratic should 
be read beyond its aesthetic modernism into its historical moment, where its ethical 
dimension emerges.  Moore writes:
   The power of the visible
   is the invisible, as even where
no tree of freedom grows,
so-called brute courage knows.
   Heroism is exhausting, yet 
it contradicts a greed that did not wisely spare
the harmless solitaire (49-55)
The spiritual power of the visible is something Moore situates at the level of the 
organism, and heroism does entail critiquing the greed and harm of an all too human 
rapaciousness.  Hidden in the compactness of Mooreʼs diction is the claim that animals 
are courageous, but she makes this claim without personification.  Instead, the poemʼs 
abstraction dissolves the barrier between human and animal enough that the relation 
between human and animal has a continuity, which demands an ethics. 
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Mooreʼs Orientalism
! The subject of Mooreʼs verse is not the self, or not directly.  Instead, a range of 
references comes to suggest a perspective, and then both object and perspective make 
something like a personality apparent behind the poem.  And perhaps without this sense 
that a poem “meant something to the person who wrote it” it risks being just a “piece of 
jargon” and not literature, as Moore writes (508).19  So as indirect as the sense of self is 
in her work, it is nonetheless decisive.  And yet at the same time, the indirectness is 
itself important in that as an abstract quality that emerges from the poemʼs detail, Moore 
is able to give both what she treats and the self that is implied, a quality of being 
described but not defined.  And to defend a certain amount of opacity, Moore cites 
Niebuhr who she says “is not famed as easy reading.”  Niebuhr writes, “The self does 
not realize itself most fully when self-realization is its conscious aim” (qtd in Moore 509).  
Niebuhrʼs comment suggests both self-discipline, eschewing a conscious aim for self 
improvement, and a larger ethical sense of then having the correct view to attain a 
greater awareness. 
! Mooreʼs disciplined respect for what is other than human is notable in her animal 
poetry, which Elizabeth Bishop undertakes to explain the uniqueness of.  Bishop faults 
even Shakespeare for an underlying condescension to animals, which Moore avoids in 
her refusal to personify.  Bishop calls the descriptive quality of Mooreʼs work “somehow 
democratic” but what she sees as democratic is that Mooreʼs minute observations of 
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19 In her essay “Idiosyncrasy and Technique” (1958) Moore writes of Stewart Sherman assembling words 
at random in apparent parody of Gertrude Stein.  But she writes that Shermanʼs “piece of jargon” “gave 
itself away at once as lacking any private air of interest” (508).  Moore thus implies that the private interest 
of the writer as a human self conveying messages is a basic experience of literary reading.  
animals maintains their otherness (135).  Surprisingly, this democratic treatment of 
animals is not paradigmatically American, but rather Chinese.  Mooreʼs “unromantic, life-
like, somehow democratic, presentations of animals come close to their treatment in 
Chinese art,” writes Bishop (135).  And while “democracy” is not an unproblematic term, 
for example Niebuhr sees it as masking a pretense to innocence, the idea that a more 
just relationship to otherness can be found in China and adapted to America seems to 
suggest a non-exploitative form of American Orientalism.20 
" Said focuses largely on Europe in Orientalism and his turn late in the book to US 
Orientalism situates that discourse in the context of twentieth century American power.  
And while he suggests that the cultural capital of European Orientalism continued to 
exercise authority in the US, he does remark that the American version is essentially a 
social science (Said 290).  This observation bears out in the colonization of the 
Philippines as a policy of societal transformation through education.  And as I argue, the 
supposition that American democracy is inherently compatible across the world is part 
of the ideology of American international intervention.  But what Said does not stress is 
that this specifically American strain of imperialist ideology implicitly critiques European 
hegemony in favor of a universalized Americanness.  
" Cynthia Stamy characterizes Mooreʼs Orientalism as a subversive Orientalism 
precisely because Mooreʼs use of China suggests its value as “form of critique of 
resident institutions, prominent persons, or the contemporary state of affairs” (Stamy 
16).  And contrary to Said, Stamy describes an American Orientalism that opposes 
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20 Writing in the early 1950s, Niebuhr critiques a Jeffersonian vision of American “innocency” as a form of 
nationalism, not a truth, while also condemning a similar innocence in communist ideology, that without 
property justice would prevail.    
European hegemony which emerges from Transcendentalism.  Part of her argument is 
that Moore belatedly practices a Transcendentalist version of Orientalism.21  Stamy cites 
from Emersonʼs 1844 journal in which he characterizes “men of talent” as “conversant 
with surfaces” which characterizes “Paris & the western European,” while “other men 
abide by the perception of Identity; these are the Orientals, the philosophers, the men of 
faith & divinity, the men of genius” (qtd in Stamy 13).  That an intuition of truth is lost in 
western culture but definitive of the East suggests that the Transcendentalist project of 
locating divinity not in orthodoxy but in private experience is ultimately in sympathy with 
a kind of Orientalism.   To Emerson the Orient provides a spiritual counterpoint to 
European materialism and Americaʼs destiny is to negotiate these two precedents.  
" This Orientalist strain in Emersonʼs work prefigures the sense of spiritual 
impoverishment that contextualizes Mooreʼs turn to moral poetry in the 1940s, and 
therefore Mooreʼs diverted focus on the self can be seen in two contexts, that objects 
and the other provide spiritual estrangement from a disenchanted world, and relatedly 
that Eastern culture is a proper supplement for Western worldliness.  Stamy argues that 
much of Mooreʼs method has an Oriental influence.  Her syllabics form “a link with the 
Chinese language, in which each character (or word, in Classical Chinese) is a single 
syllable, and verse is composed according to number of characters per line” (Stamy 
114).  Also, Mooreʼs tendency to span disparate elements without explicit connection 
shows that she draws not so much from haiku, as imagism does, but rather from the 
136
21 Stamy points out that Moore “always skirted contemporary [Chinese] history and politics” which was 
characterized by “social and political turmoil” (11). That Moore seems unconcerned with China in anything 
but a cultural context is typical of Orientalism, but that she is otherwise concerned with questions of the 
ethical relation of nations suggests a pointed non-engagement with anything but an ancient China.  Also, 
Moore doesnʼt engage in the social science aspect of how the Orient should be managed in international 
relations which suggests that her interests are atavistically nineteenth century, as opposed to aligned with 
Americaʼs power in the twentieth century.
Chinese fu style of poetry.  According to David Hawkes, the etymology of “fu comes 
closest to the English word ʻenumerateʼ” (qtd in Stamy 90). And this cataloging tendency 
is meant to “explore the reciprocity between man and the natural world and deduce from 
observations of this interaction an abstract notion or eternal verity” (Stamy 91).  In other 
words, Mooreʼs treatment of animals is an adaptation of the fu style.   
# If the fu practice accords with Mooreʼs work, that her work ascends to an abstract 
“verity” also has an Oriental valence: Daoism.  While Confucianism is typically taken to 
have been the most influential Chinese philosophy for modernism, Zhaoming Qian 
argues that Mooreʼs aesthetic draws from Daoist sources, and even though in 1938 
Moore closely read Arthur Waleyʼs translation of The Analects of Confucius, she would 
have been influenced by a “Daoist aesthetic [which] saturates even works of art with 
strong Confucian ideas” (Qian 64).  Specifically, Qian argues that modernists would 
have found an affinity for elements of Daoist aesthetics such as “observing things in 
terms of things,” “forgetting the self” (Shao Yong qtd in Qian 69), along with favoring 
“spirit over physical likeness, intuition over logic.”22  In other words, Daoist aesthetics 
would provide a philosophical justification for an antirepresentational poetics, in line with 
Mooreʼs work.  
# Qianʼs argument is not, however, that Mooreʼs aesthetic is derived from Daoism.  
Instead, his point is more measured.  Her encounter with Asian art proves influential 
because she is already predisposed to privileging the object.  Indeed, Qian reads “her 
biology lab work at Bryn Mawr” as what “foreshadows the start of her career as an 
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22 Shao Yong is a Daoist thinker who lived from1011-1077. Qian quotes from the text “On the Observation 
of Things” (Guan wu pian).  Qian goes on to explain that the method for attaining the Daoist aesthetic is to 
forget the self and “give free play to other creatures” (Qian 242, n. 18).
objectivist” (70).23  Like Qian, Kenneth Burke sees Moore as objectivist, but in contrast 
to symbolist and imagist (Burke 486).  In fact, Burke qualifies Mooreʼs objectivism as 
bearing a form of symbolism, in which the selection of objects reveals “a concern not 
merely for the withinness of motives, but for the withinness-of-withinness of motives, the 
motives behind motives” (487).  The idiosyncrasy of Mooreʼs range of references 
suggests that at some displaced level, what Moore mentions is ultimately determined by 
her intention.
" Moore herself comments on the apparently personal basis of work that has the 
exactitude of a quasi-scientific poetry in “Humility, Concentration, and Gusto” (1951).  
The three terms of the essayʼs title each explicates a quality of Mooreʼs own verse, with 
humility corresponding to the kind of restraint remarkable in her treatment of animals 
and objects.24  Concentration describes the succinctness that Stamy sees as part of 
Mooreʼs adaptation of Chinese ideographs; and Moore acknowledges that concentration 
“may feel to itself crystal clear, yet be through its very compression the opposite” (Moore 
422).  So while the effect of humility and concentration might be obscurity, both are 
essentially impersonal, in fact they might both be said to exclude personality.  
" Moore introduces “gusto” as a kind of mistake.  Citing a cute verse by Edward 
Lear, she notes that he goes from “Pig” to “Piggy” in order “to fit the rhythm” but then the 
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23 As Qian points out, Moore retroactively affirms a strong affinity to Daoism in her work.  Upon reading 
Mai-mai Szeʼs The Tao of Painting (1956), Moore resurrected a 1909 poem sheʼd revise into “O to Be a 
Dragon” (1959), thus suggesting at least a pseudo-Daoist thread throughout her entire career. 
24 Moore does not claim that the essay explains her poetics, but rather that humility, concentration and 
gusto are “Three foremost aids to persuasion” (Moore 420).  Interestingly, Moore opens the paragraph in 
seeming reference to the Cold War, citing Commander Stephen King-Hallʼs comment “the object of war is 
to persuade the enemy to change his mind” as pertinent to “times like these” (qtd in Moore 420).  In other 
words, persuasion is taken as Mooreʼs topic in its broader importance to the necessity of changing hearts 
and minds to win wars.  
odd emphasis nonetheless is “a virtue as contributing gusto” (423).  Emphasis along 
with a sense of the writer behind the lines contribute to the effect of gusto; and it can be 
described as Bonnie Costello does, as “the feeling of pleasure accompanying 
bafflement” (qtd in Kahan 523).  Benjamin Kahan goes so far as to argue that gusto is 
part of the effect of Mooreʼs poetry, specifically in the tension between explicitness and 
obscuration.  Kahan interprets Mooreʼs frequent professions of wanting to be clear with 
her persistent indirectness as enacting a kind of queer textual erotics.  Rather than see 
Moore as aiming at eventual clarity and thus resolving a problematic equivocality, 
Kahan proposes that Moore does not seek a teleological outcome.  Instead, the 
combination of exactness with unclarity just is.  Kahan goes on to argue that the 
difficulty that this approach to writing creates has its own pleasure.  The mode of 
pleasure in Mooreʼs poetry could be read as queer, since as with Villa, her texts tend 
both to criticize heterosexual love, famously in “Marriage” (1923), and to locate desire in 
alternative practices.  But Kahan argues that rather than read Mooreʼs work as being 
homoerotic, it more properly should be regarded as having a specifically celibate mode 
of desire.  Kahan writes: “celibacy can be read as accommodating multiple identities.  
This multiplicity often takes the form of socially objectionable desires - pedophilia, 
impotence, masturbation, and especially homosexuality” (515-6).  But then celibacy is 
not a code for some other sexuality, and Kahan does not understand celibacy as a form 
of self-censorship.  Indeed, Kahan refers to Foucaultʼs famous repressive hypothesis, 
that we are enjoined to speak about sex as the truth of our being, and offers celibacy as 
a refusal of the form of power practiced through sexual hermeneutics. 
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! If power is conventionally thought to impose itself upon an otherwise free person, 
Foucault proposes a radical reversal: the very notion of individual freedom is itself a 
construct of power.25  Foucault addresses the apparent deadlock of his account of 
power by proposing that rather than see the self as an identity, the self should be 
thought of as self-fashioning, as something that progresses through a set of practices, 
which he calls the “care of the self.”  Ethics therefore comes to the forefront of 
Foucaultʼs thought since the task to confront in opposing power is actually the problem 
of which practices of the self enable which types of truth.  
! Focusing on Foucaultʼs study of Hellenistic culture, Edward F. McGushin 
describes the practice of the self as a process of self-directed criticism.  In Greek 
thought, the “self inherently tends toward error” (McGushin 106).  But this natural state 
in not the true self.  Instead, through “care one is able to achieve the truth of oneself, to 
become who one truly is, by rejecting what one has made oneself into.”  McGushin 
situates Foucaultʼs turn toward this model of self-correction as indicating something of a 
break in Foucaultʼs thought.  Whereas he might initially be seen as a kind of theoretical 
archaeologist, whose role is to “study the space in which thought deploys itself, as well 
as the conditions of this thought, its mode of constitution” to use Foucaultʼs own words 
(qtd in McGushin xvi), McGushin sees his turn toward care of the self as “etho-poetic,” 
as concerned primarily with opening up to new thought.  Moreover, while Foucaultʼs 
140
25 Perhaps Foucaultʼs most famous example is the discourse of sexuality and while it is well known, it is 
difficult to summarize.  Foucault begins by noting that sexuality is “elusive by nature” (Foucault I: 66).  
And the basic intimacy of sex is taken up by Christian confession as a problem of hiddenness which must 
become explicit.  And while confession has the effect of problematizing sex and suggesting that a 
discourse of sexuality has an instructive purpose, it is the rise of science and medicine in the nineteenth 
century that Foucault sees as pursuing a more aggressive form of normalization.  As a result, sexuality 
“was no longer accounted for simply by the notions of error or sin, excess or transgression, but was 
placed under the rule of the normal and the pathological” (67).  
project of diagnosis is typically seen as at odds with someone like Heidegger, McGushin 
remarks that Foucaultʼs etho-poetic turn might be more similar to Heideggerʼs concerns 
(xvi).  
" Foucault himself characterizes his turn toward thought that is directed away from 
explanation and toward the unforeseen as an “ʻascesis,ʼ askēsis, an exercise of oneself 
in the activity of thought” (Foucault II 9).  In part, itʼs through the concept of askesis that 
Foucault justifies turning toward a context far removed from the contemporary in his 
inquiry into sexuality.26  The very process of undertaking this research has the purpose 
of  being a work that is self-critical, that seeks change “through the practice of a 
knowledge that is foreign to it.”  Foucaultʼs thought then, comes to emphasize a mode of 
critique we have been tracing throughout the chapter, a sense that the relationship of 
the self to the other creates the possibility for a relationship to truth, whether in 
Heideggerʼs metaphysics, the immanence of divinity in Niebuhr, or in subversive 
Orientalism.
" For the all Marianne Moore issue of Quarterly Review of Literature, Villa 
published two of Mooreʼs poems, one of which appeared under the journalʼs masthead 
in its opening pages.  This poem, “By Disposition of Angels” has a thematic similarity to 
Villaʼs leopard poem in focusing on the singularity of the other-than-human.  
Messengers much like ourselves? Explain it.
Steadfastness the darkness makes explicit?
Something heard most clearly when not near it?
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26 Foucault consistently points out that the Greek context of History of Sexuality Volume 2 cannot be 
easily transposed into the contemporary moment.  On one hand he writes that the Greek “arts of 
existence” which the book examines are of “unquestionable importance in our societies” but also that their 
assimilation into Christianity altered a great deal (10-11).  
! ! Above particularities,
These unparticularities praise cannot violate.
! One has seen, in such steadiness never deflected,
! How by darkness a star is perfected. (1-7)
The abruptness of the first line perhaps recalls Mooreʼs concentration, and indirectly 
might suggest her adaptation of a Chinese idiom, but in terms of interpretation, it seems 
mostly likely that “messengers” refers to the angels in the title.  That Moore demands 
explanation and explicitness when dealing with angels might seem at first skeptical, but 
as the second half of the stanza shows, such questions show that angels are above 
particularities, and should be left in their indistinctness.  The poem can be read as a 
kind of askesis precisely because it eschews description for the virtues of steadiness 
and the unknown.  
! We might recall that the first lines of the first poem in Have Come, Am Here 
invokes the unsaid and that what is unsayable is to Villa the ultimate content of all his 
verse, the “great word without sound” that is “what I never said” (10, 1).  Moore ends 
“By Disposition of Angels” similarly with the sense that apart from language, there is a 
depth of meaning.
Star that does not ask me if I see it?
Fir that would not wish me to uproot it?
Speech that does not ask me if I hear it?
! ! Mysteries expound mysteries.
Steadier than steady, star dazzling me, live and elate,
! No need to say, how like some we have known; too like her,
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! Too like him, and a-quiver forever. (8-14)
Read with the first stanza, Moore transitions from stars to concrete objects, which then 
take on the significance of the star that perfects itself in darkness, and we can read the 
resistance of the thingly quality of things in the indifference of star, fir and speech to an 
observer.  Mooreʼs gnomic comment, which might here serve as the poemʼs moral is 
that “mysteries expound mysteries,” and phrased as an observation, this comment 
might well be read as a condensed summary of what both Moore and Villaʼs poetry 
seeks to treat as subject matter.   
! This chapter has shown that the aesthetic formalism of Villa and Moore pursues 
formal innovation as estrangement in order to challenge a culture of materialism with 
spiritual otherness.  Religion allows Moore and Villa to use their specific identities as 
non-male and non-white (respectively) as a foundation for a relationship to truth and 
self-transcendence that can be deeply critical of political injustice, while engaging 
injustice at the level of ethics, which as Foucault describes it, is “a form of relation to the 
self that enables an individual to fashion himself into a subject of ethical 
conduct” (Foucault II 251).  Itʼs the encounter of the self with other that the poems stage 
which put forth a more just relationship of self-questioning and openness. 
! Poetry like Mooreʼs, that depends on nonrational, apparently fanciful 
connections, has been vulnerable to complaints of randomness.  In fact, David Hsin-Fu 
Wandʼs 1971 essay, which cites only sparingly from Moore scholarship, quotes A. 
Kingsley Weatherheadʼs unsympathetic assessment that Mooreʼs work shows “fanciful 
items [...] that the poet had not initially intended,” that the poemʼs details get the better 
of the poet (qtd in Wand 472).  But Wand points out that Mooreʼs technique is similar to 
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“the fu subgenre of Chinese literature” (473); and that ultimately Mooreʼs poemsʼ span 
of reference and style makes two mythic animals, the dragon and the kylin, apt symbols 
for her work at large.  
Miss Moore has, through her assimilation of the Vital Spirit of the mythical 
Chinese beasts, managed to soar like the dragon and glide like the kylin 
from poem to poem. [...] In inhaling the chʼi (breath or vital spirit) of the 
dragon and the kylin, Miss Moore has miraculously transported the 
essence of Cathay, or classical China, to the soil of American poetry.  
(482)
Wand seems to suggest that Mooreʼs straying afield of herself puts her in mythic 
connection to “the essence of Cathay” but this claim decisively dates Wand.  After all, 
“Cathay” as a cultural construct of a past China, mediated by scholarship, which 
nonetheless expresses the truth of China, its essence, is exactly what Saidʼs 
Orientalism so influentially objected to.  At points through his essay, Wand finds it 
expedient to invoke his authority on China, not explicitly, but in assertions of what might 
“astonish any Chinese” (475).27  Beneath Wandʼs claim that Mooreʼs work is somehow 
essentially Chinese is the sense that he can make this assertion on the basis of his own 
Chineseness.  
" Wand wrote poetry as David Rafael Wang, and under this alter-ego he positioned 
himself in the 1970s as an Asian American poet, acknowledging as an influence Amiri 
Baraka, among others.  And in an essay from 1965, “American Sexual Reference: Black 
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27 Admittedly, these assertions are rare, occurring in what I cite above and also on p. 471.  However this 
rhetorical strategy is so unorthodox in the context of Asian American studies that these few moments of 
willingly portraying himself as a native informant is striking enough to deserve comment.
Male,” Baraka argues that what makes “[m]ost American white men [...] trained to be 
fags” is their alienation from the real (Baraka 243).  In contrast, “the black man is more 
ʻnaturalʼ than the white simply because he has fewer things between him and 
reality” (249).  Barakaʼs argument shows a decisive shift compared to the abstraction 
which was important to Moore and Villaʼs poetics, in which abstraction is suspicious and 
rootedness, as solid as race itself, should be what culture aims at.  Baraka writes that 
while Western white art has critiqued the “unfeeling materialism and murderous 
assertions of self-sufficiency” it is nonetheless “the concentrate of this culture” (246).  
The artist is then an “extremist” of his “societyʼs tendencies.”  Baraka then asserts “the 
most extreme form of alienation acknowledged within white society is homosexuality.  
The long abiding characterization of the Western artist as usually ʻqueerʼ does not seem 
out of place” (246-7).  Homosexuality itself becomes a symptom of the nonreality of 
Western culture, which isolates itself from the physical by exploiting nonwhites.  
Opposing racism entails first affirming contact with reality, but in poetry, this contact 
despite what Baraka asserts, can only be mediated.  Thus, in the third chapter, I read 
Barakaʼs violent poetry with Wangʼs surprisingly homoerotic verse and argue that what 
the poetics of cultural nationalism ultimately depends on, is an immediacy that adapts a 
version of the Whitmanian lyric.
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Chapter 3
Pain, Sex and the Reality of Ethnic Nationalism: Amiri Baraka and David Rafael 
Wang*
! In the first half of this dissertation, I argued that work that seemed unconcerned 
with establishing an oppositional ethnic identity nonetheless worked to oppose racism, 
and that this opposition wouldnʼt be obvious to us because the kind of interventions 
poets like Hartmann and Villa attempted were directed at what they saw as preceding 
politics: cultural meaning.  My supposition was that the idea that race logically precedes 
culture--that itʼs an identity that exists prior to a cultural work and thus determines it--is a 
later historical creation.  In a very schematic outline of history, the origin of that idea, the 
privileging of racial identity, would seem to emerge at a specific point: the ethnic 
nationalist movements of the 1960s and 1970s.  This chapter examines that period and 
indeed, I read poetry from that period as affirming the creation of racial identity as the 
paradigmatic marker of individuality, or to use the phrasing of the period, 
“consciousness raising,” which after all implies the basic nature of identity since it 
resides in the consciousness.  But then even this notion of consciousness raising has a 
history.  As James Smethurst points out in his history of the Black Arts Movement, the 
“long foreground” of the Black Arts Movement is actually rooted in two Communist 
political theories, the first directed at a “folk-based avant-garde” and the second 
premised on a “popular avant-garde” (Smethurst 23-24).  Given that these two 
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approaches to culture are Communist, emerging out of Communist party congresses, 
their ultimate aim was more the production of Communist ideology, than something like, 
say, the paradoxical infinitude of human interiority.  Turning to Asian American literature, 
William Wei similarly sees a Communist approach to art as definitive, citing the 
influential status of Mao Tse-Tungʼs “Talks at the Yenan Forum on Literature and 
Art” (Wei 64).  Thus weʼd expect that the poetry of ethnic nationalism would be one of 
political certainty, a social poetry free of a vexed, individual consciousness.  But the 
texts themselves belie such a conclusion.
" Instead, what we observe is a poetry that doesnʼt assume the seamless 
connection of individuals with a political program, but treats them both: on one hand 
attempting to advocate for an understanding of identity as conflictual, specifically of 
racial oppression as an unbridgeable division in US society, and second attempting to 
see in cultural difference a broader, modernist impulse--the desire to regenerate society 
through an art vivified not by a degenerate false consciousness but the truth of actual 
experience.  This doubled character of ethnic nationalist verse is confirmed by chance 
by the two figures I examine in this chapter, each of whom had doubled existences 
corresponding to a devotion to politics or a devotion to art: LeRoi Jones/Amiri Baraka 
and the less well known David Rafael Wang/David Hsin-Fu Wand.2  
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2 Referring to the writing of these writers who produced work under both names raises a question of 
consistent reference.  In what follows I will refer to writing produced under a given name as though it were 
the work of an author with that name.  So for example, when Wand writes an essay with descriptions of 
Wangʼs work, I phrase it as though Wand described Wang, though it is the same person.  
Pain in the Black Arts Poetry of Amiri Baraka
! What does the exclamation point at the end of the title of Amiri Barakaʼs poem 
“Black People!” mean?  Is it the mark of address, as though to continue Barakaʼs poem 
“SOS” which has as its purpose the “calling [of] all Black people” (2); or is it just to show 
simple excitement, as though the poemʼs call to take whatever you want is itself 
exciting?  In fact, these two possible readings are at odds with each other and reflect a 
larger incoherence in the poem.  Toward the end of the poem Baraka writes: “We must 
make our own world, man, our own world” and then again similarly “letʼs make a world 
we want black children to grow and learn in.”  These appeals to black nationalism, 
which the first quote implies will be a nation different from the US and which the second 
quote clarifies is nation that is ideal and perhaps utopian, and which suggests the 
political goal of his earlier hailing of black people in “SOS,” ultimately has no logical 
connection to the more lurid but libidinally exciting appeal to take not only “those stoves 
and refrigerators, record players in Sears, Bambergers, Kleinʼs, Hahnesʼ, Chase and the 
smaller joosh enterprises” but also to “take what you want” up to and including “their 
lives.”  
! The fact that these two appeals, one to an ideal to be realized through the 
political aim of the poem, the other an appeal to the pleasure of giving in to desire, the 
desire of commodity capitalism, doesnʼt have a logical, necessary connection suggests 
the eclipse of logic in what is essentially a provocation for war.  War, in Elaine Scarryʼs 
analysis, is fundamentally the act of injury, but as she points out, injuring persistently 
falls out of view in the discourse of war, especially in its particular illogic.  Scarry points 
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out that the “rules of war are […] arbitrary” like any contest, and no political, 
geographical or social outcome is necessarily guaranteed just by the mere fact of war 
(Scarry 62).  But then war is more effective than some other type of contest because 
“the legitimacy of the outcome outlives the end of the contest”--Scarry imagines that 
after a conflict decided by chess game the method of this decision will necessarily seem 
trivial and unconvincing.  In contrast, with war, 
so many of its participants are frozen in a permanent act of participation: 
that is, the winning issue or ideology achieves for a time the force and 
status of material “fact” by the sheer material weight of the multitudes of 
damaged and open human bodies. (Scarry 62)
Thus, at least Barakaʼs appeal to take white lives isnʼt just consistent with his vision of a 
black utopia to come, but part of the means by which that political hope could be 
realized.  Scarry emphasizes materiality, as though to suggest that the arbitrary decision 
that war authorizes comes to seem nonarbitrary in its connection, which again isnʼt a 
logical connection, to a material object, the body.  Scarry thus suggests another reading 
of Barakaʼs appeals to take the latest consumer electronics, not just to fulfill a capitalist 
commodity fetish, but to materialize and challenge the arbitrariness of conventional 
ownership.  In fact, itʼs through ownership that murdering whites enters the poem, after 
all, “their lives” are just another example of the “shit you want” (Baraka line #?).  
" Scarry suggests that warʼs overall function is to connect an immaterial ideology 
to the materiality of bodies; this sort of connection also occurs in the poem.  Barakaʼs 
meditation on money, “money dont grow on trees no way, only whiteyʼs got it, makes it 
with a machine, to control you” leads into “you cant steal nothin from a white man, heʼs 
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already stole it he owes you anything you want, even his life” (Baraka 225).  Thus 
something abstract, control, takes on first the character of money, which seems to 
embody control, in that “only whiteyʼs got it;” by bypassing money, looting turns into a 
rejection of white control--obviously not because racial oppression really is a matter of 
property relations mediated by money, but through a symbolism that is enforced 
violently.  
" Barakaʼs equation of white lives with objects is perhaps where the poem is at its 
most violent, and itʼs hard to think through what the logical implications are for a 
moment that eschews logic this starkly.  Furthermore, the poemʼs call to black people to 
get things seems at odds with Barakaʼs more insisted upon theme in the volume Black 
Art, the collection “Black People!” concludes: the transcendent, spiritual nature of black 
identity.  In fact, 26 pages earlier, far from advocating murder the similarly titled “Black 
People: This Is Our Destiny” is almost wholly not about objects; as “destiny” suggests in 
the title, this poem is about the world  to come that the end of “Black People!” invokes.
" Interestingly, “Black People: This Is Our Destiny” begins with an image not of 
division and exclusion, but of inclusion.  In fact, the poem begins not just with an image 
of inclusion, but a form that uses comma splices and repetition to itself seem inclusive.  
The road runs straight with no turning, the circle
runs complete as it is in the storm of peace, the all
embraced embracing in the circle complete turning road
straight like a burning straight with the circle complete (1-4).
Read with “destiny” in the title, the first line seems to establish the inexorable quality of 
what Baraka images the black future to be, a road with no turns; but then this first lineʼs 
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enjambment, pointedly against syntax, includes a circle.  Intuitively, if the poem is about 
destiny, a road makes more sense than a circle, the kind of sense that a line like “race is 
only direction up” affirms (7).   But if the circle seems like a less intuitive image, it at 
least suggests how the teleology of the black race is also present at its origin--making it 
explicit that destiny embodies both a sense of immanence and transcendence.  Race 
might be directional, but it is also “where / we go to meet the realization of makers 
knowing who we are” (7-8).  By the end of the poem, this destined circularity turns oddly  
inclusive.  
[…] vibration holy nuance beating against
itself, a rhythm a playing re-understood now by one of the 1st race
the primitives the first men who evolve again to civilize the
world (17-20).
The “1st race / the primitives” suggests Barakaʼs sense of origin and evolving again 
suggests culmination, but what is regenerated isnʼt just the first men, but the world--put 
under emphasis by being placed alone at the poemʼs end.  
" Does “world” here include whites?  Based strictly on “Black People: This Is Our 
Destiny” I argue that it does.  The massive completeness this poem equates with God 
includes “the endlessness of all existing feeling, all / existing forms of life” (12-13).  
“Existing” emphasizes an immediate presence; in fact, with an almost Whitmanian logic,  
immediacy contributes the sense of the infinite that makes Barakaʼs notion of 
151
completeness seem metaphysical.3  Furthermore, by definition, “all existing forms of life” 
would have to include the existing, present life of whites.  
! But then such logic doesnʼt necessarily mean that Baraka intends to include 
whites in the destiny of black people.  “Black People!” asserts that whites have to die in 
order to create the black world to come:
We must make our own
World, man, our own world, and we can not do this unless the white man 
is dead (19-21)
Baraka doesnʼt really mount an argument here; he only suggests that the world that we 
must make our own has to be a world “we want black children to grow in,” which already 
means that that world is defined by race (22).  
! Why must we make our own “World?” In “Black People!” the answer seems to be 
that white control amounts to a kind of theft.  Although Baraka states “you cant steal 
nothin from a white man, heʼs already stole it he owes / you anything you want, even his 
life,” when we ask what exactly the white man has stolen from “you”--the exhorted black 
people of the title--the answer would be everything, since there is nothing that you canʼt 
be in the wrong for taking back (8-9).  Thus the poem suggests that in not the world to 
come but the current world of the poem, black people are totally victimized by white 
theft.  This implied thesis makes it clear why white people must be reduced to objects 
whose very lives can be stolen with the same logic as commodities.  If the white person 
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3 In the next chapter I make the argument that Whitmanʼs metaphysical appeal in the paratactic lists he 
favors in the 1855 Leaves of Grass operates with a similar logic.  By juxtaposing a potentially infinite 
series of specific items, Whitman attempts to material a sense of the infinite itself.  
has stolen everything from blacks, then when black people steal it back, there is nothing 
left to a white person.  
! “Black People!” seems to make white people into first objects and then nothing.  
But strangely this position of nothingness is neither nonexistent nor irrelevant; after all, it 
must actively be excluded in the new “World” Baraka envisions.  The poem thus 
attempts to define white subjectivity as a kind of pseudo-Hegelian negativity.  In so 
doing Baraka inverts what Frantz Fanon describes as the ontology of blackness in the 
“Fact of Blackness” chapter of Black Skins, White Masks (1967), making Fanonʼs 
comments on black racialization apt for Barakaʼs poetic racialization of whites in this 
poem.4  Ironically, Fanon too imagines an all black, non-divided subjectivity, though not 
in the post-revolutionary future as in “Black People!” 
! Instead, Fanon imagines a pre-colonial society, which sounds oddly 
impoverished in that such a situation presents “no occasion, except in minor internal 
conflicts, to experience […] being through others” (Fanon 109).  Fanon then mentions 
Hegelian “being for others” before writing that “every ontology is made unattainable in a 
colonized and civilized society.”  The Hegelian “being for others” that Fanon invokes, 
then passes over, describes the moment when pure being goes from a state of 
existence to reflexiveness; an “I=I” that introduces the crucial self-difference between a 
metaphysical totality, and awareness of that totality, with awareness paradoxically 
suggesting a distance from that totality.  Thus, Fanon begins to imagine a Hegelian 
ontology for the colonized, which after all would reiterate a colonial discourse of 
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4 Fanon actually describes the impossibility of a black ontology, but his discussion on ontology suggests a 
perspective that does ask metaphysical questions about basic assumptions and might therefore be 
loosely called an “ontology,” despite Fanonʼs discomfort with adapting this term.  
civilizing, since colonization would have as a positive effect the sublation of primitive 
wholeness for “being for others.”  Notably, Fanon doesnʼt even finish this line of thought 
and simply abandons “every” ontology, claiming that for the colonized “there is an 
impurity, a flaw that outlaws any ontological explanation” (110).  This impurity is actually 
the impossibility of an in-itself blackness, a blackness not aware of its differentiation; 
according to Fanon  “not only must the black man be black; he must be black in relation 
to the white man.”  Thus the untenability of a black ontology results not from a lack of 
“being for others” but from a lack of an original moment of metaphysical wholeness.  
" Hegel begins Phenomenology of Spirit not with self consciousness, but sense 
certainty; Fanon describes the “implicit knowledge” of what his body does when he 
wants to smoke in slow, phenomenological detail (111).  This unselfconscious sequence 
of thought affirms the self as body, in a form of sense certainty.  But then the self-body 
connection of established in smoking is “assailed at various points”--that is, in racist 
encounters that single out Fanonʼs blackness, such that “the corporeal schema 
crumbled, its place taken by a racial epidermal schema” (112).  Fanonʼs adjectives 
replace body with skin, both of which seem physical and thus at the level of sense 
certainty.  But as Fanon makes clear two paragraphs later, this substitution is a 
reduction--the substitution of physical presence into object.  Race is not an attribute of 
sensation, but rather “an amputation, an excision” that places blackness into a 
negativity, a negation of the general category of “man among other men.”  
" An object that has the effect of negativity--that renders presence into an object 
according to Fanon--seems paradoxical because objects tend to connote not negation 
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and absence but existence.5  But then the way that Fanon describes race, as “an 
amputation, an excision” renders race into a wound, thereby suggesting one negativity 
that is immediate, pain.  Pain is the overall subject of Scarryʼs text which I used above 
to describe war, and her description of pain suggests how the negative object of race, 
blackness in Fanonʼs genealogy and whiteness in Barakaʼs prophecy, is finally 
necessary for the transcendent moment in both Fanon and Barakaʼs notion of 
revolution.
" Fanon was not a cultural nationalist and though Baraka name-drops Fanon, he 
doesnʼt share Fanonʼs conception of blackness, as Darieck Scott points out.  According 
to Scott “for Black Power writers and activists, blackness describes a social and 
economic condition, a vibrant culture to be endorsed on its own terms, an essence and 
a kind of telos,” as we see in Barakaʼs “Black People: This Is Our Destiny” (Scott 35).  
For Fanon, “blackness [is] a strategic instrument in a contest for political supremacy.”  
But despite these differences, its notable that in either Baraka or Fanon, blackness is to 
some extent disavowed, either in favor of a purer form or a revolutionary 
transcendence.  There is something finally counterfactual about blackness, perhaps 
best called imaginary in that within blackness there is some trait that surpasses or 
differentiates itself from the known quality of blackness.    
" Scarry claims, in a strikingly totalizing statement, that pain and imagining “are the 
ʻframing eventsʼ within whose boundaries all other perceptual, somatic, and emotion 
events occur” (Scarry 165).  Feeling pain and imagining can be thought of as in these 
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5 Fanon writes: “On that day, completely dislocated, unable to be abroad with the other, the white man, 
who unmercifully imprisoned me, I took myself far off from my own presence, far indeed, and made 
myself an object” (112).  Thus what Fanon describes as the substitution of body for skin results in the 
objectification of the self, the subject, as entirely determined by the skin.   
terms on the basis of what Scarry calls “intentional state” and “intentional object,” but 
which might simply be called sensation and object.  Pain is objectless, but is a state of 
sensation; similarly imagination has an object but that object isnʼt able to be sensed--
Scarry points out that if one imagines, one must imagine some thing.  And if all other 
perceptual, somatic or emotional events carry some form of feeling state and object, 
then it becomes clear why pain and imagining would frame these other categories of 
experience.  As an example Scarry contrasts touching wheat to looking out at it (165).  
In touch one feels not only the object, the wheat, but also oneself feeling it; thus touch 
makes us aware not only of the object but of our own body.  And since it makes us 
aware of the body itself, touch has a proximity to pain.  In contrast, in seeing wheat 
oneʼs eyes donʼt tend to have “any self-conscious state of feeling;” one has more of an 
awareness of the object of sense than the sensation of sensing (165).  
" But Scarryʼs point isnʼt just that pain and imagining are opposites and that senses 
partake more of the qualities of pain or more of the qualities of imagining.  Instead she 
proposes an intimacy inherent to pain and imagining.  Taking as an example something 
like “dying of thirst and ʻseeingʼ water on the next sand dune,” Scarry suggests 
imagining is not just the neutral calling to mind of what doesnʼt exist (168).  Instead 
imagining that answers pain externalizes an otherwise incommunicable internal state.  
“The more exactly the object of desire or hunger or fear fits or expresses the state, the 
more precise a projection of the state it is, the more will it seem to have been generated 
by the interior state itself and will be considered a visionary solution,” Scarry remarks 
(168).  Interestingly, what constitutes “a visionary solution” is the extent to which an 
object can be imagined that seems to function as the object of a state of sensation 
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without an inherent object.  Here the capacity for imagination to call forth objects that 
“are not passively available as an already existing ʻgivenʼ” enables the sensation of 
personhood itself to transcend an uncommunicable state of pure experience via 
symbolic objectification (167).  
# In assessing Barakaʼs poems in Black Art, Jerry Gafio Watts describes them as 
“formulaic harangues against whites and whiteness and celebratory invocations of 
parochial blackness” which are nonetheless “the best poems that Baraka wrote as a 
black cultural nationalist” (Watts 234).  His harangues against whites include in its 
formula violence, even genocide, as in “Attention Attention,” a poem that like “SOS” 
calls black people together, only now with the added proclamation that “All greys must 
be terminated immediately / End of species must be assured” (Baraka 15-16).  Watts 
emphasizes the essentially pathetic character of these “infantile and overblown 
condemnation[s] of whites” in that the totality of Barakaʼs pronouncements suggest 
more the perverse desire of having victimization acknowledged, and thus “undermines 
the credibility of the juxtaposition of praise that [Baraka] lavishes on blacks” (Watts 232). 
# Wattsʼ argument is attractive because it helps us to accept that the poems in 
Black Art are good, while enabling us to condemn Barakaʼs advocacy of genocide and 
murder--an advocacy we obviously shouldnʼt support.  But that attractiveness blinds us 
to an underlying dynamic in what Watts characterizes as a juxtaposition between 
violence against whites and praise for blacks, or something like the equating of 
murdering whites to getting objects you want in “Black People!” against the affirming, 
metaphysically complete vision of a black utopia to come in “Black People: This Is Our 
Destiny.”  The unfulfilled quality of Barakaʼs vision in “Black People: This Is Our Destiny” 
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suggests Scarryʼs characterization of visionary imagination above.  What makes the 
poem not just a fatuous imagining of something that doesnʼt exist is the poignancy of 
the desire that it should exist.  In fact, the poem hinges on a line that specifically invokes 
war: “the war in our hearts [is] but the purity of the holy world / that we long for” (9-10).  
War here is not the violent, genocidal death of whites, or at least it is not overtly and 
exclusively that.  Instead, its direction is not toward injuring, what Scarry points out is 
the real aim of war, but to an ideological justification of war, a pure world.  And for that 
reason we can see the same desire that animates “Attention Attention” and “Black 
People!” in its relation to Barakaʼs positive, hopeful vision.  As in war, pain and injuring--
even the figure of genocide--gives Baraka the means with which to tie the imagined 
construct of his just world to come, to materiality--in fact to something that is the closest 
experience of pure materiality, not the sensation of objects, but sensation itself: pain.  
" Finally, we might address one last incoherence relating to the poem “Black 
People!” not an ambiguity related to its content, but one of intent.  Werner Sollors 
characterizes the poem as “perhaps the most extreme example of Barakaʼs ʻpragmaticʼ 
and functional poetry” before quoting it in full (199).  Sollors then gives a brief account of 
Barakaʼs appearance in court on July 14, 1967, quoting Judge Leon Kapp, passing 
judgment on an allegation that Baraka had “illegal possession of firearms.” Kapp states 
that “Proof of a personʼs intentions may be inferred from all that he did or said” and then 
reads “Black People!” (201).  Barakaʼs response is also cited:  “Iʼm being sentenced for 
the poem.  Is that what youʼre saying?” On one hand, Judge Kappʼs reading of the 
poem, as the actual expression of what Baraka thinks people should do seems to be the 
more courageous reading, one that suggests a total commitment of artistic work to 
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political act.  That Sollors characterizes the poem as “pragmatic” and “functional” almost 
provides a winking insinuation that this poem which is barely a poem, really is an 
exhortation.  Barakaʼs ultimate acquittal on the grounds of the poemʼs cultural status as 
poem comes to then seem like a cop out.  
" Baraka wrote in “Black Art,” his “most widely quoted statement of the new Black 
Arts sensibility” according to Watts, that “poems are bullshit” (Watts 175).  And to see 
Baraka as ultimately disavowing one of his “Poems that shoot / guns” (Baraka 20-21)--
such as “Black People!”--suggests that Barakaʼs poems of black revolution really might 
be “nothing more than mere thuggery superimposed on hurt black feelings, impotence, 
and defeat,” which is the description Watts gives to “Black Art” (Watts 177).  But then 
what Barakaʼs response to Kapp and Wattsʼ characterization of “Black Art” really have at 
stake is the widely acknowledged “Mao at Yenan” aesthetic--that “literature and art are 
subordinate to politics” (Mao).  
" Sollors mentions in passing that Barakaʼs appearance before Judge Kapp occurs 
during the Newark “riots” but he doesnʼt emphasize what Komozi Woodard does, that 
the Newark Uprising resulted from increasingly violent encounters between police and 
the black community.  In fact, Baraka himself was beaten:
We were told to come out of the camper bus.  When I opened the door 
and stepped down, one detective...preached to me, screaming that we 
were the “black bastards” whoʼd been shooting at him.  I said that we 
hadnʼt been shooting at anyone….whereupon he hit me in the face and 
threw me against the side of the camper.  The detective then began to jab 
me as hard as he could with his pistol in my stomach, asking, “Where are 
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the guns?” I told him that there were no guns.  Suddenly it seemed that 
five or six officers surrounded me and began to beat me.  I was hit 
perhaps five times on top of my head by nightsticks, and when I fell, some 
of the officers went about methodically trying to break my hands, elbows 
and shoulders.  One officer tried to kick me in the groin and there were 
many punches thrown.  As they beat me they kept calling me “animal” and 
asking me, “Where are the guns?” (qtd in Woodard 81)
Baraka repeatedly notes that the beating occurs simultaneously with questions, using 
the gerund form so that as “he began to jab” Baraka, he also was “asking, ʻWhere are 
the guns?ʼ”  What occurs isnʼt just a violence that is purely physical.  The verbal act, the 
question, actually “consists of two parts,” the question itself and the answer (Scarry 35).  
According to Scarry, the question appears as the motive for the beating, “providing [the 
police] with a justification” and thus absolving him of responsibility; while the answer, 
which the one being beaten is supposed to give, is meant to discredit the victim, 
“making him rather than the torturer, his voice rather than his pain, the cause of his loss 
of self and world” (35).  That last phrase, “loss of self and world,” is Scarryʼs description 
of the effect of pain, but itʼs strikingly present in Barakaʼs account of being beaten too.  
“They were beating me to death….I was being murdered and I knew it” (Baraka qtd in 
Woodard 81).  That Baraka specifically “knew it” interestingly suggests his awareness of 
a state that should be negative, the loss of life; and thus a kind of doubleness: “what the 
process of torture does is to split the human being into two, to make emphatic the […] 
distinction between a self and a body” (Scarry 48).  
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! Scarry notes that through oneʼs “ability to project words and sounds out into [the] 
environment, a human being inhabits, humanizes, and makes his own a space much 
larger than that occupied by his body alone” (49).  Scarryʼs language suggests that she 
intends this basic aspect of speech to be a general impulse.  Then she observes “This 
space, always contracted under repressive regimes, is in torture almost wholly 
eliminated” (49).  Scarry doesnʼt argue it, but her suggestion is that in being what 
repression attempts to limit, the capacity to imaginatively extend oneʼs subjectivity 
outward is a basic freedom that in some way threatens the exercise of power.  After all, 
this faculty makes the environment itself available for at least imaginative transformation 
and even these imagined alterations, might well be a precursor to “a total reinvention of 
the world” (Scarry 171, emphasis removed).  
! Barakaʼs attempt to categorize “Black People!” as a specifically aesthetic work 
and not as political incitement to violence can therefore be read not as a repudiation to 
a radically political art.  Instead, the appropriation of the imagination, and thus art, to 
politics is part of the violence of abusive power, as Baraka himself would have 
experienced in the violent appropriation of his capacity for speech against the physical 
reality of his bodyʼs pain.  Thus, if Maoʼs formulation, with its implied opposition between 
dedication to art and dedication to a cause, has come to seem the obvious way to 
situate an art that is meant to also be political, as Barakaʼs was at this point, what 
Barakaʼs poetry actually demonstrates is that politics strives to realize itself on the 
reality of the individual--both in the act of torture and in Barakaʼs own poetic 
combinations of violence and language.  And as counterintuitive as it might seem, even 
Barakaʼs black arts poetry has an underlying lyric, almost Whitmanian concern: the self. 
161
Pornography, Race, Politics
! That Baraka tries to give a poem the immediacy of action, as in lines like “Fuck 
poems / and they are useful, wd they shoot / come at you” (“Black Art” 5-7), suggests 
that his aim isnʼt to advocate violence, or so I argue.  Instead, what apparently violent 
lines attempt is making an imagined possibility of racial liberation as real as possible, by  
invoking the immediacy of bodily reality through what is least amenable to mediation in 
either language or thought--pain.  
! To some readers, my use of the quote in the previous paragraph might suggest a 
misreading.  These lines seem violent when read with a hard stop after line 6: would 
poems “shoot” and then, as though revising that thought, would they “come at you.”  But 
a less vexed and simpler reading would be to just read past the enjambment: would the 
poem “shoot come at you.” But while this reading makes textual sense, it raises another 
question.  Why should a poem ejaculating make it useful, especially if what we want are 
“poems that kill” (19)?
! I want to start answering this question in a seemingly unpromising way, by 
considering the work of David Hsin-Fu Wand.  Wand, who wrote poetry under the name 
David Rafael Wang, isnʼt an obvious choice to read in context with Baraka, in that while 
Wand might have written critical works meant to promote Asian American activist poetry, 
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Wangʼs verse isnʼt political in the way that Barakaʼs seems to be.6  In fact, Josephine 
Nock-Hee Park, who opens her third chapter in Apparitions of Asia with what would now 
probably be the most prominent consideration of Wand, reads Wand as something of a 
failed Asian American poet--failed in that unlike “poets of the ethnic nationalist 
movement” Wand was unable to align “poetry with […] politics in the conviction that an 
aesthetic revolution could mean a cultural one” (Park 95, 94).  Thus Park argues that 
Wandʼs division into Wand the critic and Wang the poet shows that even as “the scholar 
aligned himself with the Asian American movement” his poet alter-ego “belonged to an 
American Orientalist tradition which clung to the vestiges of the American bard,” with 
this vestigial bardic quality connoting Orientalism, the very thing that Asian American 
movement poets universally opposed (94).  
" Parkʼs reading of Wand/Wang is more complicated than something like the 
privileging of aesthetics (understood as personal) against the privileging of politics 
(understood as social), but that somewhat simple opposition still operates in her 
contention that Wand doesnʼt connect the aesthetic to the political, and that this lack of 
connection is what defines Wangʼs work and makes it fail.  But then as I tried to show in 
my reading of Barakaʼs most stridently political poems, the abstract, unembodied nature 
of politics means that any naturalized politics--like an agreed-upon blanket rejection of 
all Orientalism--results from the appropriation of physicality, as in Barakaʼs use of 
violence, through the imagination, which is the faculty for sensing what isnʼt present to 
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6 My indirection in characterizing Barakaʼs Black power verse is meant to suggest my argument, which is 
that the apparently simple politics of this verse masks Barakaʼs deeper engagement with a problem of 
lyric subjectivity, and thus a connection to the mainline Whitmanian poetic tradition that activist ethnic 
poetry is usually seen as opposing.  But for simplicity I refer here to the sense in commentators like 
Sollors and Watts that Barakaʼs politics are the subject of these 1960s poems, while indicating my 
difference from that view with the somewhat weak qualifying word “seems.”  
the senses, and thus is vital for politics.  But also, the imagination is the traditional 
domain of literary art, and thus the province of aesthetics.  
! I donʼt think Park is wrong in characterizing Wand as schizophrenically divided 
nor even wrong in seeing that division as what consigns his verse to a kind of minor 
status, not quite in the mainline of Modernism, not quite in the mode of the Movement, 
which is actually varied and not easily summarized.  Indeed, itʼs because Wand is so 
divided between the “American bard” tradition, understood I think as the assumption 
that a more intense engagement with the self will express broad, or even universal 
truths, and the triumph of political verse, which sees consciousness itself as something 
that can be created through literature, as in the very common rhetoric of “consciousness 
raising” in the ethnic nationalist movement, that Wandʼs work reveals tensions inherent 
to both of these opposed traditions and thus proposes their similarity.  
! Wandʼs work as Wang, as Park points out, isnʼt obvious in its support for the 
ethnic nationalist project.  But then “The Ash-Hauler” from Wangʼs 1975 collection The 
Intercourse is at least an imitation of Barakaʼs Black Arts poetry, if not a call for pan-
ethnic minority power.  As in Barakaʼs work, Wang uses a pop culture reference, thus 
suggesting a populist ethos.  In a more overt imitation of Baraka, Baraka is part of the 
“Greco-Sino-samurai-African tradition” Wang sees himself writing in, Wang contrasts a 
masculine, minority male against whites who are portrayed as effete.7
Superman has turned black
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7 Wangʼs comment on Baraka comes at the end of The Intercourse in an author biography that faces a full 
page photograph of Wang fingering an arm rest and wearing what looks to be a traditional Chinese jacket 
with a scarf, his face with a kind of knowing sneer.  To be clear, Wang writes singles out Barakaʼs work 
“as a playwright” and by omission suggests that he doesnʼt respect Barakaʼs poetry.  But then Barakaʼs 
plays also increasingly, and certainly by 1975, were more about “exorcising Barakaʼs literary past, by 
ridiculing absurdist drama as an expression of white degeneracy,” according to Sollors (208).  Thus even 
citing Barakaʼs plays, Wang here attempts to align himself, however dubiously, with Barakaʼs politics.  
Let him flap his biceps
Swoop down upon the villains
See how fast they turn and run
dropping their used powder puffs (2-6)
That the villains are white is made clear in the next stanza: “the pasty-faces are scared 
stiff” (7).  That Superman wasnʼt always black, but becomes black undermines the 
contrast between the pasty-faces and Superman, so much so that this second stanza 
replaces Superman with “a two-fisted panther,” a kind of obvious reference to the Black 
Panther Party (8).  And yet oddly the poem actually begins with the line “Race never 
enters the picture,” which suggests that nothing about the opposition between 
Superman and villains, pasty-faces and panthers is racial.
" As much as “The Ash-Hauler” imitates Baraka, it also doesnʼt quite culminate in 
the violence that Barakaʼs poems advocate.  The pasty-faces that are afraid of panthers 
are left afraid, there is no actual violence.  Instead, the panther 
doesnʼt need to snarl
to get his teeth to light up
in the sparkle of his sunny nature.” (9-11)  
For Wang the emphasis is more on specular viewing than action and for that reason, the 
poem stages tableaus rather than actively trying to “shoot come at you.”  Thus, while 
weʼre tempted to see in the first line some kind of invitation to read the poem as racial, it 
is actually more a picture. To state that race never enters the picture makes sense 
because in this poem, which only consists of pictures, race is not deeply significant, but 
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externalized, spectacular.8  Moreover, that Superman becomes black suggests 
blackness as a general term for non-whiteness; Bill V. Mullen points out that for both 
Marcus Garvey and W. E. B. DuBois blackness “was a flexible metaphor able to include 
not only mulattoes but Asians, Africans and Jews” (Mullen xxxv).  Thus as a metaphor, 
Supermanʼs blackness, he was created by two Jews after all, is another reason why 
race is only external, not fundamental.  
" “The Ash-Hauler” concludes the first section of The Intercourse, what Wang titled 
“The Thrusts.”  The other two sections, which are numbered as “acts,” are “The 
Insertions” and “The Withdrawal.”  At this superficial level of titles, “thrusts,” which is 
both the first part of the book and is what sequentially precedes insertion, seems 
unlikely to mean the thrusting of sex.  Instead, it might more plausibly be something like 
the subtle thrusting of erection, a kind of tightening of the hips in preparation of full 
arousal.  If so, that “The Ash-Hauler” isnʼt about depicting an act of black over white 
power, but rather the image of a black Superman frozen in muscular dominance over 
white villains who drop their make-up, means that the poem deflects its politics and its 
imitation of Baraka into sexuality--and not just sexuality, but a kind of perspicuous 
166
8 The poem ends with a series of puns:
! If you donʼt get this, man, dig:
! Us spade cats will shovel white trash
! into the underground furnace of love. (12-14)
These last lines, somewhat like the ending couplet of a Shakespearean sonnet, break out of the poem to 
comment on it, but in that commentary, proposes that the poemʼs point might be missed.  Then, as though 
to assist the reader in missing the point, the three quick puns of “dig” “spade” and “shovel” occur to make 
the final surreal image playful.  We might be tempted to read the poem as though it bore the overtones of 
Barakaʼs most outrageous Black Arts poems, which advocate genocide and have “the extermination 
blues.”  But then such a reading is something of a stretch in that if whites are reduced to white trash, 
blacks are also reduced to shovels, so there is no privileging of any particular identity.  And more 
convincingly, rather than invoke the furnace in the context of the Shoah as Baraka does in “For Tom 
Postell, Dead Black Poet,” Wang uses the furnace as an image of love.    
emphasis on the sexual that exists in an objectifying gaze, in the sense that physical 
exteriority is about to manifest sex.
! In fact, itʼs this objectifying gaze that makes up the general subject of the poems 
in “Act I: The Thrusts.”  For example, the first poem “Kouros” is only three lines:
To capture your beauty:
Ring a gazelle tight with a rope
And watch him bound through the woods.
A kouros is a life-sized nude statue of a boy, and thus already the poemʼs title suggests 
its content: the “capturing” of beauty in something like sexual possession.  The poem is 
recognizably Imagist in its brief, intense focus on a single, vivid picture, and thus might, 
in a politicized context, seem regressive: like the Orientalist reticence of some haiku 
derivative.  Even so, this poem shows that it is through image that Wang begins a 
sequence of poems which in its culmination with “The Ash-Hauler” stages dominance 
and submission as a sexual spectacle across apparently opposed poetic styles.  
! If, as Park argues, Wangʼs poetics fall into Orientalism, the evident homosexual 
desire in “Kouros,” which itʼs tempting to affirm against the chauvinism of early Asian 
Americanists, might actually be enabled by the very Orientalism that weʼre still likely to 
critique.  After all, drawing our attention to kouros as an artifact of a lost, but once 
highly-cultured civilization evokes the Orient; and itʼs worth noting that Greece as a 
nation in Asia Minor could be geographically subsumed into the Orient.  Greeks were 
even counted as Orientals under the 1907 Oriental Exclusion Act, as Iʼve noted 
elsewhere.9  Not that I want to argue that Greece is the Orient in the terms Edward Said 
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9 See my “Why Jeffrey Eugenidesʼ Middlesex Is So Inoffensive” from Critique 51:1 (2009) p. 10.  I cite 
Stavros Frangosʼ historical work on Greeks in Michigan.  
establishes in Orientalism.  In fact, such a claim would have to be heavily qualified by 
the claims of Greece as the source of Western Civilization.  But I do want to emphasize 
what David L. Eng points out about the conflation of primitivity in general with non-
normative sexual excess.  Eng argues that “Freud initially isolates the figure of the 
homosexual as an exemplary model of a stalled and pathological narcissism,” a 
narcissism which in turn applies to both children and primitive peoples (Eng 10).  Eng 
specifically emphasizes Freudʼs Totem and Taboo as positing a hypersexualized and 
primitive racial body.  As Eng describes it, for Freud, the primitive is “unable to banish 
forbidden sexual impulses” to the unconscious, which thus results in what Freud sees 
as a redundant, over-insistent forbidding of incest, as though incest was constantly 
about to happen (8).  Totem and Taboo, as Eng points out, is drawn entirely from 
secondary sources, which points to the epistemology of Orientalism that Said objected 
to: the substitution of discourse for knowledge.  Thus, itʼs tempting to sometimes read 
Totem and Taboo as an aberration, since Freud is otherwise scrupulously focused on 
primary observation, as in his case reports.  But then it isnʼt that the discursive, 
unscientific roots of Totem and Taboo disqualify it from producing further discourse, or 
that the work derived from Totem and Taboo would have some obvious deficiency 
compared to something drawn from a more scientific method.  If anything, both Saidʼs 
comments on Orientalism and what Eng argues to be Totem and Tabooʼs articulation of 
a theory that extends throughout much of Freud, of sexual excess as regressive, testify 
to discourseʼs considerable power in the face of alternative, possibly more material 
accounts.  
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! Thus Wangʼs black Superman as contrasted to his powder-puff dropping white 
foes also intimates the persistent black stud stereotype; a stereotype affirmed in 
Supermanʼs transformation into an image of animal power while whites remain “pasty-
faces.”
! Before moving on to the second act of the book, what by naming “The Insertions” 
in a book called The Intercourse Wang suggests is the volumeʼs central section, itʼs 
important to note the specular quality of the first section, from which Iʼve chosen 
“Kouros” and “The Ash-Hauler” to represent.  For both these poems, male figures are 
presented as objects of sight with the poemʼs speaker in the position of viewer.  It 
seems as though what is seen and sexualized should then simply be available for 
vision, but as “Kouros” shows, it is not enough simply that the person being seen is 
seen.  The quality that incites the gaze, for example beauty in “Kouros,” is not easily 
captured, which is the point of the poem.10  
! What Jacques Lacan calls “the given-to-be-seen” is a theorization of the gaze 
and Lacanʼs phrasing suggests the accidental, somewhat excessive quality of 
something like sexual attractiveness, in a manner that suggests beauty in 
“Kouros” (Lacan 74).  Lacan proposes two examples to describe the gaze and the 
given-to-be-seen: first mimesis in insects which suggests a core insight of the “given-to-
be-seen,” that though we both see and are seen, the fact of being seen precedes our 
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10 “The Ash-Hauler” similarly depicts whatever fascinates the gaze as being elusive, most notably in the 
visual shifting from Superman to a panther.  That substitution suggests that whatever made Superman 
initially an object of the gaze is what motivates the transformation in the second stanza.  
seeing.11  The second example is perhaps more suggestive of Wangʼs work, “the 
satisfaction of a woman who knows that she is being looked at, on condition that one 
does not show her that one knows that she knows” (75).  Other than elaborating the 
complex conditions of who knows the other knows without knowing it, Lacan doesnʼt 
detail this example, but the womanʼs pleasure in being looked at suggests sheʼs 
probably beautiful.  Or rather, it is by asking whether sheʼs beautiful that we understand 
why her being looked at must be disingenuously disavowed.  Her beauty itself 
presupposes a gaze, and thus operates as what Lacan calls a “stain”--something like 
the mimetic markings of an insect which show that a visual feature already is the object 
of the gaze, before there is an explicit entity that gazes.  And through the series of 
knowing and unknowing the gaze becomes a position someone can provisionally relate 
to, but not identify with or become.12  For to become the gaze would be to be in the 
impossible position of completely seeing the given-to-be-seen, what would be a sensory 
plenitude that surpasses representation and difference.  For that reason Lacan 
emphasizes that the gaze which the given-to-be-seen is directed toward is elided.  And 
to return once more to “The Ash-Hauler,” we could now see that Supermanʼs flexing of 
his biceps is an invitation to be seen, which makes the dropped powder puffs not just a 
sign of fear, but of the kind of captivation by beauty “Kouros” describes.  
" Using the Lacanian given-to-be-seen to read the poems of “Act I: The Thrusts” as 
poems about the stain of sexual visibility will perhaps seem counterintuitive; sexual 
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11 Lacanʼs point here parallels his point of language preceding the subject.  After all, we accede to the 
already invented system of signs of our language; we do not invent it on the fly for our individual use.  
Similarly, we are seen before we are aware of seeing, since as a biological model species of minimal 
psychology, even insects adapt to the world first as what is seen. 
12 The gaze, especially in Slavoj Zizekʼs explications of Lacan, is a superegoic entity.  One that watches 
not from the perspective of subjects, but more in the sense of an intractable all-seeing presence.  
objectification, after all, seems like it is the imposition of a phallocentric subjectivity, that 
wants to use fucking to degrade and possess.  But in my reading, what confers 
sexuality to the images in the poems is the product of a gaze that no one ever 
embodies, a mark of visibility that makes an inhuman, all-seeing gaze fleetingly 
apprehensible.  With “Kouros” and “The Ash-Hauler” it is perhaps impossible not to see 
in both Lacanian and anti-Lacanian theses some evidence, which suggests that at this 
point my argument would be inconclusive.  But that ambiguity can be explained as an 
effect of where these poems stop, before insertion, which after all is the title of the next 
“act.” 
! Sex in “Act II: The Insertions” is on the whole bisexual, as though to justify the 
titleʼs plural ending.  And this section also features the title poem “The Intercourse,” 
which begs more analysis if we are to understand what the book The Intercourse is 
about.  The poem does somewhat relate to insertion, as its placement should indicate, 
depicting it, questioning it, but somehow the poem seems to be more about a shading 
between what we might read as homosexual and homosocial desire.  It begins with a 
series of three or two line triads:13
Youʼve been having 
  sex with her
  four times a day
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13 Obviously, it seems like bad mathematics to call a two line segment a triad, but in doing this I am 
making the claim that this beginning part of the poem is derived from William Carlos Williamsʼ use of three 
line sections he called triadic lines.  Though there isnʼt critical agreement on what constitutes Williamsʼ 
triadic line, it is meant to be a unit that relates intensity to typography with the intention of bearing 
something of a variable meter.  That what Iʼm calling Wangʼs triads tend to be syntactical statements that 
occur across whatʼs typographically marked as three lines suggests his imitation of Williams.  Wang was 
a collaborator and correspondent with Williams late in life and Zhaoming Qianʼs “William Carlos Williams, 
David Raphael Wang, and the Dynamic of East/West Collaboration” in Modern Philology 108.2 (Nov 
2010): 304-21
But with me
  once only
  in life you have… (1-6)
What these lines most explicitly articulate is the quantity of sex: four times a day is a lot, 
in that it implies not only four times in one day but four times for multiple days and in 
addition to that there is the once more, or once “only” that occurs between “you” and 
“me.”  And though this isnʼt the kind of frequency that would mean sex is all that is 
happening it does suggest a kind of disinhibition toward sex, recalling Freudʼs 
theorization of the hypersexual primitive, simultaneously the oversexed homosexual, 
who is unable to master his drives, and gives into them, and thus has more sex than he 
should.  In Wang itʼs the apparently bisexual “you” who is simultaneously hypersexual, 
although the excess of sex is heterosexual.  But because these lines are really a 
complaint--youʼve been having too much sex with her and not enough with me--
overactive sexuality is still something wrong, as it is with Freud.  This judgment is subtly 
indicated by matching these two triads: four times a day is contrasted with the once only 
“in life you have…”  Against what sounds almost workaday there is the singular once of 
once-in-a-lifetime, although as the complaining tone intimates, and the rest of the poem 
affirms, the single instance of sex connotes sexʼs failure, not its value.  
" This failure is so abject that the speaker abandons even his complaint; then 
depicting the titular intercourse.  Excerpting the poem in quotation becomes somewhat 
misleading from this point on because Wang begins to break down the triadic lines such 
that what the poem means emerges more in the linesʼ flow than in formal units, and the 
ending third of the poem also has a visibly looser form.  But for the sake of interpretation 
172
I want to persist in a close, detailed manner by citing slightly more than the next three 
triads.14  
I should be
  jealous, but, no,
I canʼt/ You can fill
  her up when
  her body spreads
But with me nothing
  changed even if you
came […] (7-14)
Whatʼs misleading about this excerpted quote is the sense that why the speaker canʼt 
be jealous is the evident naturalness of heterosexual intercourse--that sense is 
markedly questioned later in the poem, as a conclusion of what this initial idea leads to.  
But then what this quote does include is the poemʼs only overt description of 
intercourse, notable because of the series of titles that put intercourse under emphasis. 
Intercourse will take on the definite article here because of its contrast with the failed 
homosexual attempt at intercourse earlier in the poem.  What that somewhat awkward 
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14 In the quotation that follows I quote two two-line triads.  If the triadic line is intended as a metrical 
structure, what Williams seems to have intended, then a two -line triad is no more unusual than any other 
metrical substitution.  In this poem, we can see that the formal deviation coincides with content.  The 
ending “no” of line 8, (“I should be / jealous, but, no”) enacts the interruption which makes the nonexistent 
third line a kind of pause or discontinuity.  Similarly the next two-line triad can be seen to have a pause in 
that the climactic moment of coming, again an experience of interruption, coincides with the elided third 
part of the triad.  And what I donʼt block quote here is the third two-line triad that continues syntactically 
from “even if you / came” (13-14).  This triad would be: 
" came / we could be in bed
"   again & again / but
Again the “but” indicates a cutting off from the content of the line, something in the manner of the “no” of 
line 8.
“the” in “The Intercourse” suggests is that there are a plurality of possible intercourses 
of which one gets emphasized.
! The emphasized, heterosexual intercourse Wang depicts is similar to another 
depiction of heterosexual intercourse, Andrea Dworkinʼs account in her almost 
identically titled book Intercourse (1987).   Dworkin defines intercourse as “being 
entered” through grammatical parallelism: “There is never a real privacy of the body that 
can coexist with intercourse: with being entered” and it is her description of intercourse 
as entry that is so similar to Wangʼs (154, my emphasis).  Dworkinʼs book isnʼt so much 
a linear argument as a kind of meditation, and she riffs on the motif of penetration so 
that her ideas emerge by reading epigrammatic statements that take on axiomatic force. 
Thus,  “She is opened up, split down the center. She is occupied—physically, internally, 
in her privacy.”  And, “A woman has a body that is penetrated in intercourse: permeable, 
its corporeal solidness a lie.”  Wangʼs “You can fill / her up when / her body spreads” is 
also about a womanʼs “occupation” by a man, to appropriate Dworkin; but in Wang what 
intercourse means isnʼt primarily a matter of privacy, but of transformation.   “But with 
me nothing / changed” suggests that what makes the speaker unable to begrudge his 
lover sex with “her” isnʼt that her body can be occupied and his canʼt--interestingly 
Dworkin too notes that “A man has an anus that can be entered, but his anus is not 
synonymous with entry” (155)--but that entry between man and man isnʼt transformative 
(12-13).  Thus what Wang imagines is an interpersonality to sex that Dworkin excludes.  
If the woman is penetrable and loses the privacy of her self in penetration, Wang 
suggests the penetrating man is also affected.  Or more precisely, the act of 
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heterosexual intercourse is something the speaker canʼt dismiss because it is an act 
that changes both man and woman.  
" Saying that sex involves two people is perhaps too obvious to deserve comment, 
but this observation also suggests why if we are to read the given-to-be-seen as sexy, 
that sexiness isnʼt based on the viewer occupying the position of what Lacan called the 
gaze.  Because what is at stake is sexiness, we need to attempt a definition of that 
term, all the while noting that defining sexiness is like defining what is natural or 
inherent to sex itself.  Dworkinʼs definition of sex, or rather heterosexual sex, is 
appealing because she critiques the naturalness of sex as a construct as she defines it, 
arguing that the vagina is a sign “of being made for intercourse: for penetration, entry, 
occupation” and thus intercourse becomes by definition dehumanizing, a “violation of 
boundaries, taking over, occupation, destruction of privacy, all of which are construed to 
be normal and also fundamental to continuing human existence” (155-6).  But then 
Dworkinʼs analysis begins from its own construal of naturalness, her axiom that 
humanness itself is based on having “a body that is inviolate” which inexorably means 
that “when it is violated, it is abused” (154).  This supposition already presupposes that 
sex can only be abuse, because for Dworkin humanness actually means something like 
agency.  For that reason a human experience as widespread and common as not being 
in control canʼt be affirmed as human, it has to be seen as antihuman.  
" Dworkinʼs version of the inviolate self thus presupposes the domination that she 
then decries, which isnʼt necessarily a problem, except that it is not sexy.  Itʼs clear 
enough that Dworkin begins from politics, from a discourse of agency.  But then as Leo 
Bersani observes, politics is not simply reflected or expressed through sex; itʼs only 
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through an “extremely obscure process” that “sexual pleasure generates 
politics” (Bersani 208).  In fact, Bersaniʼs view restates Foucaultʼs widely circulated 
thesis from the first volume of History of Sexuality, that to see a relationship between 
sex and politics as simple, simply opposed in what Foucault critiques, is an erroneous 
temptation.  
" Bersani makes his point about sexʼs obscure relation to politics to theorize a 
problem that bears superficial resemblance to Dworkinʼs, why gay men find erotic that 
which oppresses them--heteronormative masculinity.  But rather than say that gay men 
are culturally constructed as feminine through penetration, which after all for Dworkin 
defines the iniquity of heterosexual sex, Bersani writes that the “logic of homosexual 
desire includes the potential for loving identification with the gay manʼs enemies.  And 
that is a fantasy-luxury that is at one inevitable and no longer permissible” (208).  No 
longer permissible because writing in 1987 Bersaniʼs immediate occasion is both a 
governmental indifference to AIDS, and widespread homophobia in response to AIDS.  
But what is perhaps more interesting is Bersaniʼs ahistorical claim--that loving 
identification with gay menʼs enemies is “inevitable.”  But then this inevitability, which 
might seem essentialist, is actually strongly constructivist.  It is because maleness 
doesnʼt exist apolitically that to want a man means to desire “a socially determined and 
socially pervasive definition of what it means to be a man” (209).  Thus masculinity is 
defined not at the level of an inviolate self, but at the level of the social and the cultural, 
which means that it is a level beyond the control of even the pressing political agenda of 
conscious social actors.  
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! But Bersani goes even further.  Not only do gay men inevitably love their 
enemies, but that love results from the general characteristic of sexual desire itself.  If 
gay desire must accede to heterosexist versions of masculinity, then an oppressive 
mentality “is in part constitutive of male homosexual desire, which, like all sexual desire, 
combines and confuses impulses to appropriate and to identify with the object of 
desire” (Bersani 209, my emphasis).  Thus Bersani suggests that one thing that makes 
the relation of sex and politics obscure is that sexual desire is itself mixed--not only an 
appropriation, Dworkin would call it “possession,” but an identification.  Therefore sex is 
not just a narcissistic appropriation of a sex partner always reduced to the status of 
object, or if it is, it is so because of culture, and then because sexiness is cultural--which 
means both beyond the self and defining of the self--no one can be inviolate, as in being 
an uncaused cause, in sex.
! Itʼs true that beyond his comments about masculinity and gay eroticism, Bersani 
doesnʼt argue why what he characterizes as all sexual desire, a combination of 
appropriation and identification, is what is paradigmatic about sexiness, but my feeling 
is that Bersaniʼs claim is both specific enough--it suggests not only why Dworkinʼs 
account of intercourse doesnʼt sound sexy, but also why as Bersani points out, parodies 
of gender arenʼt sexy either--and broad enough--in that a certain variation in relative 
amounts of appropriation and identification, or love and theft, is possible--to ultimately 
seem intuitively convincing.  But more to my point, Bersaniʼs account of sexual desire 
enables us to gloss both forms of intercourse in Wangʼs poem.  Thus, the notion of 
transformation that is what justifies the rightness of the man and womanʼs intercourse in 
is better captured by what the poem suggests is a kind of ecstatic expansion of selves: 
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she spreads and he fills.  While the failed sex between the speaker and “you” is a kind 
of mutual inviolateness of nothing changing.  And in this contrast, finally, is why 
identification with the gaze is an erotic dead-end.  Just as the speaker is reduced to a 
kind of voyeur of sex between his lover and her, from the point of view of the gaze, no 
participation in sex is possible.
! Although I read “You can fill / her up when / her body spreads” as depicting a 
sense of the body not as bounded and inviolate as in Dworkin, but expanded and 
conjoined as in Bersani, these lines do assign different roles, filling versus spreading, 
that Dworkin would be inclined to read as “an act of possession in which, during which, 
because of which, a man inhabits a woman, physically covering her and overwhelming 
her and at the same time penetrating her” (Dworkin 79).  But then to claim that the 
poem does more than what Dworkin describes, requires the whole poem:
Youʼve been having 
  sex with her
  four times a day
But with me
  once only
  in life you have…
I should be
  jealous, but, no,
I canʼt/ You can fill
  her up when
  her body spreads
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But with me nothing
  changed even if you
came / we could be in bed
  again & again/ but
at best, it will be
  simulated sex: only cocks
  & pussies
                  are strangely 
matched? I turned to you
for your whole being, not just your arms,
                                               your buttocks,
                                               your legs/only
  when I watch the light
spreading over your face
  when I stray into
  what we shared:
                              pot, jazz, Greek gods, nymphets, &
                              ideas/ do
we come 
  to a collaboration of wills, with
  cold sheet transmuted into
     scroll of words 
        more urgent & intense
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            than the ruffled bed.  (27)
As I suggest above, the poem turns out not to naturalize heterosexual sex because it 
sees “cocks / & pussies” as strangely matched.  Implicitly, a cock and a cock would be a 
less strange a match.  But leaving the question of genitals aside, in saying “I turned to 
you / for your whole being, not just” body parts, Wang suggests that sexual desire is like 
what Dworkin describes it as being--a desire to possess.  But then what the speaker 
experiences is only the thwarting of this desire for possession, not its achievement.  
Penetration does not cover and overwhelm the whole being; it is only the province of 
particular ill-matched parts.  
! Not that sex is then egalitarian; for “The Intercourse” a sense of equality, “a 
collaboration,” is only possible in a third intercourse, not hetero- or homosexual 
penetration, but intercourse in the ordinary sense of communication.  Wang tries to 
make communication seem not mundane but itself erotic, perhaps differently erotic.  
The “urgent & intense” words are substitutes for sex, note the transformation of bed 
sheet into sheet of paper, and instead of a collaboration of bodies, intercourse-as-
communication is a collaboration of wills.  
! What Wang finally proposes is a poetics as intense as sex, that is supposed to 
result in a filling/spreading not restricted to genitals, but rather of experience and idea; 
but it seems like he only proposes it, he doesnʼt create it.  After all,  a collaboration of 
wills is diffuse in a way that sex is not, especially sex in this poem, which is explicit and 
pointedly not a private matter between the two who are having sex.  So to make a 
statement that is almost too obvious to make sense, but ironically fulfills Wangʼs vision 
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of a sexual poetry, he most succeeds in writing a poem that has some of the intense 
characteristic of sex in the poemʼs depiction of sex, when it is most like pornography.  
" Although The Intercourse is persistently and overtly about sex, itʼs not easy to 
call it pornographic; but then pornography, as Frances Ferguson observes, is extremely 
difficult to define, most obviously in the example of obscenity trials.  Such trials are 
based on an attempt to define pornography as a category based on content, but then no 
particular content is always pornographic, or so Ferguson argues (10).  “What is 
pornographic about pornography, I maintain, is less what it presents than the relative 
actions and relative assessments it offers of the various parties to it.  Pornography 
offers more a social evaluation than an evaluation of an object,” writes Ferguson (9).  
Thus pornography isnʼt best understood as an object, but more as a structure.  Like sex, 
porn proceeds from inequality, but unlike sex it has at heart an external character.  Sex 
happens as an action and only exists as that act; but pornography is a durable object.  
But then why the object status of porn is significant is not because the object itself has 
meaning, but because as an object, it instantiates a relation to us that is impersonal, 
especially compared to the personal relationship that underlies sex.  Thus porn creates 
the hierarchical experience of sex as something external, to which our own interiority, 
however vexed or however untroubled, isnʼt significant.  
" Fergusonʼs structural account of pornography depends on her reading of 
“utilitarian structures,” for example, a school room as imagined by Jeremy Bentham.  
“Students in Benthamʼs classic Panoptic classrooms were supposed to change seats 
with every academic exercise and to take their places in the seats that indicated how 
well they had done in the previous trial.  In this way, Panoptic disciplinary systems 
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aimed to display both fact and values” (18).  In this example visibility, the relative 
ordering of seats, is what ensures that the fact of a performance corresponds to the 
value of that performance.  
! Obviously, porn does not assess us through exams, but what is notable in 
Fergusonʼs example is the extent to which any number of inchoate internal factors, like 
something as nebulous a studentʼs situation, is totally irrelevant in producing that 
studentʼs place within a group of other students.  Similarly, pornography is also 
indifferent to individual circumstance, and like the classroom organized by ability, its 
participants are put into an implicit order related to sex. In fact, making sex particularly 
visible, in the way that the class makes test performance visible, is what pornography 
accomplishes:  “pornography responds to the sense that visibility needs emphasis to 
become perspicuous,” perspicuous in the sense that a studentʼs ability becomes 
perspicuous (21).  And like the Panoptic classroom, “Its various procedures revolve 
around creating an ictus, or emphasis, that converts visibility into perspicuousness.”  
For that reason, “it has nothing to do with content per se.  Instead, pornography 
represents the attempt to capture the ʻsexinessʼ of anything that can be said to be 
interesting by giving it the relative weight that it has within a particular social grouping 
(21). 
! If Wangʼs poems fall short of being pornographic, “The Intercourse” at least 
articulates the desire for a pornographic poem in Fergusonʼs sense, a poem that has 
the intensity of sex, but acts on the will.  Whatʼs more, read with Ferguson the 
collaboration of wills Wang wants would displace the isolate self of failed intercourse, 
because pornography renders that type of interiority unnecessary.  Park reads Wang/
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Wand as irreconcilably split between an insincere public avowal of ethnic politics and an 
internal, almost perverse commitment to Orientalism.  The appeal of something like the 
pornographic verse Wang imagines is that it wouldnʼt need to be a poetry of ideological 
pronouncements because it would not need to convince a conflicted subject split by 
desire to accede to abstract principles.  Instead, it would leave that subject behind along 
with principles in an external order, experienced with the immediacy of sexuality.  This 
desire suggests an answer to the question of why Baraka sought to supplement his 
poetry of violence with a poem that would “shoot come at you.”  I argued that the fact of 
pain as the sensation of sense itself, without object, makes something like an 
incorporeal political agenda take on the reality of experience.  Orgasm, the moment of 
shooting come, similarly, might be thought of as a sensation of sense, not the feeling of 
a particular object of sensation.  In that case, a poetry of violence and a poetry of 
sexuality are similar.  They can both be used to make something immaterial, the 
political, the social, seem immediate; but immediate not through argumentation or 
persuasion, but experientially.  This emphasis on immediacy makes the political poetry 
that follows in Barakaʼs vein, one that combines the aesthetic of Yenan and the Popular 
Front, a version of what that aesthetic is often read as being opposed to--the discourse 
of selfhood, here returning as immediacy, intensity.  
The Universal Subject of Ethnic Poetry
" Toward the beginning of his 1966 essay “Poetry and Karma,” Baraka makes a 
statement that a century earlier would have seemed Whitmanian, “American poetry 
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reflects American lives” (17).  But his intent, unlike Whitman, is not to argue for a poetry 
of metaphysical inclusiveness, but for exclusions--possibly nothing short of a rejection of 
American poetry itself.  “Merica is to die, soon” he remarks, which, following from the 
logic of poetry reflecting material conditions, means that the poetry of America is also 
about to die (18).  He depicts American poetry, specifically modernism, as dead 
because what it reflects is only the vacuousness of American life itself.15
Chinese Poetry and Anglo Saxon Poetry were Avant Garde in 1915, The 
Destruction of Localism.  The Missouri lad who wishes himself into a 
Saville Row funeral, or the Idaho boy who left his Barbarian people, ditto 
the Missourian, in search of CULTURE, knowing there was none where 
they had come from.  And so replenished their streams.  Or Williams who 
understood that mere concentration on the Local, presumed it to be 
General, and again generally descriptive of the world.  (21)
What Baraka first notes is that canonical poetic modernism is not a poetry meant to 
materially reflect America; it is “The Destruction of Localism,” capitalized as though it 
were a title.  But then in not reflecting America, what Eliot and Pound end up showing is 
the cultural poverty of American life because their poetry is the rejection of that life.  
Even Williams, who one might expect to be a more congenial modernist for Barakaʼs 
point--that poetry reflects reality--must be refused; his problem is that he made the local 
a description of the general.  
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15 While Baraka pointedly mentions the antiquated dates of the height of modernism, “beginning of the 
century” (20) and “1915” (21) he observes that poetic modernism from these dates is nonetheless more 
modern that the work of the modernistʼs “legitimate successors and improvers” (20).  Thus Baraka 
suggests that the modernism of Pound, Eliot and Williams from the early twentieth century is the high 
water mark of American poetry, even to 1966, the date Baraka is writing.
! In “Poetry and Karma” Barakaʼs main point is that poetry is “thought trying to 
spiritualize itself” (22), and that black people “are the spiritual people” (24).  Thus black 
poetry must be uniquely authentic, metaphysically so, and relevant, a living expression.  
And though, as Watts points out, the essay also has the “concealed” purpose of 
“specifically denigrat[ing] the creativity and creations of those white poets who were 
once his friends and mentors,” what I want to emphasize is how behind both of these 
agendas is the Whitmanian project in which authentic speech rooted in lived reality 
defines a true poetry (Watts 244).  
! In Barakaʼs disavowal of the bohemian milieu of LeRoi Jones, his judgment on 
his former self is curiously difficult to read.  Watts sees him as avowing LeRoi Jones, as 
though in the fifties and early sixties Jones carried the spiritually alive character of black 
verse into something like Donald Allenʼs The New American Poetry, 1945-1960.16  But 
then Baraka himself makes more of a contradictory comment in discussing his place in 
that anthology, noting first that “we are poets from different sources, finally,” thus 
suggesting that a black poetry, intrinsically living and radically opposed to dead white 
poetry as it is, does not belong in a tradition that includes white poets.  But then the rest 
of the paragraph takes umbrage at the fact that more black poets were not in The New 
American Poetry:  “Only LeRoi Jones in New American Poetry, 1945-60.  The Negro!  
Whose poetry then, only a reflection of what the rest of that E-X-C-L-U-S-I-V-E club was 
doing.  You mean there was no other poetry, you mean there were no other spooks, &c. 
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16 In claiming that Watts sees Baraka as affirming Jones, I am interpreting how Watts situates Barakaʼs 
quote on Jonesʼ presence in The New American Poetry.  He reads Jonesʼ fit in with the other New 
American poets as though those poets are the “few white poets who are devoted to creativity” and who, in 
Barakaʼs words “masquerade as captive niggers” (qtd in Watts 245).  Thus Watts suggests Baraka reads 
Jonesʼ work as being part of “the superior spirituality of black poetry” described in this later essay, 
although this is not the immediate context for Barakaʼs remarks in “Poetry and Karma” (Watts 245).  
I pass” (25).  This comment is indecipherably ambivalent.  On one hand, Baraka 
suggests his work as LeRoi Jones represents black poetry, not only in Jones being “The 
Negro!” but the apparent outrage of other black poetry not being represented.  But then 
he also suggests that Jones is only copying what is really more an “ofay suburban 
social [club]” than a true, living poetry (25).  
! Jonesʼ statement on poetics in The New American Poetry repeats a version of 
whatʼs incoherent in his later condemnation.  And, as in “Poetry and Karma,” he phrases 
his position through the figure of a group poetics defined not as conformity, but as 
authenticity.
“HOW YOU SOUND??” is what we recent fellows are up to.  How we 
sound; our peculiar grasp on, say: a. Melican speech, b. Poetries of the 
world, c. Our selves (which is attitudes, logics, theories, jumbles of our 
lives, & all that), d. And the final …. The Totality Of Mind: Spiritual … 
God?? (or you name it) : Social (zeitgeist) : or Heideggerian umwelt. (424)
Jonesʼ injunction “How you sound??,” which is also the essayʼs title, interestingly 
proposes not just idiosyncrasy--a particular poetʼs “peculiar grasp” on any number of 
possible contexts--but idiosyncrasy raised to the status of what defines a group, that is, 
idiosyncrasy-as-norm.  But then what Jones presents as an arbitrary list--note his 
colloquial “say”--is actually an enlarging series that begins unassumingly with probably 
the most expected element of how an American poet might sound, American speech 
made self-consciously weird in its very typography, to something quite far from 
idiosyncrasy, the infinite itself--thus suggesting Barakaʼs later privileging of black 
spirituality as definitive of black verse. 
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! The trajectory of Jonesʼ thought embraces a kind of universalism that is explicitly 
a “totality,” whatʼs more, it actually critiques a more limited, specific form of verse, one 
that Baraka also attacks--“academic verse.”17  Marjorie Perloff notes that Allen in his 
introduction tersely states that “the New American Poets ʻreject all those qualities typical 
of academic verse;ʼ” he doesnʼt delineate what exactly those rejected qualities are (qtd 
in Perloff 106).  But Perloff offers a description of the academic verse Allen sees the 
New American Poets as rejecting:  “In 1960, the Age Demanded that a poem be self-
contained, coherent, and unified: that it present, indirectly to be sure, a paradox, oblique 
truth, or special insight, utilizing the devices of irony, concrete imagery, symbolism and 
structural economy” (107).  What Perloff describes sounds initially similar to Jonesʼ 
sound based poetry, as something “self-contained” academic verse seems individual in 
its concentration into a single aesthetic object.  Thus, what Jones is promoting in “How 
You Sound??” is actually less the sense of individual contingency, which after all could 
be the province of a self-enclosed poem of oblique truth and paradox, but the universal.
! This conclusion, that New Critical academic verse is less about universalism than 
Jonesʼ avant garde poetry, is perhaps counterintuitive; admittedly, it initially struck me as 
such.  But deciding on the putative universalism of the poetry endorsed by New 
Criticism has more to do with interpreting its ambition to objectivity than its aim at a 
transcendent universality.  If such poetry is meant to be universal, it would be universal 
only through its status as an enclosed object, in other words, its universality would be 
immanent, not transcendent.  That distinction means that the universality of a New 
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17 Baraka writes, “The girlish professors cannot admit of anything as art that would show that they are 
girlish professors” (25).  Thus they are unable to recognize the art of “Duke, Monk, JellyRoll, Bird, Sun-
Ra, or James Brown” or “where Shakespeareʼs ʻrhythmʻ was stale and punkish.”  
Critical objective poem actually depends on the New Critical reading procedure; in itself 
all a poem has to be is self-contained.  Or in other words, what is demanded of the 
poem is less the universality that will be discovered in it, but its specificity, its singularity, 
which is the basis for the subsequent discovery of its universality.  For myself, this 
conclusion was difficult because an emphasis on particularity and the more restrained 
universality possible from that more situated frame seems to be culturally progressive, 
and New Criticism is commonly taken to be conservative.18  
! Jonesʼ “For Hettie” announces in its title its non-universal address, to a single, 
intimate person; but it nonetheless presents a version of a universal perspective, 
through something immediate and idiosyncratic like the “jumbles of our lives.”  The 
poem is not self-enclosed; in fact, it mocks self-enclosure in its discontinuous logic.  
My wife is left-handed.
Which implies a fierce de-
termination. A complete other
worldliness.  ITʼS WEIRD BABY
The way some folks
are always trying to be different.
A sin & a shame. (1-7)
Grammatically, beginning the clause in line 2 with “which” suggests that the clause will 
be nonrestrictive so that what Hettieʼs left-handedness means is not the necessary 
consequence of left-handedness, but rather additional information.  And while such a 
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18 Finally, even if the reader isnʼt convinced of my claim that New Criticism is objective but not universal, 
what is important for my argument is less a definition of universalism, than a sense of the universal as 
constituted in relation.  My claim then becomes that Jones is more fixed on this relation, which would 
mean a textʼs external connection, than the internal focus of the New Critical poem. 
technical consideration might not determine a reading of the line, its pseudo-logical 
language “which implies” similarly suggests that what follows should be a necessary 
conclusion, as opposed to just another, possibly related or possibly unrelated detail.  
Combined with a declarative tone that arises from clauses being punctuated as 
sentences, all of these dubious assertions seem insisted upon.  Thus, by the end of the 
first stanza, left-handedness becomes a mark of her willful difference, an effort at 
weirdness, that as effort, makes left-handedness less a natural indication of her pre-
existing state of difference than part of the “sin” of “always trying to be different.”  What 
isnʼt stated is that as a secondary characteristic of effort, difference is not Hettieʼs 
original condition; that original condition would have had to be sameness, the point of 
view of non-difference that the poet here speaks from.  
" That perspective, with its occulted universalism, is never the explicit content of 
the poem; in fact, it only emerges as an artifact of the poemʼs intense description of 
Hettie.  Thus, to say that Jonesʼ poetics is directed at the universal, at the “final … The 
Totality Of Mind” means that that universal only emerges through the voice, or “sound,” 
which after all is as individual as the source of a poetʼs sound, the poet him or herself. 
What Jones really articulates in “How You Sound??” is something like a poetʼs 
exemplary status.  In his own words the essay finally “means that I must be completely 
free to do just what I want, in the poem” (424).  It is through that freedom, that 
unrestrained embrace of the self, that his poetry can break from being determined and 
can turn into something universal.  And thus Baraka in 1966 has a difficult time attacking 
Jones; after all, Jonesʼ project in this otherwise all-white volume, is actually similar to 
what Baraka is arguing for: a poetry understood to unrestrained, to be spiritual.  But 
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then the key differences is that while for Jones this universality emerges from the self, 
for Baraka, something more problematic ensures the materiality of the spiritual, his 
construction of black people as “the spiritual people, […] [t]he living beings, the relatives 
of the most ancient men on earth” (24). 
! As I note above, this kind of appeal to a bygone black greatness implies a lack in 
present blackness, and makes whatever blackness is could be said to be real, as in 
experientially available, an odd experience of negativity.  And thus, at the risk of 
repeating my earlier point, Barakaʼs attempt at immediacy in his Black Arts poetry 
depends heavily on connecting whatʼs nonmaterial and even unmaterializable, his 
version of blackness, to some kind of material support, through something like the 
invocation of pain.  And then through pain, Baraka actually returns to Jones, since pain 
ultimately is an experience of the self as self, without object or mediation, and thus the 
self in the mode of intensity.  
! But then is this negativity something to merely pass through, and if so, why not 
proceed as Baraka does when he is LeRoi Jones and just privilege the personal?  If the 
project of Black Arts is to be different from Jonesʼ avant gardism, which it obviously is, 
then the figure of what Mullen calls “the ancient greatness of the race,” also a 
widespread figure of early Afrocentrism, must be more than just an absence to later 
fulfill (Mullen xxxiii).  But how exactly?  
! What Mullen calls “Afro-Orientalism” suggests at the very least that an Orientalist 
context bears some relevance to a black context.  Mullen takes pains to define his 
analytic as “a counterdiscourse that at times shares with [Orientalism] certain features 
but primarily constitutes an independent critical trajectory,” and as an independent 
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discourse opposes racism rather than perpetuates it (xv).  Mullen emphasizes global 
capitalismʼs similar strategy of racialization as a reason why Orientalism could be 
understood as broadly racist, not just anti-Asian.  But then he also recognizes his 
difficulty, which is that by positing that a version of Orientalism might be emancipatory 
even under specific, historical conditions his study puts forth, he not only goes against a 
giant like Edward Said, he risks conflating blacks and Asians, and even at the minimal 
level of explanation, what any critical work undertakes, he further risks a creeping 
Orientalism, a sense that what he describes he also defines.
" In his verse Wang, as Park notes, is heavily Orientalist, though such a claim 
wouldnʼt be borne out in what Iʼve quoted above; indeed, as Wand quoting Hugh 
Witemeyer on Wang notes, “only two” poems in The Intercourse “have ʻChinese 
subjects or toneʼ” (qtd in Wand 132).  That Wand selects this quote suggests his 
readiness to distance Wang from Orientalism, perhaps perceiving what Park describes, 
that Asian American poetry was stridently opposed to Orientalism and gaining in 
institutional strength.  Witemeyerʼs comment is a little dubious in that the extent to which 
tone is Chinese is an issue thatʼs far less obvious than that of content, and in fact much 
of The Intercourse consists of “epigrams” as Wand again uses Witemeyer to say (qtd in 
Wand 133).  These short poems, such as “Kouros,” might also be described as 
derivations of haiku, filtered through Pound, which then would have some degree of a 
Chinese tone, understood to be an Orientalist version of China.  But what more 
obviously confirms Park is something Wand wouldnʼt be able to re-describe, Wangʼs 
“The Grandfather Cycle.”  In a later essay, Witemeyer, seeming to be very much not the 
Wang booster that Wand portrays, quotes a comment by Wang in which he calls “The 
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Grandfather Cycle” his “major work in progress” (qtd in Witemeyer 202).  This comment 
is almost unnecessary given the scale of this project: Wang intended it to be “a long 
family epic” of “101 Cantos” (“Grandfather” 31).19  
! According to Witemeyer, quoted in Wand, “The Grandfather Cycle” is about “both 
the culture and the ʻepic fornicationsʼ” of F. K. Wang a “classic Chinese scholar,” who 
“the speaker, his grandson, envies” and “thinks of […] with nostalgia.”20  From this 
summary, we can already make out this poemʼs Orientalist structure.  Its subject is the 
bygone China of Mandarins, of which F. K. Wang was one, with an explicitly nostalgic 
bent.  Furthermore, the poem isnʼt just a family history, but also a representation of “the 
culture,” all of which can be seen in “Canto X--Fermata II. The Escutcheon.”  A case 
might be made for this particular cantoʼs Afro-Orientalist importance in that it wasnʼt only 
published in The Human Voice in 1966, but also in GUMBO, edited by Yusef 
Komunyakaa, in 1977.  The poem begins by presenting the culture as follows:
To be tied to a pillar
Stripped to the buttocks
The body cut up by ingenious torture
Such fates were allotted
To heroes and patriots
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19 That this is Wangʼs major work is also attested to by the length of time Wang was working on it.  While 
fifteen cantos of this poem were printed together in The Human Voice in 1966, according to Witemeyer, 
“Wand had begun to write [it] in 1956” (198).  Additionally, Wand intended it to be Poundian, and received 
encouragement from William Carlos Williams to keep writing it (198).  
20 This set of citations is somewhat complex given Wandʼs use of Witemeyer to describe his own work as 
Wang.  Witemeyer quotes Wang with the phrases “epic fornications” and “classic Chinese scholar.”  But 
then all of what I quote of Witemeyer comes from a block quote that Wand selects as his discussion of 
Wang on page 134.  In this 1978 essay Wand is straightforward that Wang is himself.  According to Park, 
in an earlier 1973 essay, Wand maintained the appearance that Wang was not Wand, perhaps so that the 
credibility of praising himself wouldnʼt be questioned (Park 93).
Chinese history 
Resounds
With violence (1-7).
Wangʼs general characterization of Chinese history, as violent, serves as a kind of 
summary to the five lines above it; but more to the point, such a generalization 
reiterates the stereotype of Oriental despotism, “cut up by ingenious torture” might even 
refer to lingchi, death by a thousand cuts, which further suggests the vast distance of 
what passes for Chinese governance from Enlightenment principles of politics and 
sovereignty, which is ultimately to say, it is Orientalist.  
" The rest of the stanza affirms a second Orientalist trope, the inscrutable Oriental.  
If Chinese history shows heroes and patriots repeatedly tortured, their heroic status is 
shown in their shear endurance of pain.
No threats nor bribes
Could discourage the martyrs
The mind soared unfettered
While pain froze the organs (8-11)
Wang presents these heroesʼ orientation toward pain as perverse: they are unable to be 
“discouraged” from undergoing torture.  But then pain, despite the earlier description, 
here doesnʼt read as pain, but as a kind of transcendence, that might well be pleasure.  
Pain might affect the organs, but those are frozen, while the mind is “unfettered.”  
" Eric Hayot analyzes an anecdote remarkably similar to what Wang presents, that 
of a silent, Chinese victim of torture, only Hayotʼs example is a purportedly true account 
of Edmund Scottʼs attempt to convince the East India Company “of his surehanded 
193
direction of its financial fortunes” in the wake of theft from an English warehouse in the 
early seventeenth century (Hayot 42).  Scott tortures a Chinese goldsmith in Java who 
“does not simply fail to cry out, or even to cry; he attempts to bite off his own 
tongue” (45).  Regarding torture, Scarry writes that the “translation of pain into power is 
ultimately the transformation of body into voice” (qtd in Hayot 45).  That the goldsmith 
doesnʼt translate pain from body into voice seems to suggest that Scarry might be 
wrong.  But then insofar as the Chinese goldsmithʼs silence suggests “an inhuman 
strength, and the absence of his voice ʻjustifiesʼ the escalating inhumanity of Scottʼs” 
torture, Scarry is actually affirmed (45).  It is because in remaining silent the goldsmith 
requires a greater display of power that he finally seems inhuman, inhumanly powerful.  
And thus his torture does seem to render him somehow transcendent.  
# Hayotʼs point in discussing this example is not merely to read a historical 
instance of Britainʼs encounter with a transnational Chinese merchant, but rather to read 
how Stephen Greenblatt, in Learning to Curse, situates this anecdote as evidence, as 
something that has what Hayot describes as having “the example effect.”  This effect is 
inherent to the exampleʼs exemplarity, that some unimportant instance, chosen at 
random, will have been made to illustrate not its randomness, but some overarching 
idea.  Whatʼs more, the exampleʼs “value lies precisely in its having ʻnothingʼ to do with 
the […] material it illustrates” (27).  Hayotʼs argument is that the example does pertain to 
what it illustrates, because, in a somewhat aporetic manner, an example is by definition 
exemplary.  More important for Hayot is what he sees as a general construct, a kind of 
structural motif, in which a random example illustrating some universal turns out to ask 
whether China fits that universal, as is suggested by the title of his book, The 
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Hypothetical Mandarin.21  This use of China as a far-out, almost absurd example, 
suggests a “more general sense of the role China has tended to play in Western history 
and thought.  There, “China” has most consistently characterized as a limit or potential 
limit, a horizon neither of otherness nor of similarity; but rather the very distinction 
between otherness and similarity” (8).
! What this means for Wangʼs tenth canto is that the Chineseness of those who 
silently endure torture is important, because it reveals that such a reaction to pain does 
constitute the limit of what we can conceive as human.  But crucially this limit does not 
suggest that the inhuman is abject.  On the contrary, it seems oddly powerful.  
Moreover, if Hayotʼs theory of the example is correct, it seems powerful precisely 
because it emerges from an example of China.  
! Hayot accounts for this perhaps surprising conclusion by noting something that 
he says is an “impossible thing to say in literary studies,” that China “more than any 
other place, […] has served as the ʻotherʼ for the modern Westʼs stories about 
itself” (Pomeranz qtd in Hayot 9).  Hayot supports this bold, almost chauvinistic claim, 
by appealing to what might at this moment seem like itʼs literary studiesʼ discourse of 
truth, history.  
Chinaʼs unique mythology in Western history is the product of two major 
historical facts: first, that modern Europe encounters China as the first 
contemporaneous civilizational other it knows, and not as a “tribe” or 
nation whose comparative lack of culture, technology, or economic 
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21 The hypothetical mandarin of Hayotʼs title refers to whether moral judgment depends on proximity.  The 
question is what someone would do “if he could make a fortune by killing an old mandarin in China by 
simply exerting his will, without stirring from Paris?” (Balzac qtd in Hayot 4).  
development mitigated the ideological threat it posed to progressivist, 
Eurocentric models of world history. […] Second, for much of the period 
that modern Europe has known China--especially in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries--the latter had significant economic and technological 
advantages over Europe in the manufacture of certain especially desirable 
goods, most notably tea, silk, and porcelain, whose exchange dominated, 
financially and figurally, the maritime economies of the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries” (9).
That Wang praises his grandfatherʼs “epic fornications” isnʼt surprising, given The 
Intercourse, but we might now see that what the Orient represents to Wang is not 
abjection.  In fact, the specificity of his reference, to the privilege of a Mandarin China 
only two generations removed, suggests that the Orient is not just some vague essence 
suggestively alluded to.  Instead, itʼs an essence that Wang attempts to make real 
through sex and violence as relations because of it lacks reality in another mode of 
experience, the temporal present.  But not being present doesnʼt mean irrelevance, in 
that the universal must be tested against a distant example, and only in that relation can 
something like a virtual universality be knowable.  
" Barakaʼs appeal to bygone black originators is also an attempt to read the 
universal as always determined through a contingent position.  Hayot describes this 
kind of relational universality as “ecliptic:” the universal “as it is imagined from a 
particular perspective, one whose locality is named and defined by the universal it 
declares” (11).  Thus defining a past and future in terms of an absent power, is an 
attempt to make that power define the contingent position from which those nonpresent 
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temporalities can be imagined.  In the next chapter, I turn from this consideration of 
physicality to temporality, and suggest how temporality grounds an increasingly 
inclusive account of the real, as the enduring democratic project of Whitmanian 
populism.  
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Chapter 4 
Postmodern American Ethnicity: Linh Dinh with Walt Whitman
! In a short story by Linh Dinh with a first person narrator also named Linh Dinh, 
Dinh writes this about ethnicity:  “I am American insofar as I read the box scores every 
morning, eat French fries on a regular basis, know that Buster Keaton is a genius.  I am 
Vietnamese insofar as I have black hair, yellow skin, and a Napoleon complex” (“A 
Strange Letter” 30). Dinhʼs parallel use of “insofar” suggests that both identities are only 
partial.  And while his lists of national characteristics donʼt sound Whitmanesque, they 
share the metonymic quality of Whitmanʼs more expansive lists of oppositions, and later 
in this chapter I will argue for a deeper understanding of Dinh and Whitmanʼs 
connection.  At this point, the difference between Whitman and Dinh is that with Dinh 
the whole that these parts relate to isnʼt spiritual, just unsaid, in a kind of colloquial 
inarticulateness captured by the word “insofar.”  Itʼs that barely addressed and partly 
unacknowledged totality that Dinhʼs identity gestures toward in the story, but that isnʼt a 
problem since as Dinhʼs lists imply, no one unproblematically experiences his or her 
social identity.  
! But this postmodern account of racial identity, as shifting, unserious, and cultural 
does imply difficulties about race and ethnicity, particularly whether ethnic identity really 
is on the same level as both racial phenotypes and eating fries.  On one hand, drawing 
from the influential work of Michael Omi and Howard Winant, the answer would be yes.  
Omi and Winant argue that from the 1960s onward, race comes to be defined not 
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biologically but culturally; hence Omi and Winant suggest that race should be 
understood as “racial formation.”  And so it is precisely because neutral cultural 
activities can be made to mean something about a personʼs ethnic identity that race is 
such an important social category.  But then on the other hand, it seems objectionable 
to equate race with trivial details.  Arguably, race as a form of difference is increasingly 
not understood with any sense of causation or depth, and thus without real meaning, 
especially under multiculturalism, as Rey Chow points out in The Protestant Ethnic and 
the Spirit of Capitalism (2002).  More troublingly, Chow argues that ethnicity is not 
equally applied to all racial groups, despite the multiculturalist avowal that everyone has 
an ethnicity.  In actuality ethnicity “is nonetheless resorted to time and again as a 
boundary marker” with “pejorative connotations of a limit and limitation of the group 
marked ʻethnicʼ” (Chow 28).  
# What this chapter undertakes, then, is an account of race under postmodernism, 
addressing the deep ambiguity of the extent to which race operates as culture and 
therefore is fluid, and alternatively, reveals the boundaries of society and is thus limited.  
My argument is that race should be understood under a strong culturalism, and that 
superficially race does appear to be opaque, meaningless differences spread out in a 
postmodern web.  But the intervention I seek to make is to restore a sense of meaning 
into race as culture, by accepting the logic of culture, drawn from cultural studies.  
Culture may be ephemeral and shifting, but it is significant in its immediacy; in fact, 
ephemerality is one indication that culture is real, situated in the shifting present tense 
of experience itself.  And I propose that it is through the immediacy of experience that 
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on the one hand the boundedness racial categories enforce can be resisted and on the 
other, that the reality of racial experience can be affirmed.  
! Summaries of Whitman typically feel impoverished but nonetheless I interpret 
Whitman, particularly Whitman in 1855, to be a poet attempting to create a vision of 
American culture that depends on a temporality of presence and simultaneity.  Whitman 
definitely sees his work as a break with the past, and for that reason as new, innovative; 
that break with the past, with a lingering feudal, hierarchical culture, makes Leaves of 
Grass American.  And yet at the same time its meaning emerges in the context of the 
past, at the very least as what his unmetered long lines contrast against.  So his poetry, 
which incidentally is mostly in the present tense, enacts a kind of account of the 
present: the fullness of immediate experience which alone unifies experiences that are 
otherwise intractably multiple.  Limiting my reading of Whitman to this perspective, 
Whitman becomes a paradigm of American culture defined as presentness.  Dinhʼs 
work, which doesnʼt mimic Whitmanʼs style, draws from this particular innovation 
specific to Whitman. 
! Whitman conflates nation with poetry under the assumption that poetry 
determines a larger cultural identity, and while Dinh has to acknowledge poetryʼs 
marginal status in American culture, both poets nevertheless appeal to a similar sense 
of immediacy in order to make claims on what nationality means.  If ethnicity is a 
cultural identity, and race mediates a relationship between different ethnicities, nation in 
the way Whitman conceives it, has the potential to offer a form of identity that is more 
encompassing than either ethnicity or race.  Whitmanʼs idea of national identity seeks its 
affirmation not in limitations, but in a kind of meta-level displacement -- as though rather 
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than have to affirm a particular identity at the expense of others, Americans might see 
the full multiplicity of all forms of identity as what expresses their true nature.  As 
Whitman put it in his 1855 preface, America wouldnʼt be “merely a nation but a teeming 
nation of nations” (LG 5).  
Nationality as Personal Experience
" Whitman avoided printing his own name on the title page of the 1855 Leaves of 
Grass to put in its place his picture.1  But in the long poem that comprises the book, 
Whitman actually names himself twice.  The more famous instance is the line: “Walt 
Whitman, an American, one of the roughs, a kosmos” (LG 50).2  What is jarring about 
this line is that it takes Whitmanʼs transcendental conceit, that an individual is a 
“kosmos,” but ties this idea not to a generic term like man, and not even to a pronoun 
like “I,” but to a first and last name; in fact a name withheld from its proper place on the 
title page.  In “A Strange Letter” (2002), Linh Dinh begins similarly, by invoking the 
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1 Betsy Erkilla begins her book Whitman: The Political Poet (1989) with this observation that Whitman left 
his name off of the title page, putting instead a portrait.  Erkilla writes that Whitmanʼs omission of his 
name from the title page is meant to challenge the conventions of literary authorship “in order to make 
personal contact with his audience” (Erkilla 4).  Brian Folker also interprets Whitmanʼs image, technically 
an engraving from a daguerrotype, as expressive of the larger themes in the 1855 Leaves of Grass.  The 
mechanically reproduced art suggests that something intimate could be made widely available, as in the 
significance of grass as “Whitmanʼs central metaphor for a life force that is both humble in its commonality 
and overwhelming in its ubiquity” (Folker 3).  
2 I use the Library of America edition of Leaves of Grass which includes both the 1855 and 1891-92 
editions, but does not include line numbers, and for that reason I cite page numbers instead of line 
numbers.  The Library of America edition seems to me to be the most accessible for reading the 1855 
edition, because being able to easily refer to the most widely read form of Whitmanʼs poetry (1891-92) 
helps to situate the 1855 versions.  The variorum, edited by Gay Wilson Allen and Sculley Bradley, 
includes line numbers, but since Whitmanʼs changes across all his editions are tracked in those volumes 
in footnotes, itʼs difficult to reconstruct a particular editionʼs version.  In addition, the entire 1855 volume, 
even across formal breaks and sections titled “Leaves of Grass,” tends to be read as a single poem, at 
least insofar as no table of contents accompanied the original volume.  The length of the entire text then 
would be difficult to refer to by line number.  
immediately identifying markers of name and nation: “My name is Linh Dinh and I am 
American.”  Dinhʼs story is published as “fiction” in the journal Manoa (2002), but the 
assertion of the speakerʼs name, which is the authorʼs name, makes the work seem 
autobiographical.  In fact, the next sentence gives the name of Dinhʼs actual wife, 
making the work seem even more autobiographical. 
" But then even though both works take pains to announce that the ultimate 
subjects are actually the self, each work enacts a complicated dialectic between public 
and private.  In Whitman this tension results in a vision of nationality as a form of 
personal experience.  And as I note above, the racial context of nationality in the form of 
rights and privileges is something that Dinh explicitly takes up, and so ultimately a 
sense of the nation as an element of personality, as a part of the self, makes selfhood 
oddly indefinite, or undefinable.  But even as articulating just what defines the interiority 
of a person turns impossible, personal experience nonetheless establishes an 
immediacy that establishes a kind of reality for things as immaterial as selfhood, and the 
forms of cultural identity that fold into that concept.  
" If we think of culture in expanded terms, not merely as the forms of expression of 
a society, but something closer to social life itself, then the experience of analytically 
separate categories like nation and race can be put together in the kind of flux with 
which they are unevenly experienced under postmodernism.  Only in a less pure 
understanding of cultureʼs multiplicity can we start to explain why these forms of 
identification which arenʼt ever totalizing, nonetheless have such real effects.  Bruce 
Robbins characterizes cultureʼs emotional power as a sense of “lived particularity” which 
makes the human dimension of cultural forms socially important (Robbins 18).  The 
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notion of “lived particularity” has to do with a subjective, emotional effect of culture; but if 
we think about Whitman and Dinhʼs examples, part of the effect is also a sense of 
eschewing culture altogether for something more intimate.  These attempts at a culture 
more intimate than culture create a kind of suspended disbelief that bridges a real 
contradiction: the feeling of the authorʼs private revelation which comes alive in the 
close contact of the moment of reading is actually a textual artifact available to any 
reader at any potential time.  
" Presentness has a similarly contradictory character: itʼs both the fullness of 
experienced reality and ephemeral, so that to think of the present as present is to 
suspend its constant slide into the past.  The 1855 preface begins with a specifically 
national defense of the contemporary. Whitman asserts a difference between America 
and “other politics or the idea of castes or the old religions” combined under the term 
“the past” (LG 5).  So although the first words of the preface remark that “America does 
not repel the past,” this distinction between the US and other differently-organized social 
units is actually definitive, on the basis of time.3  Whitman is not idiosyncratic in this 
temporal understanding of what defines America.  In fact, Sacvan Bercovitch argues 
that the idea, or perhaps ideology, of America as a corrective of pastness derives from a 
Puritan version of historiography which manages to combine the sacred and the secular 
in an image of transcendence.  Bercovitch points out that the Puritan immigrants of the 
1630s thought of themselves in a transatlantic context.  Quoting John Winthropʼs 
remark “the eyes of all people are upon us,” Bercovitch argues that “Winthrop was 
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3 In this opening paragraph, as Whitman goes from assertion to allegory, the image he uses is that the 
past is a corpse “slowly borne form the eating and sleeping rooms of the house” in contrast “to the 
stalwart and wellshaped heir who approaches.”
admitting” that his vision of New England was dependent “on the Old World.  It was not 
enough to set up ʻa Specimenʼ of New Jerusalem; their eyes had to be on it” (Bercovitch 
74).  However, the eyes of the old world were decidedly not upon New England, and to 
simplify Bercovitch considerably, what happens is that Puritans compensate for their 
insignificance by rejecting and disavowing Europe.  The Old World becomes “benighted 
[…] awaiting its redemption by the mighty works of Christ in America” (76).  Here the 
Puritans break from all other colonists in not claiming the land as Europeans.  But more 
significantly, their self-justified New England became both “ʻwilderness purityʼ and an 
Army of Christ advancing into a continental New Canaan,” so that the “larger, American 
vision which the Puritans bequeathed” was of “a chosen nation in progress--a New 
Israel whose constituency was as numerous, potentially, as the entire people of God, 
and potentially as vast as America” (35).  Bercovitch suggests that a sense of 
chosenness, of already being sacred, combines with an affirmation of process which 
makes a temporality of presence, note Bercovitchʼs rhetorical tic of adding “new” to 
Biblical sacred places, come to be definitive of American ideology.  
# While Whitman seems most concerned with novelty in terms of national 
government, his distinction based on time has a literary connotation as well.  As 
Jonathan Arac points out, the initial sense of literature as specifically creative in America 
is also tied to a sense of refusing the past in favor of newness.4  Aracʼs literary history 
shows that in “the late eighteenth century, ʻliteratureʼ meant all culturally valued writing” 
and indeed the dominant American literature before 1850 was a form of nonfiction that 
we wouldnʼt now characterize as literary, the national narrative (Arac 608).  Arac 
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4 Arac points to Edgar Allen Poeʼs reviews as attempts to define literature in terms of imagination and 
novelty, see p. 694.  
describes this writing as stories “of the nationʼs colonial beginnings” that “looked forward 
to its future as a model for the world.”  In this light, Whitmanʼs preface refers to this 
context of popular literature in its nationalism, even as it draws upon a more recent 
sense of literature as imaginative innovation.  
" Whitmanʼs nationalism is self-evident in remarks that distinguish America from all 
other nations at all other times, as in what I cite above, and in a claim like “The United 
States are essentially themselves the greatest poem” which is a remark that Dinh will 
find significant (LG 5).  The sentence that precedes this particular assertion makes an 
important qualification to what would otherwise seem nationalistic:  “The Americans of 
all nations at any time upon the earth have probably the fullest poetical nature.”  In this 
comment, Whitman adapts the Puritan sense of Americaʼs global significance to the 
realm of culture.  To be American is not a matter of time and space, instead 
Americanness is defined by poetical nature, more specifically, a poetical nature like 
what Whitmanʼs own poetry attempts in its metonymic expansiveness.  
" But what Whitman means by poetic greatness is by no means the neoclassicism 
celebrated by someone like Alexander Pope in “An Essay on Criticism” (1711).  Pope 
would write:
Those rules of old discoverʼd, not devisʼd
Are nature still, but Nature Methodizʼd
Nature, like Monarchy, is but restrainʼd
By the same Laws which first herself ordainʼd. (88-91)
For Whitman, poetry is guided by nature, but not in restraint.  Instead, poetry “is 
something in the doings of man that corresponds with the broadcast doings of the day 
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and night” (LG 5).  Implicitly Whitman follows in the mold of the Puritan rhetoric 
Bercovitch identified.  Poetryʼs sacred aspect, nature, is something that is apparently 
opposed by the construct of meter, though in Pope this apparent contrast is resolved at 
the higher level of natureʼs instantiation of rules.  Similarly, Protestantism initially divides 
the sacred from the profane, the “holiness of the ʻholy landʼ depends on other lands not 
being holy” (Bercovitch 78).  The New England Puritans made “the actual, terrestrial 
new continent before them” a sacred place of realized prophecy (77-78).  Similarly, 
Whitman takes the methodology of poetry and makes it not a deferred naturalness, but 
naturalness itself.  
# Alexis de Tocqueville put the possibility of a specifically American poetry in 
slightly different terms.  Acknowledging that “the language, the dress, and the daily 
actions of men in democracies are repugnant to conceptions of the ideal,” he thought if 
he himself undertook an American poem, he might nonetheless take as his object 
something “of the infinite greatness and littleness, of intense gloom and amazing 
brightness, capable at once of exiting pity, admiration, terror and contempt.  I have only 
to look at myself” (qtd in Orr 650).  Fifteen years before Whitman, de Tocqueville seems 
to have forecast his method.  So even as Whitman asserts a lofty position for the true 
poet, taking the basis of poetry in nature and sacralizing a departure from versification, 
the content of his poems are organized by something no more sublime than proximity to 
his own senses.  “What is commonest and cheapest and nearest and easiest is Me” (LG 
38).  De Tocquevilleʼs comment clarifies how an autobiographical verse which takes the 
self as its subject is implicitly democratic.  
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! If Whitman can be thought of as combining a national narrative with a then-new 
notion of literariness, his comment on basing his work on what is commonest suggests 
that his emphasis is on the literary, the poetic as he polemically defines it, over and 
above a concern for praising a national political state.  And his stirring rhetoric implies 
that to insist on calling the US a nation-state would be to betray its essence, which after 
all, is fully poetical.
! To read Whitmanʼs nationalism in this idiosyncratic way, in which his enthusiasm 
for America is interchangeable with an enthusiasm for poetry, goes against the more 
common view of Whitmanʼs assertions for America.  As Arac reviews it, in the 1940s 
Whitman and Mark Twain are credited with transforming literature into a specifically 
American idiom, as if recording an American essence, by critics specifically concerned 
with institutionalizing American studies (1996: 44).  Aracʼs overall argument is closer to 
the literary Americanness that I see in Whitmanʼs preface.  His point is not that Whitman 
uses the popular language of America to transform literary discourse, nor that 
Whitmanʼs work is paradigmatically American.  Instead, he proposes that Whitmanʼs 
stylistic innovation should be regarded as a “creole” practice, tightly connected to 
Whitmanʼs newspaper journalism.  After all, it is in the newspaper, and not out of 
spontaneous national folk language, that methods which are recognizable in Whitman, 
like the “arbitrariness of ... inclusion and juxtaposition” are found (Benedict Anderson qtd 
in Arac 51).  Thus the immediacy of Whitmanʼs poetry, that he draws from what is 
“commonest and cheapest and nearest,” comes in part from his closeness to the 
newspaper medium (LG 38).  
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! Arac draws in Benedict Andersonʼs theory of print capitalismʼs role in nationalism 
to help support his argument that what Whitmanʼs poetic innovation is actually more 
transnational than is commonly assumed.  For Anderson, the advent of nationalism is 
pointedly not a natural progression in scope from individual to family through dynasty 
and religion into government, but rather a shift in the type of community that can be 
imagined.  Anderson argues that the shift from a prenationalist consciousness to one 
naturalized to the nation requires a change in historicization.  In fact, history as a past 
time radically different from the present is not the imagined reality that precedes 
nationalism in the middle ages; according to Anderson medieval temporality imagines 
time as a “simultaneity of past and future in an instantaneous present.”5  If it seems as 
though experiencing time in this prehistoric way would feel immediate, it should be 
noted that this sense of time as a single temporality depends on a strong sense of 
Divine Providence to which all moments refer.  Because time fits into a religious 
schema, its past and future are experienced as the present.  
! So then paradoxically, only when time is no longer an extended present but 
rather a unit of measurement, as it becomes in modernity, is something like immediacy 
possible.  Time measured “by clock and calendar” makes an event specifically marked
(24).  And while it might seem that time is mediated through the arbitrariness of 
measurement, in actuality such measurement enables the standardization by which 
experience can be tied to a “firm and stable reality” (25).  Anderson emphasizes that the 
modern sense of time as a countable unit also creates an experience of simultaneity, 
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5 Anderson Imagined Communities 24.  Anderson gives an example of this medieval conception of time, 
representations of scenes from the Bible in the stained glass of churches and paintings of early masters.  
Such paintings depict scenes of the Christian nativity in “modern dress” so that “Christ is born bear[ing] 
the features of Burgundian peasants” (Anderson 22). 
not of all times collapsing into a the present, but of the presentʼs richness, that at any 
moment an indeterminate amount of people are sharing the same moment.  For 
Andersonʼs argument, this experience of time is crucial for imagining the nation as a 
form of personal identity, but readers of Whitman will recognize this spontaneity of 
multiple experience in a rich present.  According to Whitman, Leaves of Grass is meant 
to compel “every reader to transpose himself or herself into the central position, and 
become the living fountain” (qtd in Mattheissen 650). 
" Whitmanʼs comment on a readerʼs experience is actually an account of 
standardization, that what Whitman records isnʼt just the sensory world, but sense.  So 
Whitmanʼs subject might be the self, as opposed to the selfʼs experience, but if so, 
Leaves of Grass depends on the general character of selfhood.  Anderson remarks in a 
later essay that newspapers not only initiated a sense of standardized time, but also 
enabled an anonymous seriality, meaning something similar to Whitmanʼs idea of a 
reader transposing him or herself into the poem.  Rephrasing an analysis from Imagined 
Communities, Anderson cites the example of a 1913 Javanese anticolonial essay, 
published in a newspaper, which points out “the incongruity of Dutch colonials 
celebrating the Netherlandsʼ independence from Napoleonic subjugation while forcing 
the natives they themselves held in subjugation to contribute to the cost of 
festivities” (Anderson 1998 119). Anderson now points out that the rhetoric of this 
comment depends on an interchangeability between Javanese and Dutch subjectivities, 
a sort of “central position” from which the ironies of colonialism can be denounced.  
" In this same essay, Anderson writes that in Imagined Communities he 
overemphasized “the significance of the calendrical simultaneity of apparently random 
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occurrences” in newspapers (120).  In fact, temporal simultaneity is only one way to 
understand a larger shift toward understanding the self serially, as aggregable into 
general categories, which enables nationalistic identification, among other things.  But 
even so, Anderson does write that collective subjectivities are not all serial, devoting a 
large block quote from a story that depicts a characterʼs awareness of the divide 
between serial and non-serial versions of social belonging.6  Indeed the richness with 
which we experience culture, and a cultural phenomenon like nationalism, depends on 
more than just a serial, substitutable sense of identity.  
Globalization, Taste, and Non-Serial Identity
" Dinhʼs vague discomfort with ethnicity, with which I began this chapter, has with it 
a governmental dimension, but his overall ethos of ironic distance characterizes both 
ethnicity and nationality.  Just as with ethnicity Dinhʼs eponymous narrator doesnʼt 
bother to seriously list the determining traits of ethnic belonging, he also leaves 
nationality only partially addressed.  At the beginning of the story, quoted in part above, 
Dinh qualifies his assertion of being American with the parenthetical remark, “At least 
thatʼs what my passport says.”  The “at least” implies that passport is at best a minimal 
kind of identity.  But then because he mentions a passport, Dinhʼs remark canʼt help but 
to also suggest the privileges of American citizenship in an transnational context of 
travel.  The privileges of citizenship is one cause of a strengthening of serial identity 
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6 See “Nationalism, Identity, and the World-in-Motion” pp. 127-28.  The protagonist of a story by 
Pramoedya Ananta Toer joins a revolutionary movement, but this contrasts with her localized, familial 
contexts.  Anderson translates a passage that depicts both the serial and non-serial social worlds the 
protagonist inhabits.
according to Anderson, since government resources increasingly depend on responding 
to constituencies.  Consequently, rights and entitlements come to naturalize those very 
constituencies, which can be as large as the imagined community of the nation itself.  
Despite all this, both the privileges the passport confers through national identity and 
Dinhʼs inability to say exactly what other than his passport would determine his 
nationality, indicate that the bottom line of his storyʼs opening is his ambivalence toward 
these forms of serialized selfhood.  By the end, the story finally shows an alternative to 
serialized forms of identity through culture and the significance of personal taste.  
" That “A Strange Letter” begins with these uncertain avowals of identity suggests 
a more personal form of selfhood that contrasts with the instrumental forms of ethnic 
categorization and nationality, but then Dinhʼs ambivalence also has to do with ethnicity 
and nation itself.  After all, to write “My name is Linh Dinh and I am an American” 
already suggests a discrepancy, that linguistically “Linh Dinh” is not at all an English 
name.  If this first line is to be read not as a paradox, we must read it in the context of a 
multicultural America.  Remarking on “hyphenated Americans” Chow observes that the 
ethnic portion of identity always occupies the first term which makes Americanness a 
kind of non-ethnic universal.  The implication is then that “ethnic particulars, while 
continuing to exist, no longer really matter (because they have been reduced to the 
merely picturesque)” (Chow 30).  But then of course, such a state isnʼt an actuality that 
can be used to define Americanness, but an anticipated future, which then temporalizes 
ethnicity itself as atavistic.  So then part of Dinhʼs ambivalence should be understood as 
the unevenness of multicultural identity: both its multiple cultures and multiple times.  
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! The eponymous letter in “A Strange Letter,” which both is and is not strange, 
suggests ambiguities at play in nationality, since the letter is a request that plays upon 
the possibility that American identity is universal.  Reproduced in the text of the story, a 
Vietnamese cousin of Dinhʼs wife asks her to find a Vietnamese American for her to 
marry, but with embarrassing effusiveness and indirectness.  This request itself, notably, 
is not strange.  In fact, as Robbins observes, a sort of genre exists of upwardly-mobile 
female migration to the west.  Robbins cites work by Jamaica Kincaid and Bharati 
Mukherjee and argues that they share a genealogy with no less a canonical work than 
Jane Eyre, all featuring a narrative of a better life in the metropolitan center.  Robbins 
writes that as a genre, these works “flatter the metropolis as inevitable destination and 
saving source of freedom and happiness” (Robbins 102).  In this regard, Dinhʼs wifeʼs 
cousinʼs fictionalized letter is totally normal, and even expected.  
! Robbins takes up Gayatri Spivakʼs reading of Jane Eyre as an allegory of both 
colonization, in that Jane has to replace “Bertha/Antionette as the rightful ʻMrs. 
Rochesterʼ” by “economically exploiting and symbolically destroying figures who 
represent Europeʼs colonial possessions” (Robbins 101-102), and as an allegory for 
critical practice itself which now tends to read Janeʼs empowerment as broadly feminist, 
“at the expense of postcolonial subjects” (102).  Robbins calls this observation a “double 
allegory,” but the point seems to be simply that the freedom of the metropole implies the 
exploitation of someone else who is out of the picture.  More difficultly, Spivakʼs double 
allegory spans centuries.  It is “an allegory of the role of empire in the canonical 
literature of the nineteenth century” with “an allegory of the twentieth-century “bourgeois 
feminist” critic” as Robbins points out (101).  Spivak herself is clear that insofar as 
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feminist readers donʼt recognize the displaced other behind Janeʼs rise, their blindness 
“attests to the continuing success of the imperialist project displaced and dispersed into 
more modern forms” (Spivak 243).  Thus, there is an implicit third allegory behind 
Spivakʼs two, an allegory that conflates colonialism with postcolonialism, at the cost of 
sufficiently addressing the context of globalization.   
" Thinking of the genre of Jane Eyre-like stories, what stands out about “A Strange 
Letter” is that it doesnʼt portray America as a land of wealth and happiness; in fact, 
Dinhʼs experience of America is decidedly impoverished.  The story ends making a kind 
of punchline out of the cousinʼs desire to immigrate into the American dream, but not 
without a certain pathos.  Because the letter is embarrassing, it actually succeeds in 
feeling intimate, and thus ultimately, it achieves a kind of sympathy.  Acknowledging that 
she and Diem, Dinhʼs new wife, arenʼt all that close, Tran Tu Ngoc, the letterʼs signatory, 
nonetheless tries to create that closeness through the text of her letter, almost in the 
manner of Whitmanʼs claim that “this is no book / Who touches this touches a man” (“So 
Long” LG 611).  Dinh notes that the writer was “a distant cousin, someone [the wife] had 
not seen or talked to for more than a decade” but this unpromising circumstance is 
portrayed by Tran differently:
You havenʼt been back to Can Tho in a long time.  Perhaps you donʼt even 
remember me.  I still have very fond memories of your visit in 1989.  I was 
so happy to see you because I am the only girl in my family.  Even back 
then you were very fashionably dressed.  Do you remember?  The two of 
us went all over Can Tho.  We ate roasted corn; you took me to school, 
helped me with my homework.  We rented Hong Kong videos and stayed 
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up until two in the morning.  Then we fried up some duck eggs with 
scallions.  Do you remember? (Dinh 30)
The issue of remembering is made pathetic, first by the remark that Tran could have 
been forgotten, and then by the specific details punctuated twice by the beseeching 
question, “Do you remember?”  That Tran remembers announces the importance of 
these memories even as she states that itʼs possible Diem has forgotten.  If so, the 
memories become doubly intimate in that only Tran now has them, and that these 
personally significant moments are now being shared.  Moreover, the letter itself bears 
these possibly forgotten memories back to someone who experienced them, making the 
letter not just a text, but part of both peopleʼs subjectivity.  Notably even without an 
acknowledged connection, the letterʼs shared sense of identity comes about in an 
organic version of simultaneous experience.  Whether remembered or not, Diem and 
Tran were in the same place at the same time.    
" The actual fond memories are narrated either in the plural first person or in 
second person address and related with adjectival specificity and situated in a physical 
passage through a city.  And while Tran doesnʼt get to the long lists of metaphysical 
seeing that Whitman favors, the underlying experience of being close to what Whitman 
could call a “Camerado” in a city no less, carries at least a Whitmanian sympathy.  John 
Timberman Newcomb notes that Whitman is associated with putting “transcendental 
idealism into a framework of urban modernity” especially in “Crossing Brooklyn 
Ferry” (1856) (Newcomb 294).  In terms of the type of connection that Tran tries to 
create with Diem, a poem like Whitmanʼs “Out of the Rolling Ocean the Crowd” (1865) 
from the “Children of Adam” cluster suggests how the city enables a sudden intimacy 
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that doesnʼt depend on maintaining contact and is deep though temporary.  In fact, 
transience characterizes the urban encounter.  “Now we have met, we have lookʼd, we 
are safe” writes Whitman, “Return in peace to the ocean my love, / I too am part of that 
ocean my love, we are not so much separated” (LG 6-8, p. 263). We might further note 
that Whitman uses a metaphor of the ocean for a crowd, adapting nature as a figure for 
the city.  Interestingly, if both Tran and the now pseudo-American Diem share the 
intimate space of these memories then Tran would also have a kind of Americanness, if 
only as potential. 
" The letter then affirms what Dinhʼs hedged considerations of ethnicity suggest, 
the porousness of identity.  Even the (post)colonial Vietnamese subject, Tran Tu Ngoc, 
has both a metropolitan existence, detailed in her memories of hanging out with Diem, 
and at least possible access to transnational immigration into the United States.  In fact, 
the possibility of migrating to the US is all the more real because of her life in the city; 
after all, this is what her connection to Diem is based on.  Spivakʼs analysis of Jane 
Eyre perhaps shows its date in that urbanized space is not part of the colonial world she 
sees as persisting into the then contemporary moment which forms the basis of 
connection for her doubly allegorical reading.  
" In fact, a trend that wouldnʼt have been evident in the early 1980s is that 
globalization transforms both temporality and spatiality across a network of international 
cities.  In a rough summary of her work, Saskia Sassen suggests that the 1970s marked 
the limit of the Keynesian city, based on industry, to a globalized city based on 
increasingly abstract financialization.  Sassen observes that an outcome of globalization 
has been intensified inequality within cities.  She writes, “while inequality has long been 
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a feature of cities, major structural trends in todayʼs phase generate novel types of 
social and spatial inequality which, at the limit, alter the very meaning of urbanity and 
civic life” (Sassen 3).  
" Writing in 1996, Frederic Jameson offers a description of finance capitalism that 
helps to explain the shift from a Keynesian city to the global city Sassen analyzes.  
Capital, understood as money invested in agriculture and manufacturing, begins tied to 
locality; after all investing capital in this form depends on creating profit through 
concrete transactions based on real commodities.  Sassen points out that the 
Keynesian city is tied to the “material” economy, that even now one aspect of a cityʼs 
inequality is the persistence of these earlier economic sectors.  But even industries like 
mining, manufacturing and transportation buy more financial and insurance services, 
thus further driving financialization (Sassen 4).  Jameson points out that at some point 
industrialization begins to reach limits in profitability; industrial expansion can only 
support a finite amount of investment, and markets become saturated (Jameson 
141-142).  At this point the greatest profit comes not from production but from financial 
exchanges, and once profit is invested in speculation and not in production, money itself 
becomes free-floating and abstract.  
" To make this point, Jameson veers into a strange comparison.  He contrasts 
“cotton money, or wheat money, textile money, railway money, and the like,” money 
invested in concrete industries, with a figure of moneyʼs abstraction: “Now, like the 
butterfly stirring within the chrysalis, [capital] separates itself off from that concrete 
breeding ground and prepares to take flight” (142).  Jameson doesnʼt expand on this 
image or give a clear statement of what exactly capital now becomes.  Instead, his point 
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seems to be that capital in this abstract mode no longer exists in terms of things, but as 
potential; for that reason it would be misleading to try to attribute to capital some 
definitive quality.  So if we now observe “the intensification of communication technology 
to the point at which capital transfers today abolishes space and time and can be 
virtually instantaneously effectuated from one national zone to another,” such an 
observation confirms the shift in capital toward greater abstraction (143).   
! From there Jameson asserts that “the problem of abstraction - of which this one 
of finance capital is a part - must also be grasped in its cultural expressions” (143).  By 
this he seems to mean that capital and culture are connected through a mediated 
relationship to abstraction so that examining abstraction results in insights into both 
money and culture.7  In fact, Jameson sees abstraction as characterizing capitalism 
itself.  He suggests that the break capitalism introduces is the difference between 
commerce, when money is simply what enables goods to be exchanged, to what he 
calls, drawing from Deleuze and Guattari, the “deterritorialization” of commerce in which 
money goes from a medium of exchange to something without content, not wheat-
money but the butterfly in the chrysalis.  The concept of deterritorialization enables 
Jameson to claim that abstraction “implies a new ontological and free-floating state” 
which at this deeper level emanates out as culture and capital (153). In this more 
muscular form of abstraction, deterritorialization, Jameson describes money as “that 
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7 Arguably Jameson frames the relationship of culture, capital and abstraction in this way merely as an 
initial conceit to launch into a more complex, historicist consideration of how his account of the shifts from 
realism to modernism to postmodernism track with the development of capitalism, but it seems to me that 
if so, Jamesonʼs deeper analysis preserves at least a theoretical separation between money and culture. 
For that reason I stick with Jamesonʼs initial, clearer formulation of this relationship in my own 
interpretation. 
element which by definition has no content or territory and indeed no use-value as 
such” (153).  
! But is money really without content and use-value at the level of its very 
definition?  On one hand, Dinhʼs story seems to suggest that it is.  In her letter, Tran 
claims to be “very poor” although Dinhʼs wife tells him that she is actually well off (31). If 
this is the case, Tranʼs American dream isnʼt for something like a better life, which she is 
already living, but for profit in all of its deterritorialized abstraction.  But reading Tranʼs 
motivation in this deterritorialized mode begs the question of why mediate her desire for 
money through America at all, why not simply want to marry rich?  Itʼs hard to tell the 
truth from the bullshit in her letter, which is at times cynical and at times naive.8  After 
making the apparently cynical statement that her family is very poor, while also claiming 
“Iʼm not trying to suck up to you now that you have a rich husband,” Tran goes on to tell 
about when she thought she might marry a Vietnamese American (31).  
! In this paragraph, what seems to be Tranʼs pursuit of money is presented as 
wanting to live in America.  As though to evoke as much pity as possible, she begins by 
contrasting Diemʼs “luck” with her own:  “If only I were as lucky as you, how happy Iʼd 
be.  I have dreamt of coming to America since I was ten, maybe earlier, but this lifelong 
dream has brought me nothing but disappointment” (31).  This figure of luck masks any 
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8 I use the term “bullshit” with an eye toward its descriptive qualities.  Harry G. Frankfurt in On Bullshit 
(2005) notes that the “loose usage” of bullshit is a phenomenon which is “vast and amorphous” (#).  
Because of its commonality, “bullshit” has less of a sting than outright lying, and implies not so much 
immoral deceptiveness, but an insincerity that after all isnʼt so serious. He likens bullshit to “humbug” 
though obviously “humbug” canʼt be used interchangeably with bullshit without acknowledging the unhip 
character of its association with Scrooge in “A Christmas Carol.”  Humbug, like bullshit, characterizes an 
untruth that is short of lying, suggesting as Frankfurt remarks, that there is a “continuum” of untruth, of 
which lying is a severe form and bullshit a more innocuous (#).   These two aspects of bullshit are 
relevant to my use of it in that Tranʼs letterʼs untruths donʼt seem as harsh as lies partly because they 
seem part of a vast, amorphous context of exaggeration.  
overt concern with money, and makes it plausible that America is actually something 
that is important to Tran beyond just wealth.  And this sense that she genuinely believes 
America to connote luck is affirmed in the childlike avowal of her “lifelong dream.”  Weʼre 
told in the exposition that Tran is twenty-three so admitting that sheʼs wanted to go to 
America since age ten makes the detail of her claim untrue, while suggesting the 
excess of sentiment attached to her dream of going to America.  
" Itʼs notable too that Tranʼs avowal of being poor, and Diemʼs counteravowal that 
she is well-off isnʼt as clear cut as it might have initially seemed.  After the letter ends, 
Dinh asks his wife whether Tran is really poor.  “I asked my wife about Tran Tu Ngoc 
and was told that her family deals in electronics.  They have a four-story house, and she 
has vacationed in six different countries.”  If she is not actually poor, and this is the 
definite meaning of these details, then this information suggests that Diem and Tran 
really arenʼt so distant, that ten years of not speaking doesnʼt mean that the latest news 
isnʼt still conveyed and made known.  Therefore, ironically, if Tran is lying, Diem is too.  
Tran is not some unknown, distant relation whose wedding wishes can only be cynical.  
And Diemʼs exaggerated distance from Tran, under a psychoanalytic reading, would 
suggest their actual closeness, that Diem too harbored some kind of American dream.  
In a way, then, the letter is honest.  It expresses an understanding of Diem and Tranʼs 
similarity while acknowledging the many disavowals necessary to come to that 
understanding.    
" These kinds of somewhat transparent lies are the kind of thing that makes the 
overall tone of the letter one that is between cynicism and earnestness and makes it 
less plausible to read Tran as only interested in money; she is clearly interested in some 
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kind of idea about America itself.  This kind of cathexis to a specific nation doesnʼt seem 
explicable under the robust theory of abstract capital put forth by Jameson, unless we 
have recourse to claiming the unevenness of all postmodern phenomenon, including 
financialization.  In fact, Tranʼs interest in America does seem to partake in a more 
classically Marxist notion of consumption.  In Grundrisse Marx notes that eating is a 
form of consumption, and that this example exposes the basic quality of all 
consumption.  If consuming food “produces” the body, this productive aspect of 
consumption “is also true of every kind of consumption which in one way or another 
produces human beings in some particular aspect.”9  In other words, consumption 
occurs because the consumer appropriates the commodity into his or her identity.  And 
Tran wants to see herself as in some way American.  
" Pierre Bourdieu points out that in the act of consumption both economic and 
cultural appropriation occurs.  And if Jameson is correct that economic consumption is 
motivated by the status of money as what enables exchange while also existing 
abstractly as profit, Bourdieu similarly proposes that cultural consumption is driven by 
“profit in distinction” through differences in “cultural capital” (Bourdieu 228).  Cultural 
capital, Bourdieu suggests, is not absolute but rather relational.  It arises because any 
cultural production objectifies its conditions of production, and therefore embodies the 
social relationships under which cultural objects come to be.10  Bourdieu notes that the 
difference in distinction between different cultural objects is intensified when what he 
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9 From the chapter “Production, Consumption, Distribution, Exchange (Circulation)” under the section 
“Consumption and Production.”  I am using the digitized text at http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/
works/1857/grundrisse/ch01.htm#2.  
10 Marx would put Bourdieuʼs point that cultural production objectifies social relations under the category 
of productionʼs own moment of consumption.  As he notes in Grundrisse the basic figure of production 
would be the worker using up his ability to produce in production itself.  
calls “the field of cultural production” obtains more autonomy relative to economics.  In 
other words, so long as cultural goods seem to express not merely a vulgar monetary 
price, but a universal, aestheticized value, the role of distinction in motivating 
consumption becomes more important.  And the figure of an autonomous aesthetic 
value, like the figure of money, is a suitably deterritorialized abstraction to motivate the 
pursuit of cultural profit seemingly for its own sake.  
! Dinh ends his story reflecting on his twenty four years of impoverishment in the 
US, meant to contrast with Tranʼs life of third world privilege.  He gives three separate 
incidents at unspecified times.  
! Once I went to a supermarket and paid for a packet of Ramen Pride 
with 28 pennies.
! Another time I paid for a can of Spam with 159 pennies.
! I waited until there was no one around before I went to the cash 
register, but as I counted out my pennies for the grinning cashier--as I 
formed for her 16 mounds of nearly worthless currency, minted merely to 
decorate the bottoms of shopping-mall fountains--a long line grew behind 
me.
! Once, in the cheapest bar in Philadelphia, I tried to pay for a mug of 
Rolling Rock with 60 pennies and was told to get the fuck out.
! “You have to take this! Itʼs real money.”
! “Get the fuck out of here!” (31-32)
Each of these instances is presented as a singular event.  But prefaced as they are with 
“once,” “another time” and “once” again, itʼs clear that the episode expands from the 
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initial scene in the supermarket to the bar with an indefinite sense of time, making it 
seem like Dinh is poor outside of any teleology of exchanging rags for riches, which 
oddly makes poverty occupy the same nontemporal status of the adjective American 
that follows any hyphenated American expression of multicultural identity.  And at this 
point Dinhʼs Whitmanian assertion of the authorʼs presence within the text comes to 
embody a particular cultural position, poverty.  While Bourdieu focuses on the autonomy 
of elite culture, itʼs interesting to note that Dinhʼs self-positioning at the economic 
margins asserts its own distance from the merely economic, as Whitmanʼs 
characterization of himself as “one of the roughs” does as well.  The various 
insincerities of Tranʼs letter makes Dinhʼs admissions come across as bracingly true, in 
its implicit rejection of even wanting to be rich.  And when he ends with stating the 
obvious content of the letter, Dinh suggests the absurdity of Tranʼs striving.  “This is the 
implied P.S. to the strange letter: Your husband must have a Vietnamese American 
friend who might be interested in a country girl like me” (32).
" Pennies, as an increment of money so small as to almost no longer be money, 
come to indirectly represent that other form of governmentally-guaranteed identity, 
citizenship.  Dinh remarked in the opening paragraph how his American identity is 
backed up by his passport, and given the qualifications that this American identity then 
takes, the fact that pennies too are only nominally money suggests the limitation of this 
kind of official definition of things and people, of the kind of serialized identity ascendent 
with nationalism, which is that it all has only a minimal character.  That the nation also 
exists in the cultural imaginary, in a differential field with other nations that creates 
cultural capital along with economic capital, seems to suggest a way that identity can be 
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more meaningful, but the fact that culture also operates under the logic of consumption 
would be cause for pessimism, not optimism.  
The United States As Essentially the Greatest Poem
! In his blog Dinh twice quotes Whitmanʼs assertion “The United States themselves 
are essentially the greatest poem,” and his use of this quote on both occasions is not 
merely to make fun of it.  In a post from August 16, 2010 Dinh transitions from a 
paragraph made almost entirely of Whitmanʼs quote to a paragraph beginning “Boy, was 
our bard wrong!”  But here he focuses not on the question of Americaʼs status as the 
greatest poem, but on what overflows from Whitman after that assertion: that we “need 
never be bankrupt while corn grows from the ground” (qtd in Dinh). Dinh remarks:
Though we grow practically nothing but corn now, we are bankrupt, and of 
all the arts, none is more despised and neglected than poetry, but donʼt 
worry, this article is not really about that dessicated [sic] corpse, but the 
climate that has made poetry obsolete, the conditions that are the cause 
and symptoms of our national nervous breakdown. 
Dinhʼs engagement with Whitman is explicitly tangential; he goes out of his way to 
assure us that his subject isnʼt poetry, which he assumes that we hate.11  But then even 
if the topic is not poetry, Dinh nonetheless proposes a relationship between the nation, 
poetry, and culture.  If poetry is a marginal, rejected form of culture, that very condition 
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11 Itʼs interesting to note that if we presume poetic utterance to be marginal and despised as Dinh 
suggests, blog writing would then have a higher status than poetry.  After all, blog prose is not obsolete as 
poetry is, and itʼs what Dinhʼs reader has chosen to read instead of other cultural texts, including poetry.
suggests a problem in culture, which is actually its hostility to poetry.  To Dinh poetry is a 
form of attention that opposes the subtle propaganda characterized by “the beamed 
appearance of normalcy, the goofy jokes, dancing contests and fried chicken ads, etc, 
thatʼs masking pervasive rot and despair.”  Despite the claim that his topic isnʼt poetry, it 
actually is.  Moreover, Dinhʼs sense that poetry expresses an orientation toward culture 
is actually close to Whitmanʼs meaning in his quote, though this connection isnʼt at first 
obvious.  Itʼs through a question of the cultural status of the nation that Dinh and 
Whitman come to a similar sense of what the United States means.  This meaning is 
actually one of becoming over being.  Whitman writes: “A great poem is no finish to a 
man or woman but rather a beginning. Has any one fancied he could sit at last under 
some due authority and rest satisfied with explanations and realize and be content and 
full? To no such terminus does the greatest poet bring” (LG 24).  If Whitman means that 
the United States is the greatest poemit is not as some already realized fact, but as a 
potentiality that Whitman thinks will inevitably be realized.  Dinh might seem to suggest 
that fatuity of such a hope, especially in the trash culture of, say, dancing contests and 
fried chicken ads, but his poetry attempts, through a kind of blog ethos, to affirm the 
kind of Americanness Whitman invoked.  Thus, despite his ethnic hybridity and 
transnational fluidity and the hybrid and fluid nature of his blog and poetry writing, Dinhʼs 
work is actually about proposing a plausible model of national identity in the face of 
what seems like the postmodern dispersal, aided by the Internet, of just that type of 
metanarrative.  Also, Dinhʼs handling of Whitmanʼs themes suggest a re-reading of 
Whitmanʼs own canonical poetry and its negotiation with a dispersed identity.  
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! ! Not that Dinhʼs poetry would then remind a reader of rhapsodic lines by 
Whitman.  In his comment in Best American Poetry 2004, Dinh admits “Iʼve always been 
a reader of trash literature.  The worse the writing, the more I love it.  I get off on flawed 
thinking expressed in bad English” (Best 252).  This comment is particularly directed to 
his poem “13” which appropriates “the authoritative voice” of horoscopes, and whose 
authority is derived from its probably wrongness.  Dinh comments, “Since fortune-tellers 
already know the future, the present and the past are nothing to them.”  That 
horoscopes donʼt actually know the future, and yet ignore past and present, consign 
them to speaking with authority about what canʼt be known.  And while an analysis of 
“13” may well express Dinhʼs fascination with trash literature, his slightly later poem 
sequence “Fortunes” (2007), as its title suggests, returns to this idea of a known future, 
but with an additional element.  Before each poem Dinh lists a fortune number and a 
date, with the last “fortune” as “fortune n° 1” corresponding to the earliest date (Jam 
Alerts 104-118).  Also, appended to the bottom of each “fortune” is the line: “Filed under: 
destiny       Comments: 0.”  That each poem ends with announcing zero comments 
suggests a falling short of the vaunted interactivity of the Internet, and suggests that 
despite the possibility of leaving comments, sometimes blogs are like more traditional 
texts, simply one way communications.   
! Thus the poem sequence “Fortunes” is meant to invoke a blog and also the 
curiously intimate anonymity that Julia Rak characterizes as the “blog ideology” (Rak 
173).  Rak argues that the blog is not just a remediation of the diary, blogs have the key 
difference in existing in a “grey space between public and private selves.”  “Blogging 
depends on [a] constant evocation of the life and interests of the blogger” and thus 
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might seem private, but that apparent privacy actually suggests “both the bloggerʼs 
belief that s/he is more anonymous online than offline as it builds community between 
bloggers who trust each other as they share experiences and opinions together.”  
Blogging then, uses privacy as a means for a public engagement.  
" The first “fortune” in “Fortunes,” which is also the last fortune if “Fortunes” is read 
as a blog in which the latest entries are first, suggests a reading of Dinhʼs surrealism 
even as it seems intimate in the manner Rak describes.  After the heading with its 
fortune number (841), and date (February 12, 2007), the poem reads:
Read about “transparent white” in the afternoon, dream of Bianca Blanco 
at night, slide into third base, headfirst, of course, entangling my goatee.  
How fortunate I donʼt babble during sleep, dependable wife still snoring 
beside me.  Abrupt knife fantasy discounted as spilled subconscious. 
(104)
In the classical sense of surrealism being a superseding of realism because it records 
the greater reality of the subconscious, the poem is mostly about a dream.  But that 
dream also presupposes a suppressed reality, something true even if concealed, at 
least from the “dependable wife.”  The wife establishes the intimacy of this poem, the 
apparent license that anonymity gives a blogger to reveal more of him or herself than in 
the offline world, in that the dream itself is what someone as personally intimate as the 
wife should not know about, despite its apparent nonsense.  That the dream does 
present nonsense is acknowledged by the dismissal of the “abrupt knife fantasy” 
because it is just “spilled” subconscious.
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! But then its significance, and what must be concealed from the wife, is what the 
latent content of the dream suggests.  The concept of “transparent white” turns into a 
female name that means whiteness, counterpoised to a fantasy marked by its 
masculinity--baseball, facial hair.  In fact, in the associative logic of dreams, itʼs possible 
to see these fantasies as being addressed to whiteness and America: a white woman, 
whose inviolability establishes her as the protector of racial whiteness under 
miscegenation, and baseball, the so-called great American pastime.12  Two more 
fortunes make a concern with nation and race at least a theme in the larger poem.  
Fortune 192 is about a transnational, probably Asian, poet:
With one foot in North Korea, one in South, I write a poem.  With my heart 
in Mexico, liver in the USA, I write a poem.  With the tip of my nose in 
Great Yarmouth, Ajaccio, Dien Bien Phu, I nudge and smear borders. 
(108)
The first two instances of border-crossing turn into the writing of a poem, and the third 
instance makes a general statement that substitutes poems for an action, the act of 
“smearing” borders.  The next poem suggests that border-crossing itself suggests 
nationality, a specifically American nationality:
To be scribbled on a postcard: in the USA, even the houses are homeless, 
pointing elsewhere, yearning to get out.  This warehouse, with its fake 
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12 According to Ann Laura Stoler as discourses became increasingly focused on social health, especially 
in the wake of imperial discourse, “child-rearing” became a matter of imperial and racial duty, and white 
women became “the bearers of a more racist imperial order and the custodians of their desire-driven, 
immoral men” (35). See Race and the Education of Desire: Foucaultʼs History of Sexuality and the 
Colonial Order of Things, (Durham: Duke UP, 1995).
beams, to England; that “hacienda,” with its jive adobe, to Mexico.  Many 
swear by another galaxy. (108)
Thus connected, Dinh suggests that transnationalism itself is a common feature, 
paradoxically of a form of nationalism, American nationalism.
! The epigrammatic form of “Fortunes” means that these addresses to border-
crossing and national identity remain in this suggestive sequence of brief poems, and 
therefore donʼt invite a larger theorization of the larger implications and significance of 
this paradoxical construct of a nation defined as transnational.  But then for Dinh, the 
problem of nationality and the tendency for American nationality to construct itself as an 
exception to nationality, (as in the idea of exporting American democracy into the very 
different geopolitical contexts of Iraq and Afghanistan), is a larger concern that spans 
much of his work.  A more complex articulation of transnational American nationalism, 
and thus a suggestion on how Dinh rearticulates Whitman, occurs in his poem “Made in 
USA.”  
! “Made in USA” is from Dinhʼs 2005 volume of poems American Tatts.  The poem 
is the third in a sequence of four poems that deal with painting.  Dinh himself was an art 
student, recalling in a blog post from September 28, 2009, a “1984 Leon Golub lecture” 
in which “some dork, not me, asked, ʻWhat advice would you give a young painter?ʼ 
Without hesitation, he said, ʻQuit! It's not worth it!ʼ”  This post begins with Whitmanʼs 
“The United States themselves are essentially the greatest poem” quote as an epigraph; 
and after Golubʼs discouraging advice, Dinh points out, “Every young writer or artist 
starts out believing that he or she's a chosen one. What choice does one have?”  The 
general condition for art to exist is youthful messianism, without which Golubʼs advice, a 
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real truth, would make all art impossible.  And though Dinh uses Whitmanʼs quote again 
to point out the irrelevance of poetry in contemporary culture, he also recognizes that 
this irrelevance is enabling.13  In pointing out the artistʼs lack of a choice, Dinh goes on 
to remark: “One must think this way,” messianically, “to keep going until it's too late to 
change or death or until one has enough of failure, rejection or poverty to agonize over 
a caesura.”  Agonizing over a caesura, or developing the kind of attentive habit of mind 
necessary for art, is the difficult task students are advised to quit from, implicitly 
because it is so contrary to what society values.  But then once embarked upon, this 
artistic temperament turns into a kind of helpless slide to doom.  Through this line of 
thinking, Dinh interestingly conflates painting with poetry, as the connection to 
Whitmanʼs quote suggests, and this conflation makes “Made In USA” also a comment 
on poetry.  
" The title suggests at its most obvious level American commodity, and the poem is 
largely about a student painter, Aziz, who in the last line has “Made in USA” tattooed on 
his forehead, thus getting an American tatt.  The first stanza describes Aziz physically, 
then through nationality: “Born in Iran, he was raised in Germany and England” (2).  
Aziz is then “oriental” and transnational, and how he ended up in a Philadelphia art 
school isnʼt stated.  But then it isnʼt really a question since the point of this part of Azizʼs 
description is to suggest the insufficiency of nation to describe a person.  As with Dinh in 
“A Strange Letter,” it would be hard to say exactly whether Aziz is Iranian, German, 
English or even American.  The stanza ends with drawing Dinh, or at least the speaker, 
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13 Actually, this use of Whitmanʼs quote predates by nearly a year the other, similar use of Whitmanʼs 
quote I open this section with.  So to suggest that this use of the quote is after what I mention first is 
misleading, strictly speaking, but I invert the temporal sequence for ease of reading.  
into the poem as a like-minded art student.  Considering themselves both “badass” 
painters in the vein of early twentieth century German expressionists Max Beckman and 
Ernst Ludwig Kirchner, the speaker states “Like children, we thought we were destined 
to rule. / We painted all night, thinking weʼll be famous by morning” (6-7).  
" A childish sense of being destined to rule is another way to phrase what Dinh 
characterized as the student artistʼs outlook, being young and feeling chosen, and this 
outlook is developed in the next stanza of the poem:
What a sweet, angry calling it is--
Wanting to smear your way through life!
Painting as a metaphysical passport to universal acceptance.
Painting as a lift from the mundane and the 9 to 5.
Painting as power and trance and annihilation. (8-12)
This stanza bears the slightly patronizing sense of the childishness of seeing painting in 
these sublime terms, which makes even the gradually intensifying, phrased-in-parallel 
definitions of what painting is seem a little disingenuous.  Even so, the sublime 
difference that painting offers canʼt help but seem appealing.  At first painting is the 
transcendent form of community, “universal acceptance.”  From there painting enables a 
repudiation of the mundane implied in the universality of being universally accepted.  
And finally we break from even opposition to a sublime inhumanness that doesnʼt have 
anything to do with anything prosaic like wanting “to smear your way through life.”  But 
then the intensifying rhetorical parallelism comes off half as a joke since itʼs clear that 
what this stanza is about is a childish, aggrandized vision, not anything like a rhapsodic 
paean to paintingʼs power.  
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! This mature perspective suggests the attitude from which this poem is written, 
one that undercuts the conceit of art in favor of something more mundane, and is 
therefore a reading of the Whitman assertion Dinh returns to in his blog.  Characterizing 
art as being above “the mundane and the 9 to 5” suggests its inherent remove from 
ordinary life; so making fun of this idea, as Dinh subtly does, suggests that art is actually  
ordinary; and in a literal sense, the United States becomes a poem, because any art is 
as mundane as any experience.  And actually this evolution of art from something all-
transforming to something ordinary reflects prognostications about new media.  Lisa 
Nakamura writes that “much of the research written in the nineties centered on 
hypertext theory, or on discursive ʻvirtual communities,ʼ” areas that imply a privileged 
subcultural status, as in now less-often used term “digerati” (Nakamura 1). But then the 
Internet didnʼt evolve into some kind of unending new frontier that is forever unfixed and 
unstable.  What actually happened is “the massification of the Internet as a media and 
communicative form,” in other words, the Internet has become ordinary (2).   So then 
insofar as Dinh is hostile toward a transcendent vision of art, and possibly 
transcendence itself (recall his love of trash writing), we can see in Dinh a privileging of 
the everyday that reflects his use of ordinary communicative new media, such as the 
blog.  But also, if transcendence seems to be a form of abuse, of a childish art, Dinh still 
maintains an ambivalence toward it.  In the next stanza the speaker specifies that “in 
our cases, nothing really happened of course, / As all we had was crazy energy and a 
love for beer” (13-14).  The “sweet, angry calling” of painting reduces down to an 
obviously mundane consumable, beer, and this reduction is experienced communally in 
the plural pronoun.  At first it seems that the poet is speaking for both himself and Aziz, 
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but the next line distinguishes Aziz from the “we” who have only youth and alcohol: in 
contrast to everyone else, “Only Aziz was certifiably crazy” (15).
! Azizʼs insanity is described as misrecognized as just drug abuse, which would 
just be an intensified form of a youthful love of partying.  Instead, with a heightened 
sense of rhetorical suspense, his insanity is introduced to us as “something else 
entirely”:  
Each time he went mad, Aziz would go on about
How he wasnʼt really Iranian.
How his nose was fake, how even his skin was fake, 
How he was a blonde German child kidnapped by Iranian parents. (21-24)
Before noting the two more obvious candidates for commentary, that Azizʼs insanity 
reminds us of Dinhʼs problematic nationalism in “A Strange Letter” and that the question 
of art seems to be dropped altogether, I want to point out that Dinh uses “real,” and its 
adverbial form “really,” three times in the two stanzas weʼve been analyzing, and no 
where else in the entire poem.  At first we have nothing “really” happening with painting, 
in which reality exposes painting to be nothing transcendent, so that whatʼs real is a 
kind of objectivity.  This objective sense of reality is taken up again in line 16, “lose it for 
real,” which again contrasts a dramatic pose of an art student with actual insanity.  But 
here Dinh introduces a certain irony in that what the real designates is not sanity and 
rationality but an actual state that is the total opposite, and for that reason needs to be 
emphasized as real.  By the time Aziz asserts that he isnʼt “really” Iranian, the notion of 
the real isnʼt just a simple objectivity that contrasts with subjective mental states; it is 
rhetorical too, a mark of insistence that may not have to do with a notion of reality.  
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! Most words are typically understood to refer to things or concepts, but “really” is 
a word that doesnʼt have this referential character.  Rather than have a denotative 
function, it has more of an expressive use.  And if language is generally both denotative 
and expressive, it nonetheless is important to distinguish between these two modes.  
Thinking of language as a system of references means that language must be 
superficial, readily apparent in its reference, in order to be understood.  But in contrast, 
expression is not superficial; it represents the depth of the intention behind language.  
The difference is one between identifying something and calling a thing something.  
Deleuze states that the kind of difference between expression and denotation is 
ultimately a “depth-surface distinction,” which helps to clarify that the role of expression, 
of something like the colloquial use of “really,” is not serial like ordinary language 
signification (Logic of Sense 215).  Instead it suggests the opposite of partial, 
substitutable signifiers, which to Deleuze is not the signified, as in classical Sausserian 
signification, but a more enigmatic presence that he calls the Body without Organs.  
! In Azizʼs mad claims, the word “really” actually condenses the claims to 
nationality and art, otherwise at stake in the poem.  First, “really” enables Aziz to 
differentiate his appearance of being Iranian from some higher, but unspecified, truth.  
And at the same time the claim itself isnʼt irreconcilably insane.  To not really be Iranian 
doesnʼt preclude having been born in Iran, which the poem begins by asserting.  After 
all, itʼs not the fact of birth itself that confers nationality, instead an imaginary feeling like 
nationalism is probably more decisive.  But from there Aziz then thinks his nose and 
skin are fake, so that it seems that what really determines nationality is physical, since 
the nose, and especially the skin, both seem basic to physical appearance.  
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Appearance is also what is most obvious about any person, more so when contrasted 
with something internal like a subjective sense of nationalism.  And yet that his nose 
and skin could be fake, which they really could given plastic surgery, makes physical 
appearance ultimately unreliable as well.  Thus, Azizʼs two assertions give two 
competing versions of nationality, cultural and biological, which have to be invoked 
serially to supplement each other. 
" At the same time, if a sane reading can be made for each of these claims they 
also contain violent refusals.14  Looking physically like an Iranian as he does, asserting 
that he isnʼt entails refusing his nose and skin.  Aziz implicitly identifies himself as a 
noseless, skinless non-Iranian, through what Deleuze and Guattari would characterize 
as a schizo body: an “active internal struggle against the organs” (Delueze and Guattari 
150).  Deleuze initially developed the concept of the Body without Organs through a 
reading of Melanie Klein, in which the schizoid position, a phase of infancy, is 
characterized by a differentiation between bad, partial objects, food and excrement, and 
its opposite.  “What the schizoid position opposes to bad partial objects […] is not a 
good object, even if it were partial.  What is opposed is rather an organism without 
parts, a body without organs, with neither mouth nor anus, having given up all 
introjection or projection, and being complete at this price” (Deleuze 216).  So then what 
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14 The reader might have noticed that there is actually a third claim made by Aziz about his nationality, 
quoted above.  But since this line largely condenses the other two claims, I have omitted a reading of it in 
the main text.  As with the other claims it is possible to read a sane version and an insane version of the 
line, and both should be seen in context with the second line of the poem: “Born in Iran, he was raised in 
Germany and England.”  When Aziz asserts in line 24 that heʼs “a blonde German child kidnapped by 
Iranian parents” this can be read as logical in that Aziz might well identify with being German, having 
been raised there, while by the same logic his parents would be Iranian, since they would have been 
raised in Iran. But then what this line emphasizes perhaps more than the preceding two claims is the 
violent character of Azizʼs renunciation of being Iranian: he sees the family as a crime.  Nonetheless this 
sense of violent rejection of nationality is present in the other two claims.  
Aziz is opposing to false nationalities isnʼt another nationality, each of which would be 
partial, split between culture and physiology.  Instead what he seeks is the intensity of 
the “really:” a wholeness behind nationality, with neither culture nor noses or skin.
" Because Aziz identifies himself not as an oriental Iranian but as a teutonic 
German itʼs possible to think that at stake in this disidentification is race more than 
nationality.  But Dinh works against such an interpretation in the penultimate stanza of 
the poem:  “When Aziz was around blacks, he would say, ʻIʼm black, just like you.ʼ / But 
when he was round whites, heʼd say ʻIʼm white just like you.ʼ” (25-26).  Aziz isnʼt 
interested in the economy of social privilege in these statements, of the particular status 
of whiteness in a hierarchy of race, but rather the fluidity of ethnicity.  
" Before turning to the poemʼs ending, itʼs interesting that Dinh so pointedly details 
Azizʼs hospital: “Pennsylvania Hospital--the oldest in the country, / Founded by Ben 
Franklin in 1751” (17-18).  On one hand these details contribute realist verisimilitude to 
Dinhʼs narrative, reminding the reader that this poem is supposedly a memoir.  But 
because of Azizʼs psychosis of nationality, invoking the hospitalʼs status as the original 
American hospital and its founding father suggests a connection between Azizʼs 
madness and the national myth of origin, a myth which is also about an Americanness 
we donʼt live in the partialness of experience, but rather the deep Americanness 
beyond: what could be called an Americanness without organs.
" Itʼs almost unnoticeable that when Dinh describes the hospital as the “oldest in 
the country” it is actually older than the country.  But then this type of prolepsis is rooted 
deeply in the mythology of the nation, perhaps most apparently in George Bancroftʼs 
popular and influential ten volume History of the United States (1834-1874), which as 
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Arac points out, comes to July 4, 1776 at the eighth volume, so that the vast majority of 
this history anticipates the United States.  Arac points out that the effect of Bancroftʼs 
anticipatory history is that “the already existing, quasi-eternal, land itself” is associated 
with the United States, in such a way that the US is both “already present” and 
manifests “itself in time” (Arac, Narrative 625-626).  
" Turning to Bancroftʼs treatment of Benjamin Franklin in the third volume, itʼs 
notable that the pages devoted to Franklinʼs life actually tell a parable of a love of 
freedom coupled with industriousness.  Bancroft begins with Franklinʼs father, who 
opposed in his Boston newspaper the persecution of witches and quakers.  Arac notes 
that Bancroft in general moves by “a principle of supersession” (626).  In the first 
volume the puritans established the institutions of “Democratic liberty and independent 
Christian worship” ( Bancroft qtd in Arac 626).  By the third, Bancroft was willing to see 
the puritans as now regressive; challenged by the reformation, “freedom of mind” in 
Bancroftʼs words, he now sees “the Salem witchcraft trials as arising out of a politically 
retrograde attempt by ministers to reclaim their eroding power.”15  Thus, James Franklin 
is a proleptic figure for the freedom of mind that Benjamin would more fully embody.  
Even when Benjamin Franklin is a “runaway apprentice” he is immediately described as 
the “greatest of the sons of New England of that generation” (Bancroft 376).
" Franklinʼs founding of public institutions shows how biographical detail becomes 
allegorical in depicting the eternal Americanness of the pre-United States period.  The 
margins of History of the United States notes dates, sometimes down to the month; and 
Franklinʼs life in Philadelphia begins in October 1723, but the next date is 1749.  
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15 Bancroftʼs words are quoted in Arac, 627.  Aracʼs description of Bancroftʼs views on the Salem witch 
trials is also from 627.  
Bancroft begins this condensed span in a surprisingly small scale, detailing the 
“sobriety, frugality, and industry” of the young Franklin.  Beginning with Franklin “Toiling 
early and late” Bancroft goes on to specify that his “ingenuity was such, he could form 
letters, make types and wood cuts, and engrave vignettes in copper” (376).  From these 
mundane accomplishments Bancroft then builds what otherwise would seem like 
Franklinʼs unbelievable success, as though it merely followed through an inexorable 
logic:
He planned a newspaper; and, when he became its proprietor and editor, 
he fearlessly defended absolute freedom of thought and speech, and the 
inalienable power of the people.  Desirous of advancing education, he 
proposed improvements in the schools of Philadelphia; he invented the 
system of subscription libraries, and laid the foundation of one that was 
long the most considerable library in America; he suggested the 
establishment of an academy, which has ripened into a university; he saw 
the benefit of concert in the pursuit of science, and gathered a 
philosophical society for its advancement. (376-377)
By this stage of Franklinʼs description his mere thought seems to result in a successful 
institution of some improvement or advance, with historical time left indistinct.  The 
effect of this narrative isnʼt a sense of Franklinʼs life; it is not a biography, but a 
displacement of biography to an account of the nationʼs more abstract development.  
And itʼs for this reason that Franklin now connotes a founding father, more than a 
biographical person.
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! So then despite the specificity of Dinhʼs reference, the particular hospital, its 
claim to fame, its founding father, Dinh actually invokes a highly abstract sense of the 
nation: temporally indeterminate, populated by figures, motivated by freedom.  Recall 
that Dinh had written that every “young writer or artist starts out believing that he or 
sheʼs a chosen one” (“Empire in Funkville”).  And this attitude becomes the childish 
sense of thinking one was “destined to rule” in “Made In USA” (6).  But far from just 
dismissing it, Dinh starts to tie the longings of a nascent artist into the sense of the 
nation itself, through a subtle reference to the founding mythology of a country that 
considers itself a chosen one.  Azizʼs madness, his radical acceptance of the 
inconsistency of race and nationality, is an intensification of this mythology.  
Disappointment, either not becoming famous or not really upholding the ideals of 
democracy, is not enough to make Aziz quit, as Leon Golub supposedly advised Dinhʼs 
art school class.  Instead the “metaphysical passport to universal acceptance” either as 
painting, poetry or the land of the free, recedes from actual experience, emptying itself 
of all partially-failed real content, becoming instead the Body without Organs over which 
all these aspirations pass.  
To Think of Time
! If Dinhʼs repeated returns to Whitmanʼs pronouncement that the United States 
are essentially the greatest poem suggest that this idea is problematic, itʼs notable that 
Whitman himself ends the preface by putting it in conjectural phrasing: “The soul of the 
largest and wealthiest and proudest nation may well go half-way to meet that of its 
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poets” (LG 26, emphasis added).  Whitman can sometimes be read as merely asserting 
himself as the greatest poet, indeed his self-reviews tend to make this claim, but the 
work itself contains moments of doubt that make the ending of the preface, its status of 
awaiting something, actually true to the experience of the book.  In fact, I read 
incompleteness as the key to how Whitman creates a sense of unity from the vastness 
of referents he uses so that ultimately the transcendence his work achieves is based on 
division and fragmentation more than bland unification.  Itʼs this form of transcendence 
that enables a transformation of culture into nation, of United States into poem, and thus 
suggests how shifting, variable identifications might still have meaning.  
" One way to sum up the first Leaves of Grass is to appropriate Ivan Markiʼs 
synopsis from Walt Whitman: An Encyclopedia.  Marki summarizes the book as 
basically a narrative.  The poet “must find the voice, the language […] that will 
communicate his vision to those who are blind to its truth even as they embody and live 
it. If […] the speaker passes his trial, he will have become ʻthe greatest poetʼ” (Marki). 
That Whitman saw his purpose as articulating the not-yet-expressed truths of the people 
makes him similar to Bancroft; Arac notes that Bancroft too “conceived his task to 
resemble that of a primitive bard.  He wanted to articulate what his people already knew 
and believed […] but to give it a shape and scope that would include […] more than 
could be directly known by any single person or local tradition” (Arac 623).  The greatest 
poet is great because of his transcendence, but the process of this transcendence isnʼt 
to be merely assumed, if Marki is right that Whitman isnʼt merely asserting himself as 
bard, but trying for it.  So finally there is an open-ended quality of the 1855 Leaves. It 
occurs in time.
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! The poem that becomes “Song of Myself” has a rough sequence.  In the 
encyclopedia, James E. Miller Jr. writes about “Song of Myself” and breaks it into two 
phases, an awakening that starts with the famous soul-athwart-the-body chest 
penetration, and then a developing transcendence which is finally “ineffable” and 
mystical (Miller).  The awakening sections tend to be more concrete, and to proceed as 
lists more than avowals; they are Whitmanʼs “word of the modern . . . . a word en 
masse” (LG 49).  In fact, what I earlier cited as evidence of Whitmanʼs concern for the 
immediate, “What is commonest, cheapest, nearest, easiest, is Me,” occurs in the 
context of this first phase in what would come to be the end of the 14th section of “Song 
of Myself.”  In the 1855 version, this statement is in the midst of widely varying 
descriptions, from the “negro [who] holds firmly the reins of his four horses” (37) to the 
“wild gander [that] leads his flock through the cold night” (38).  This paratactic 
divergence makes Whitmanʼs statement, “I see in them and myself the same old law,” 
express an increasing transcendence that comes about in the disparateness of what he 
mentions.  Whatʼs discontinuous flows together in the sweep of the poem.  
! That a list poem with no obvious unifying principle comes to seem capacious and 
unified is not altogether unusual.  According to Barbara Herrnnstein Smith, when verse 
proceeds by parataxis, “that is, [when] the coherence of the poem will not be dependent 
on the sequential arrangement of its major thematic units” then the tendency of the 
poem is toward indefinite extension (Smith 99).  Smith notes that lists tend to be 
generated by something outside of the items listed, perhaps something conceptual 
(100).  Indeed, in Whitman the lists of specific images are generated by a more abstract 
conceit.  Combined with a sense of infinite expansion, the lists curiously seem to 
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concretely invoke something abstract.  Whitman summarizes this effect as he draws 
down from a catalog of different people he is comrades with, first through commentary 
and then through another list.
I resist anything better than my own diversity,
And breathe the air and leave plenty after me,
And am not stuck up, and am in my place.
The moth and the fisheggs are in their place,
The suns I see and the suns I cannot see are in their place,
The palpable is in its place and the impalpable is in its place. (LG 43)
“I resist anything better than my own diversity” suggests that the list of people, and 
Whitman explicitly includes people “Of every hue and trade and rank” (43), are all 
ultimately self-descriptions.  But then identifying with diversity doesnʼt mean Whitman 
surpasses a specific self; instead Whitman maintains a sense of specificity through his 
assertion of place.  Place forms the organizing principle to this last list--last in what he 
would later break out as section 16--and it comes to mean not necessarily a spatial 
coordinate, but rather a sense of ordered belonging.16  Place should be understood as 
being-in-place. 
" Miller marks a transition from “roaming the continent, celebrating scenes of 
ordinary life” to an erotic account of touch and then to an abstract comment on “human 
commonality,” which is evident in Whitmanʼs turn to place, especially since place 
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16 What I quote is by far not the last list that Whitman employs in “Song of Myself.”  It is however, the last 
list in what would become section 16 of “Song of Myself” which wraps a long series of lists before section 
17 which breaks from the pattern of listing with abstract commentary.  
enables Whitman to connect the palpable with the impalpable.  Because this transition 
still takes place interspersed with the vivid details of Whitmanʼs lists, it can be hard to 
notice Whitmanʼs turn away from perceptible, objective things toward thoughts.  The 
meditation on place, which begins as an assertion of specificity, becomes a kind of 
minimal and universal form of existence.  Whitman tries to articulate the reality of this 
essentially conceptual understanding as something common to all people:
These are the thoughts of all men in all ages and lands, they are not 
" " " original with me, 
If they are not yours as much as mine they are nothing or next to nothing,
If they do not enclose everything they are next to nothing,
If they are not the riddle and the untying of the riddle they are nothing,
If they are not just as close as they are distant they are nothing. (LG 43)
The demonstrative pronoun “these” seems to refer to both the immediate observed 
moments Whitman records and to something like the reflection on place, which both can 
be encompassed as thought.  In these lines thought takes on great importance in 
Whitmanʼs poem as the ultimate tally, or as the generative principle behind the observed 
world which Whitman records at length.  But then thought is also problematic in that it 
canʼt be made to appear with the same reality as things.  Whitman doesnʼt diverge into 
theoretical argumentation, after all, the great poet “is no arguer” (LG 9), but he does 
seem uncomfortable with thoughtʼs immateriality.  This discomfort is reflected in 
Whitmanʼs tone, which turns suddenly insistent and doubtful.  Supposing the poem 
actually is original, that it is more Whitman and less the reader, makes Whitman willing 
to pronounce his work “nothing or next to nothing.”  This intensified rhetoric isnʼt 
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necessary in the paratactic lists, which after all are also assertions, except that they 
assert material scenes as opposed to thoughts.  
! By the next stanza Whitman returns to serene observation: “This is the green 
grass that grows wherever the land is and the water is, / This is the common air that 
bathes the globe.”   Beginning with another demonstrative pronoun, Whitman again 
refers to the poem as a whole, except in this line, it might initially read as a simple 
description of grass.  Only with the parallel phrase of the next line is it clear that “this” 
indicates a more general, immaterial grammatical subject.  Itʼs notable how affirmative 
these lines sound and how they contrast against the repeated “nothing” in the previous 
stanza.  
! It might be tempting to see in the contrast of these two stanzas a passage 
through negativity that emerges reassuringly into the central image of the book, grass.  
But then the poem itself puts these two moments together more as juxtapositions than a 
narrative; nothing answers the series of if statements in the stanza of doubtfulness.  
! Itʼs not until the so-called “cuttings” that Whitman gives a more developed 
treatment of the possible negativity raised by the question of whether his poem is 
nothing.  In what would come to be “To Think of Time” and interestingly, a year later in 
the 1856 edition, would end that volume as “Burial Poem,” Whitman again addresses 
the possibility of nothingness.  This poem begins explicitly on the subject of thought:  
“To think of time . . . . to think through the retrospection, / To think of today . . and the 
ages continued henceforward” (LG 100).  These opening clauses leave open exactly 
what the outcome of thought is, and instead seem to focus on the moment of thought 
itself.  But then the phrase “to think through the retrospection” gives thought the 
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character of penetrating through time, in particular through the past tense, even as the 
next line puts thought in relation to the other two tenses.  If previously thought spanned 
both the real and the immaterial, here thought spans time itself.  
! But in thoughtʼs temporal unboundedness, it is clear that Whitman isnʼt talking 
about a particular personʼs thought; especially since any personʼs experience is in time, 
and not beyond it.  Itʼs in this context that Whitman returns to the question of 
nothingness.  
Have you guessed you yourself would not continue? Have you dreaded 
! those earth-beetles?
Have you feared the future would be nothing to you?” 
Is today nothing? Is the beginningless past nothing?
If the future is nothing they are just as surely nothing. (LG 100)
These stanzas return to the problem of thoughtʼs immateriality that “Song of Myself” 
leaves off on.  But in this instance, Whitman begins at a personal level, on individual 
lifeʼs limits.  Itʼs notable that he bypasses the word “thought” here for “guessed” 
suggesting a less lofty version of thinking than the penetrating thought of the poemʼs 
opening.  And at this folksy, informal level, Whitman introduces the problem of 
immateriality in the guise of the future after death, as a dread of “earth-beetles,” only to 
dismiss it in a short appeal to immediacy: “Is today nothing?”  This question seems 
more rhetorical than genuinely asked.  Because the question of whether the future will 
be nothing is not an abstract problem but the problem of a real personʼs mortality, this 
appeal to today is similarly placed in the context of a personʼs experience.  Experience 
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itself connects to the future and past and guarantees both of their reality, that both arenʼt 
nothing.  
" This apparent resolution doesnʼt proceed unproblematically, in fact, things get 
stranger considering the mutual reality of the experienced present and the 
unexperienced past.  “To think that the sun rose in the east . . . . that men and women 
were flexible and real and alive . . . . that every thing was real and alive.”  If here 
Whitman is thinking through retrospection, then what thought accomplishes is a 
reproduction of something past, put into terms of being present.  It seems as though this 
reproduction should show how immediate experience, the fullness of today, animates 
the past.  But then the strangeness that the poet marvels at with the infinitive phrase “To 
think” suggests that this presentification of the past is not the simple presence of the 
actual moment.  The next two lines amplify this difference:  “To think that you and I did 
not see feel think nor bear our part, / To think that we are now here and bear our part.”  
These lines then suggest a presence that the speaker and reader are absent for.  
" If Whitman relied on the assumed presence of the present to establish the reality 
of all times, at this point the very presence of “today” becomes less certain.  Through 
the presence of the past, presence is detached from any personʼs particular senses, 
and thus isnʼt something that can be assumed.  Jacques Derrida, as a critic of 
presence, diagnoses this relationship as a dangerous form of supplementation in Of 
Grammatology.17  Derrida remarks that when “nature, as self-proximity, comes to be 
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17 Derrida uses the phrase “dangerous supplement” in reference to Jean-Jacques Rousseauʼs guilt over 
masturbation (Derrida 150).  Supplementation in Rousseau, according to Derrida, occurs in Rousseauʼs 
infinitesimal displacement of virginity, with its sense of innocence, to pucelage, being technically a virgin. 
Pucelage is a virginity supplemented by masturbation in which pleasure corresponds to a loss of vital 
energy and risks death and castration (151-2).  
forbidden or interrupted” then supplementation in the form of “representation and the 
imagination” becomes necessary (Derrida 144).  Representation simultaneously allows 
the natural to be invoked, but only through a mediated form which “claims to be 
presence and the sign of the thing itself.”  By that logic, representation comes to seem 
whole while nature then seems less than whole, after all it requires a supplement.  The 
supplement “is a surplus, a plenitude enriching another plenitude, the fullest measure of 
presence.”  But then this fullest measure is no longer immediate, the initial lack, the 
interruption of self-proximity, is still there. 
! Whitman next points out that at every minute both birth and death is constantly 
occurring, but death by far is his greater concern.  A series of parallel “When” clauses 
suspends a long sentence that comprises the next section of the poem.  “When the dull 
nights are over, and the dull days also” along with the physicianʼs “silent and terrible 
look for an answer” and mourning, “Then the corpse-limbs stretch on the bed, and the 
living look upon them, / They are palpable as the living are palpable” (LG 100-101).  The 
pronoun “they” refers to the corpse-limbs, but for a moment in reading the clause, this 
pronoun demands a suspended expectation.  After all, more immediately “they” refers to 
“them” so that the actual referent recedes backward in time as we move forward in 
reading.  Overall there is a slight ambiguity to Whitmanʼs point that the dead limbs are 
as palpable as the living, which hides the subtle reversal in perspective Whitman 
undertakes here.  Itʼs no longer that the living are naturally palpable, but rather the dead 
with their bare palpability, a palpability without the supplemental feature of life, seems to 
be the baseline standard of this measure of reality.  Therefore finally, the supplement, 
non-presence as death, becomes a substitute for presence itself.  
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! Death as a form of presence actually enables Whitman to go on in this poem 
much as he did otherwise, but with a few decisive differences.  Details of observed 
moments are still conveyed in lists, except now preceded by “To think” which subtly 
shifts the frame so that what is being observed is situated in the sense of being 
observed across time; in other words, proximity to the poet is no longer a governing 
conceit.  A description of a livery driver takes the form almost of an obituary, with a 
newspaper-like sense of reported detail.  A stanza narrating the manʼs personality 
describes him in life, and later driving itself is described, but now Whitman ends by 
remarking “To think that these are so much and so nigh to other drivers . . and he takes 
no interest in them” (102).  This kind of situating comment implies that the poetʼs own 
perspective is more in the non-temporal moment of thought as opposed to the transient 
moment of living.  
! But as Whitman goes on thinking of experiences that arenʼt tied to specific 
people who experience them with the kind of mystical inclusiveness characteristic of 
these types of lists, he suddenly defends personal experience and specificity.
You are not thrown to the winds . . you gather certainly and safely around 
! yourself,
Yourself! Yourself! Yourself forever and ever!
It is not to diffuse you that you were born of your mother and father--it is to 
! identify you,
It is not that you should be undecided, but that you should be decided;
Something long preparing and formless is arrived and formed in you,
You are thenceforth secure, whatever comes or goes. (LG 103-104)
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Much of the speculative “To think” passages affirm the objective reality of different 
experiences, some of which arenʼt necessarily universal, like “the beautiful maternal 
cares” (103).  Establishing an individual as real follows the paratactic logic of addition, 
though that doesnʼt explain the vehemence of this assertion.  Itʼs also notable that 
Whitman attributes an intentionality to time, or at least temporal processes, asserting 
that “it” intends not to diffuse you but to identify you.  The force of this quasi-religious 
mysticism, which comes across more as intense conviction than revelation, does the 
work of establishing “you” as eternal, which means that it is at bottom an assertion.  
" Part of Whitmanʼs intense insistence on a present “you” in preference to a future 
without “you” undoubtedly arises from the polemic implicit in his emphatic embrace of a 
broad, encompassing present tense as what defines reality.  Cody Marrs sees in 
Whitmanʼs entire antebellum poetry a “fixation on the present” (49).  And this fixation is 
“a kind of ontological challenge to the temporal strictures of industrial capitalism” (Marrs 
50). Marrs sees Whitmanʼs temporality as opposed to standardization, which is a detail 
my analysis opposes.  I agree with Benedict Andersonʼs notion that standardized time is 
necessary to presuppose a single moment shared across diverse circumstances.  But 
nonetheless, Marrsʼ point, that what Whitman opposes is a sense of time as a 
measurement of industry, “a soulless index of profit and productivity” to use Marrsʼ 
words, is accurate.  After all, Whitmanʼs temporality, whether resistant of standardization 
or reliant upon it, is ultimately about the inclusiveness of the moment.  It is in this sense 
that Whitmanʼs notion of time is contrary to his historical period, that of capitalʼs 
industrialization, as Marrs points out.  Thus asserting the importance of a present-tense 
“you” implicitly defends the diminished sanctity of the individual against the transference 
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of that individual for his or her labor, so that time is more an experience of living than a 
commodity sold as labor.   And thus, time for Whitman can be a medium for 
understanding the self in the manner that non-commodified new media eventually will 
under Namakuraʼs analysis.  
" And so itʼs in implicit opposition to hierarchy that Whitman then affirms, but really 
affirms to qualify, “the known leaders and inventors and the rich owners” (LG 104).  This 
verse paragraph opens by asserting that the “great masters and kosmos are well as 
they go” but on rich owners Whitman inserts a subtle tentativeness; itʼs not that the rich 
owners are well, but rather they “may be well.”  This more conditional affirmation leads 
to Whitmanʼs point that what his poem treats is not simply the distinguished.  “The 
known leaders and inventors and the rich owners and pious and distinguished may be 
well, / But there is more account than that . . . . there is strict account of all.”  The 
displacement of vertical hierarchy, greatness, to a horizontal inclusiveness as account, 
leads into Whitmanʼs accounts of varieties of the subaltern, put again in the emphatic 
“not nothing” phrasing.
" Whitman starts with a kind of topic sentence: “The interminable hordes of the 
ignorant and wicked are not nothing” (LG 105).  And at least coming off of the notion of 
accounts, itʼs clear that not being nothing has the meaning of being included in the strict 
account, and not the earlier, theoretic question of immateriality.  The list of the 
interminable hordes, interestingly, does not immediately take the form of vignettes 
specified with objective detail, but rather cultural, geographic groupings.  “The 
barbarians of Africa and Asia are not nothing, / The common people of Europe are not 
nothing . . . . the American aborigines are not nothing.”  When Whitman does come to 
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descriptive specificity, the details seem selected to emphasize abjection.  “A zambo or a 
foreheadless Crowfoot or a Comanche is not nothing, / The infected in the immigrant 
hospital is not nothing. . . . the murderer or mean person is not nothing.”  Taken with his 
earlier use of “not nothing” to suggest the minimal presence of what isnʼt sensorily 
present, these people of the horde come to seem minimally human.  But then leaving off 
on “the mocker of religion” who “is not nothing as he goes” Whitman then identifies with 
“the rest” as opposed to the great masters.  At this point it is the minimal likeness that 
the rhetorical construction “not nothing” enables which is what Whitman ultimately 
speaks for as the great poet envisioned in the preface.  “Not nothing” lets Whitman 
avow commonality without having to actually be foreheadless, a murderer or infected, 
but if so, the democratic communality Whitman projects in his verse is characterized by 
a multiplicity that preserves a blankness, a proximity to nothingness, analogous to, and 
perhaps prototypical of, a Body without Organs.
" But finally, Whitman maintains ambivalence toward nothingness.  The “To Think 
of Time” cutting ends with a refusal of death.  “I swear I think there is nothing but 
immortality!” (LG 106).  In refusing death, Whitman also refuses time, turning to a wish 
for a permanent state of temporal immediacy, without either a deferral into the future or 
a vanishing into the past.  Ironically, this last strongly averred intuition on death, that it 
doesnʼt exist, isnʼt derived from a sense of inclusiveness, but from the kind of conviction 
seen earlier in the deistic insertion of the entity that intends and then guarantees “your” 
readerʼs existence.  This optimism comes at the cost of multiplicity, in the implication of 
an ultimate hierarchy.  Whitmanʼs final recourse to a great master, I want to suggest, 
shows his inability to think through his inclusiveness to its point of incoherence, what 
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weʼd call its deconstruction.  This inability marks him as decisively not postmodern.  
Without his at times hieratic sense of multiplicity, the strand of his work that suggests 
that radical inclusiveness is a tonic to prejudice comes forward, unlikely as it might at 
first seem, into Dinhʼs poetry which can affirm the ignorant hordes without implicitly 
renouncing them.  Moreover, to make a prognostication, a kind of fortune, on the 
cultural transformation made possibly by new media, one might hope that an 
inclusiveness that isnʼt a buried insistence on singularity, and thus on exclusionary 
practices based on social category, becomes more and more plausible.  
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Conclusion
Race, Aesthetics and the Body without Organs
! In critical race theory, perhaps no concept is more discredited than universalism; 
not that so many books have been devoted to debunking universalism, but that an 
implicit debunking runs through the cultural criticism of race: what is supposedly neutral 
and inclusive is really oppressive and exclusive, and it is by pointing this out that 
criticism in this vein goes beyond the issue of just race, and begins to suggest the 
dynamics of wider oppression.  This implicit debunking is no less present in this 
dissertation.  Certainly, I critique a history that risks dissolving into an overall narrative, 
that of gradual resistance to race culminating in our enlightened, multicultural moment 
of the present, to argue for much odder, much more complex and sometimes more 
confrontational responses to racism, which in the end is meant to show that the problem 
of racism is not and has never been a simple matter that could easily be managed.   
Against an idea that racism is under control or effectively being opposed, I suggest that 
it has only been shifting, and thus its logic still needs to be, and perhaps will always 
need to be, diagnosed and resisted.  
! So then it is odd that I proceed in this project through comparativism, which in 
seeking to compare across contexts, in my case across race, attempts to establish if not 
a universal, then a meaningful critique that traverses, and in traversing also exceeds, 
mere context.  Moreover, in mounting a comparative argument I donʼt just have to go 
beyond race, comparativism also demands I argue for what it is that enables a critique 
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across race, what grounds for comparison establish that which will exceed the particular 
and will at least gesture toward the universal.  
! My answer is not much more promising than the universal itself; most 
consistently, what I observe as challenging a hard conception of identity and connecting 
poets of different races is the aesthetic.  By aesthetic, I mean a form of cognition 
focused not on analytic thinking but on response or feeling, which is admittedly a vague 
definition.  But then it is through vagueness, or a kind of suggestive indeterminacy, that 
aesthetic experience challenges, or rather challenges and supplements, social identity--
that term that I have argued underlies categories like race.
! Versions of that claim, that conceiving of poetry as art has been a politically-
enabling perspective for minority poets, appear in each of the four chapters above, but 
here, by way of conclusion, I want to turn to an account of aesthetics in the field at 
large, by way of Timothy Yuʼs comments on why Dictee, by Theresa Hak Kyung Cha, 
has become a canonical text in Asian American literary studies.  Yu constructs a 
historical account of Asian American studiesʼ self-criticism.  By the 1990s, Yu writes, 
critics “acknowledged the political necessity of insisting on a coherent Asian American 
cultural identity in the 1970s” but argued that this paradigm, Yu calls it “cultural 
nationalism,” was also finally exclusionary (Yu 113-4).  This recognition, that something 
more inclusive than asserting identity was needed, resulted in a critical embrace of “a 
new ʻcultural pluralism,ʼ which celebrates difference,” and among other shifts in focus, 
initiated a transnational turn.  Itʼs this transnational turn that leads Elaine Kim to use 
Dictee, which Yu notes “presents itself at the precise point of rupture between the old 
and new paradigms,” as an Asian American text in her foreword to the 1992 collection 
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Reading the Literatures of Asian America  (114).  But then Dictee is not just a 
transnational text, it is also one of formal difficulty, or at least non-linearity and non-
narrativity.  So even if Dictee were initially meant to just broaden Asian American literary 
studies out of the borders of merely national literature, the text inevitably also introduces 
an aesthetic problem, lack of resolution, ambiguity, into Asian American literary criticism.  
! Not to say that the aesthetic is secondary to the transnational--indeed, Viet 
Thanh Nguyenʼs remarks on Dictee emphasize that its aesthetics, which he reads as a 
“refusal of the literary market,” are part of why this text is embraced by Asian American 
critics (Nguyen 153).  Dictee is not just a postcolonial text, it also embodies the 
“rigorous standards of politics and aesthetics” which “form the basis of an ideal 
countercanon.”  Because Dictee is difficult, we can see it as a text that doesnʼt just have 
a different, transnational subject matter, but that is itself different, uncompromisingly so.  
So that through this extreme form of difference, to Nguyen it “seems singularly willful 
and inflexible in its refusal to accommodate its audience,” Dicteeʼs difficulty makes the 
text, as a canonical work that has an implicit social value, embody difference.1  Thus, 
part of what Asian American studies sought when cultural nationalism fell into crisis was 
something hostile to understanding but still valuable, almost personal in its singularity--
that is, Asian American studies turned toward the aesthetic.  
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1 The question of what we mean by “canonical” in characterizing works as canonical to me suggests that 
we see these specially-marked works as bearing an excess value, in this case “difference.”  I explore the 
issue of canonicity more in “A Canon of Alterity: John Yauʼs Corpse and Mirror.”  in Positioning the New: 
Chinese American Literature and the Changing Image of the American Literary Canon. Eds. Tanfer Emin 
Tunc and Elisabetta Marino.  Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars, 2010. pp. 143-155.
Dictee and the Whitmanian
! What if Dictee is actually not difficult?  Nguyen summarizes Dictee in this way:  
“To the extent that Dictee can be said to be ʻaboutʼ anything, it is about the personal and 
historical experiences that have shaped Koreans and Korean Americans since the 
period of Japanese colonization” (153).  That Nguyen begins with a significant hedge 
suggests that to him summarizing Dictee is not easy, but more interestingly, this hedge 
implies that Dictee is not really about anything, and can only be made to seem to have 
some paraphrasable content to an “extent.”  But if Dictee doesnʼt really have obvious 
content, what if we read the form of Dictee as significant.  In that case, what we would 
observe is a nonsequential arrangement of thematically connected items, that 
articulates something about the intersection of the personal and historical, as Nguyen 
observes, though it does without an obvious narrative.  That description of Dictee, I 
would argue, sounds like Whitmanʼs 1855 Leaves of Grass as I discuss it in chapter 4.  
There, I claim that the Leavesʼ paratactic structure, in which sequential arrangement 
isnʼt necessary to give the poem coherence, results in the poemʼs ability to make 
something abstract, a multiplicity of experience that isnʼt bounded, concretely invoked in 
the person of the greatest poet--who the persona, “Whitman,” claims to become.  Dictee 
would actually repeat this general form of Leaves:  not only does it abandon a 
sequential organization, Cha also foregrounds the development of poetic utterance into 
a capacious discourse in the figure of the “diseuse.”  If Dictee can be read as being 
broadly Whitmanian, its status as a text of extreme difference, of being 
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uncompromisingly difficult, has to be rethought as fitting into an existing tradition, that of 
the lyric.2
! Such a claim might have sounded hopelessly conservative, say in the early 
1990s when Shelley Sunn Wongʼs essay in Writing Self, Writing Nation (1994) had to 
cast Wongʼs observation that Dictee critiques epic poetry with lyric poetry with a heavy 
qualification that Dictee contradicts “any effort to enshrine a mode of literary production 
traditionally premised on a single, unified, autonomous consciousness or identity--that 
of the lyric ʻIʼ” (Wong 117).  But itʼs safe to say that no one now seriously thinks of the 
lyric in those terms.3  Yet if Tim Yu is right in saying that “almost all critics focus on the 
bookʼs first half, particularly the opening and the ʻClio/Historyʼ and ʻCalliope/Epic Poetryʼ 
sections,” which are the more narrative sections filled with biography and history, then 
something about the lyric in Dictee remains curiously unexplored, except most notably 
by Wong and Yu, whose reading builds upon Wongʼs.   Yu argues that “what Dictée 
provides is not a means of choosing between experimental and Asian American 
methods of reading and writing,” what we might otherwise think of as lyric writing versus 
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Tim Yuʼs analysis ultimately suggests that part of the reason why Dictee is read by Asian American critics 
in terms of history and autobiography and not in terms of its experimentation with language is that 
3 Rei Terada, writing a short paper in the “Theories and Methodologies” section of PMLA summarizes 
some papers given at the 2006 MLA convention and notes:  “Pointing out the associations between lyric 
and other phenomena would be interesting in itself only if we normally believed that lyric was closed, and 
the papers show the present maturity of lyric studies by taking these connections for granted. In the 
earlier generation, it would indeed have been surprising to find papers undertaking these topics” (196).  In 
other words, present criticism focused on the lyric takes it for granted that the lyric “I” in Wongʼs sense is 
not what defines that genre.  
historical writing (Yu 122).4  Rather “Dictée shows us a way of keeping these two 
paradigms in productive tension.”  Yu may claim that his reading of Dictee is a both/and 
approach, but by the end of his chapter he notes that it is Dicteeʼs critique of language 
that “is crucial to finding a new kind of agency, one that can return again to the world of 
the present; only in language do we find” the basis of beginning again, what in Dictee is 
“a new kind of ʻhomeʼ” (Yu 136).  
# To say Dictee is a lyric, then, is to see its project as one of ultimately surpassing 
a solely historical determination, but not necessarily transcending it. So the kind of 
critique that a work like Dictee enables is a double refusal, against history and against 
transcendent individuality.  And while these rejections seem as though they result in a 
disabling negativity, I contend that negativity is actually the grounds for a stronger 
critique, stronger because instead of disavowing an incoherence between determination 
and freedom, that incoherence itself authorizes critique.  Admittedly, to think of critique 
in this way seems so abstract that what I propose might not intuitively seem critical, but 
then Dictee, if not the other works I claim as lyrics in this vein in the course of the 
dissertation, provides examples for what I mean.  
# A number of indeterminacies cluster around the section “Elitere/Lyric Poetry;” the 
most obvious is the substituted muse in the title, which according to Yunte Huang 
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4 Some critics of Dictee cite the title as Dictée, with an accent mark on the first “e.”  However, my edition 
of Dictee, the 2001 University of California Press edition, does not include the accent mark on the title or 
copyright pages.  I presume that the accent mark is an attempt to render the title correctly as a French 
word.  But then there is a rich tradition of understanding Dictee as critiquing the idea of translation, 
following from Lisa Loweʼs “Unfaithful to the Original,” an essay from Writing Self, Writing Nation that also, 
in Yuʼs words forms “the centerpiece of Loweʼs seminal 1996 book Immigrant Acts” (117).  Nguyen also 
omits the accent mark.  
shouldnʼt be “Elitere” but “Euterpe” (131).5  Why Cha seems to have invented a name 
for only this muse isnʼt clear, but Huang takes it as a deliberate mistake meant to 
emphasize the difficulty of separating fiction from documentation (Huang 132).  On the 
other hand, Wong speculates that Cha plays upon the words “elite” and “literare” in the 
name “as an oppositional gesture” (Wong 115).  Combining these two interpretations, 
Chaʼs invented title means that the literary is defined by an ambiguity between truth and 
falsehood.  That this point is made only with uncertainty through the textʼs own 
undecidability inscribes this interpretation into the act of reading this sectionʼs enigmatic 
title.  
" The title therefore plays out in miniature one almost trivial example of a lack, in 
this case a lack of explanation, enabling a kind of meaning that leaves itself open to its 
own refusal.  And if this doesnʼt tell us why Cha used “Elitere” instead of “Euterpe,” it 
does suggest her overall reading of what the lyric means.  First Cha attempts to 
frustrate sequence as the titles of the three poems that comprise this section show.  
What we get first is “Aller/Retour,” go and return, and then “Aller” and then “Retour.”  
Thus we begin with the synthesis and then go to each of the dialectic terms, suggesting 
that against a narrative expectation that the end bears the meaning of what comes 
before, Cha places that meaning at its most uncertain point, the beginning.  Additionally, 
by objecting to narrative, this section argues against not only the “Calliope/Epic” section 
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5 A second “indeterminacy” would be the image immediately following the title.  As Anne Anlin Cheng 
describes it, it is “an unidentified, grainy black-and-white photograph of a mass protest” that “Chaʼs 
private notes tell us […] documents the 1919 Korean Independence Movement demonstration” (Cheng 
143).  Cheng emphasizes the meaning of this image appearing without any documentation, essentially 
that Cha critiques the “facile mask of identification and sympathy” that a photograph enables (144).  But 
without critical apparatus, the image would have to be initially read as simply incoherent, registering a 
mystery.  
that Wong writes on, but also the “Clio/History” section.6  “Clio/History” is notable for its 
emphasis on bare duration as fact, for example while invoking Korean revolutionary 
martyr Yu Guan Soon, Cha here notes birth, death along with the so-obvious-as-to-be-
almost-parodic “She is born of one mother and one father” (25).  On history, Cha finally 
concludes on its simultaneous lostness and its self-transcendence in the form of 
metanarrative:
The memory is the entire.  The longing in the face of the lost.  Maintains 
the missing.  Fixed between the wax and wane indefinite not a sign of 
progress.  All else age, in time.  Except.  Some are without.  (38)
These terms, memory, waxing and waning, and time recur in “Elitere/Lyric,” but where 
earlier a melancholic lostness pervades historical thinking, under the lyric the 
unknowableness of history becomes the kind of lack thatʼs not simply empty, but 
productive.  
" “Aller” begins by invoking memory not in the sense of a fullness that is 
incomplete, but as something to actively forget:  
Discard. Every memory.  Of.
Even before they could.
Surge themselves.  Forgotten so, easily, 
not even as associations, (128)
Omitting what the memory is of in the first line enacts the kind of total erasure that the 
next lines go on to specify.  But then even as this act of erasure proceeds, it isnʼt in the 
end simply an absence.  A key transformation occurs further down the page:
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6 For Wongʼs discussion on Chaʼs strategy of opposing lyric to epic, see pp. 115-118 in Writing Self, 
Writing Nation.  
Now formless, no more a mould.
Make numb some vision some word some part
resembling part something else
pretend
not to see pretend not having seen the part.
What keeps the memory from actually ceasing to exist is something external to the 
memory itself, the sense faculty of sight which leads, via language, to part to part 
resemblance; from that minimal trace of memory, the bare possibility of resemblance, 
emerges its very opposite--total memory:
Start the next line.
Might have been.  Wanted to see it
Might have been.  Wanted to have seen it
to have it happen to have it happen before.  All of it.
Unexpected and then there
all over.  Each part.  Every part.  One at a time
one by one and missing none.  Nothing.
Forgetting nothing
Leaving out nothing.  (129)
Why simple resemblance leads inexorably to total presence has to do with what seems 
like a discontinuity in a poetics that is already very discontinuous, the line “Start the next 
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line.”7  Here Cha points up the paratactic structure of the poem in which its mere 
continuation, even without a discernible sequential structure, makes the poem seem 
coherent.  That coherence arises from the minimal part to part logic that exceeds total 
erasure in that if something however incomplete is simply there, a hypothetical 
connection is desired.  Hypothetical as in “Might have been;” and desired in “Wanted to 
see” or “have seen it.”  Therefore, what makes this kind of memory complete isnʼt its 
content--it is not that a form of memory exists that is omniscient.  Instead, just as the 
lack of memory is undermined from outside memory itself, the fullness of memory arises 
from that same outside.  One is tempted to see this external determinant as the reader, 
perhaps the readerʼs response as inscribed by the poem, based on Chaʼs use of vision 
to introduce paratactic connection.  But here vision doesnʼt correspond to some kind of 
penetrating insight, as in seeing through an incomplete erasure, but to its opposite:  
vision merely records an exteriority, a residue that persists on even whatʼs formless.  
" History, as Anne Anlin Chengʼs analysis of Dictee points out, canʼt be 
experienced since even to witness an event only emphasizes the eventʼs asymmetry to 
our own faculties.  “No one can be at the center of an ʻevent;ʼ its eventness is its 
historicity and therefore at some level it is unavailable to personal experience or 
possession” (Cheng 150).  In its obscurity, history becomes melancholic, especially 
considering how “Clio/History” broaches the possibility of recuperating the anticolonial, 
female revolutionary Yu Guan Soon as a mythic foundation for an oppositional identity.  
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7 This line echoes the much-commented upon translation exercise that opens Dictee--the most well 
known such comment is Lisa Loweʼs that occurs on pp. 38-42 in Writing Self, Writing Nation.  Just as 
when that earlier section shows a translation from French to English that too literally includes what seem 
to be verbal cues of punctuation, here what might be an inner cue to the poet or the reader is explicitly 
rendered.  
And thus, Dictee introduces a problematic critique of identity, inasmuch as identity is 
naturalized through a perception of genealogical continuity, which I might add, is also 
the underlying logic of race.  But to recognize the incommensurability of historical event 
to personal experience in Chengʼs account results in a kind of failed subjectivity that 
speaks to Dicteeʼs difficulty:  
We are allowed neither the complacency of spectatorship nor the 
consolation that bearing witness effects change.  In reading Dictée, our 
instinct is to re-compose all the time, to “correct,” to fact-check, to 
narrativize, to contextualize, to trace origins in this empire of signs.  Our 
compositional desires are constantly evoked, exposed, and thwarted.  
(150) 
Cheng here supposes that narrative and a completeness of context are what readers 
instinctually are drawn toward, but in the lyric, or so Dictee comes to suggest, the 
condition of not being able to apprehend history can be read not as failure, but as an 
obscurity, immediate in its sensibility, that makes narrative seem artificial and imposed.  
" Paratactic reading thus becomes the key to reconciling the problem of individual 
to history, which is also the problem of individual to race and individual to identity that 
forms the main critique of this dissertation.  Anne-Lise Francois describes paratactic 
reading as occurring in successive uses of “and” in a verse from Genesis:  “And Enoch 
walked with God; and he was not” (qtd in Francois 244).  Francois remarks that “the 
parataxis ʻand …/and …ʼ all but elides the difference, as well as the relation, between 
the two actions, so that in place of a sudden abruption and breach of presence, Enochʼs 
ʻnot beingʼ seems continuous with his walking with God, parallel to it” (245).  So then to 
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broaden Francoisʼs comments, what parataxis might do for Dictee is to replace the 
implicit singularity of narrative, in which whatever happens next makes what happens 
before vanish, with simultaneity.  
" In chapter 4, reading Dinh and Whitman, I argue that what their paratactic 
inclusiveness results in is a kind of Americanness without organs, and the connection of 
Whitman in 1855 to Dinh in the early 2000s is meant to suggest the applicability of this 
interpretation to work that derives from Whitman, the Whitmanian lyric.  Here I would 
broaden that conclusion to suggest that what the lyricʼs presentation of the fleeting or 
obscure suggests, especially as it comprises several moments, is again a kind of “Body 
without Organs.”  What the Body without Organs is not according to Deleuze and 
Guattari is “the sense of fragments in relation to a lost unity” that is, a vision of historical 
wholeness, “nor is there a return to the undifferentiated in relation to a differentiable 
totality.  There is a distribution of intensive principles of organs,” in the context of the 
lyric these would be apprehensible moments, “within a collectivity or 
multiplicity” (Deleuze and Guattari 164-5).  Itʼs that horizon of wholeness that results 
from the bare parallelism of more than one thing existing that is what I understand to be 
the Body without Organs, and what I therefore propose as a way to transform identity 
away from a definition to avow for political purposes, toward the mysterious and 
indistinct basis for relating that is inescapable.  That relating also forms the basis for a 
project of comparativism, in which no context ultimately is totalizing enough to close off 
the wholeness that the Body without Organs impossibly, and asymptotically, indicates.  
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